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Security, particularly data privacy, is one of the biggest barriers to the adop-
tion of Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) in Cloud Computing. Recent security
breaches demonstrate that a more powerful protection mechanism is needed to
protect data confidentiality from any honest-but-curious administrator. Typi-
cal prior e ort on addressing this security problem is either prohibitively slow
or highly restrictive in operation.
In this thesis, a novel cloud system architecture CypherDB, which makes
use of a secure processor, is proposed to protect the confidentiality of out-
sourced database processing. To achieve this, a framework is developed to
use these secure processors in the cloud for secure database processing. This
framework allows distributed and parallel processing of the encrypted data
and exhibits virtualization features in Cloud Computing. The CypherDB ar-
chitecture also relies on two major components to protect the privacy of an
outsourced database against any honest-but-curious administrator of high per-
formance.
Firstly, a novel database encryption scheme is developed to protect the out-
sourced database which can be executed under a CypherDB secure processor
with high performance. Our proposed scheme makes use of custom instructions
to hide the encryption latency from the program execution. This scheme is
extensively validated through an integration with SQLite, a practical database
application program.
Secondly, a novel secure processor architecture is also developed to pro-
vide architectural support to our proposed database encryption scheme and
e cient protection mechanism to secure all intermediate data generated on-
the-fly during query execution. The e ciency, robustness and the cost of our
novel processor architecture are validated and evaluated through extensive
simulations and implementation on a FPGA platform.
A fully-functional Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementa-
tion of our CypherDB secure processor and simulation studies demonstrate
that our proposed architecture is cost-e ective and of high performance. Our
experiment of running the TPC-H database benchmark on SQLite demon-
strates 10 to 14 percent performance overhead on average. The security com-
ponents in CypherDB consume about 21K Logic Elements and 54 Block RAMs
on the FPGA. The modification of SQLite only consists of 208 lines of code
(LOC).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud computing has become a popular computing model for o ering large-
scale data storage and intensive computations of large amounts of data in
a highly distributed manner. The e ect of the economies of scale and the
extensive use of parallel computing in the cloud results in a significant speed-
up of the outsourced computation at a very low cost, as compared to the
investment of deploying the same in-house computing infrastructure.
With the aforementioned advantages of Cloud Computing, it is attractive
to run a database on a cloud computing platform. In fact, there are already nu-
merous notable database vendors o ering cloud database services. The adop-
tion rate is high and is expected to rise. A survey from Tesora [3] shows that
68 percent of enterprises are using database technology in the cloud. Another
survey from 451 Research [4] also indicates an expected increase in the overall
adoption of cloud database services.
However, as indicated in these two surveys [3, 4], one of the biggest barriers
to the adoption of cloud database services is the security concern, which ranked
highest with 60 percent of the respondents in [3]. A global security study [5]
also indicates that more than half of the participants rated data security as
their major consideration of storing their data in a cloud. In [6], over 70
percent of the respondents rated security as their most important concern.
Most importantly, these security concerns are realistic. The Online Trust
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Alliance (OTA) [7] reported that over 740 million records were exposed in
2013. A security breach in Google [8] shows that any server administrator
with access to the confidential information can abuse it at ease. An even
worse issue is that any honest-but-curious server administrator is capable of
performing massive breaches of privacy without being detected.
Assuring data security in Cloud Computing is thus of utmost importance
for rapid adoption of cloud database services. In a broad sense, data security
includes confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data itself. Confiden-
tiality is the ability to hide the content of the data from unauthorized parties.
Integrity is to protect the data from being modified by unauthorized parties.
Availability is to ensure the accessibility of the data to authorized parties when
needed. Our research focus is on protecting the data confidentiality.
One obvious solution to protect data confidentiality is by encryption. For
example, Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) [9] provides encryption
services to encrypt the storage data (data-at-rest encryption). Similarly, Mi-
crosoft Azure SQL Database uses Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) [10] to
encrypt database files at rest. However, current security solutions employed in
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) are still insu cient due to the following reasons:
• The decryption keys are stored in the cloud server. Although a mul-
titude of approaches are used to protect the decryption keys at cloud
servers through software protection or a compact o -chip hardware se-
curity module [11]), it turns out that attackers can eventually break in
using sophisticated software attacks [12, 13] or hardware attacks [14, 15].
• The data are only encrypted at rest where only the data in storage are
protected. The encrypted data have to be decrypted and stored in the
server memory before any query processing. In some cases, the hackers
who manage to get administrative access to the servers [16] or the curious
administrators [17] can gain access to all the unprotected data or even
the decryption keys.
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To tackle these security issues, a protection mechanism to secure the de-
cryption key and protect the confidentiality of decrypted data in memory is
needed.
There have been many proposed solutions. One interesting solution is to
use homomorphic encryption [18–21], which permits computation on encrypted
data without receiving the decryption key. As the decryption key is not dis-
closed and the encrypted data is never decrypted, it can successfully secure
the data in the Cloud. However, these approaches are either prohibitively slow
[18, 19] or highly restrictive in arithmetic operations [20, 21]. Alternatively, the
decryption key and the decrypted data can still be stored in the cloud server
but within a self-contained and tamper-resistant co-processor [22, 23]. Such an
approach requires an extra processing system which usually has low computa-
tional power and is expensive. Lastly, the computer architecture community
has proposed a secure processor approach [24–28] which stores the decryption
key in the main processor and provides a mechanism to protect the data in
o -chip memory. Nevertheless, these approaches initially target Digital Right
Management (DRM) and portable devices which protect the application pro-
gram and data as a whole. This highly prohibits dynamic data movement and
parallel processing in the cloud computing environment. How to make use of
a secure processor to protect data confidentially in the cloud computing en-
vironment, especially with regard to securing cloud database services, is still
largely unknown and remains a significant challenge.
To be applicable to the practical cloud computing environment, the protec-
tion mechanism needs to address a number of challenging issues. In the first
place, this protection mechanism should be able to secure the decryption key
and protect the confidentiality of the decrypted data. It is equally important
that this mechanism has to be economical and e cient to be of practical use.
Trading security for performance [29] would be of less practical use because it
leaves the users a burden to manage their own risks. Last but not least, the
3
protection mechanism has to preserve the characteristics of cloud computing
so as to make cloud database services beneficial, as compared to traditional
local database server approaches.
This thesis proposes a novel cloud system architecture called CypherDB
[30, 31], which takes one step further to investigate the possibility and, most
importantly, practicability of using a secure processor to protect cloud database
services. We develop a cost-e ective protection mechanism that can secure an
outsourced database being executed in a cloud computing environment with
high performance. We also extend the role of secure processor to secure cloud
database services through a novel encryption scheme and processor architec-
tural re-design.
1.1 Database-as-a-Service
To provide Database-as-a-Service, a cloud service provider not only provides
hardware resources to store the database and host the application software
but also the Database Management System (DBMS) to provide query services
and data management to the database owner. The database owner is able to
remotely create a database in the cloud and query, update or delete it later.
These operations can be done via simple data exchange or query statements
through some standard web consoles so that the database owner can access her
database anytime and anywhere with an Internet connection. In the cloud, the
database can be partitioned and stored in geographically separate data centres.
There are also multiple computing nodes that are able to access the distributed
database and are designed for providing query services. Although a complex
architecture and operations are required to query the distributed database,
this is completely hidden and abstracted from the database owner. In other
words, the database owner has no knowledge of how her database is stored and
what operation is performed on the database. The database owner can query
the database as if it is stored on a single server.
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Most cloud database workloads can be categorized into online transaction
processing (OLTP) or online analytical processing (OLAP). OLTP is charac-
terized by a large number of update-intensive online transactions (insert, delete
or update records in databases) that are typically used to facilitate and man-
age usual business applications. The queries involved are usually short and
simple. The e ectiveness of an OLTP is measured by the number of transac-
tions per second. OLAP is, on the contrary, characterized by a relatively low
volume of transactions but a large number of read-intensive operations that
are usually used to retrieve data for data mining and decision support appli-
cations. The queries involved are often very complex and involve aggregation.
OLAP’s e ectiveness is measured by response time. In this thesis, we are
particularly interested to investigate our proposed secure processor approach
towards OLAP workload that is currently poorly supported by some existing
solutions using homomorphic encryption.
1.2 Threat Model
We assume the CSP in our model is honest-but-curious [32]. In general, it
obeys any communication protocol agreed with the database owner and deploys
database operations correctly. Any detectable tampering can be protected
by a contractual agreement between them. However, this cannot protect any
passive attack leaving no trace on the system (i.e. read/copy data from storage
disk, main memory or probe processor-to-memory data bus). The goal of an
adversary is to read the content of the database without being detected. In
summary, we consider the following threats and assumptions:
• An adversary can launch a malicious process or Virtual Machine (VM)
or even get access to the Operating System (OS) layer to copy or read
the data in o -chip memory. Simple memory bus probing to read the
data in processor-to-memory tra c is also possible.
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• The communication channels between the database owner and secure
server or among secure servers and secure nodes are all open and subject
to eavesdropping.
• The DBMS is assumed to be securely booted by employing secure boot
technology (e.g. Bastion [33], TPM [11]). Run-time Execution Validator
[34] can also be employed to ensure that the DBMS is running as ex-
pected. Code injection attack is therefore not considered in this thesis
and is assumed that this attack can be tackled by the aforementioned
techniques.
• Side-channel attacks such as timing-attack or power-analysis attack are
not considered in this paper because these attacks are prohibitively costly
to implement in a typical data centre environment. Indeed, to launch
these attacks, the attacker needs to breach the physical security of the
data centre and this is highly unlikely to happen. Any hardware tam-
pering on the processor is also assumed to be infeasible in the cloud
environment.
1.3 Research Objectives
In the design of our protection mechanism for securing cloud database ser-
vice, we address four fundamental aspects: security, performance, cost and
deployment in the cloud. These four aspects are elaborated below.
Security. We have designed a robust protection mechanism to secure the
decryption key and decrypted data during query processing in cloud database
services. In our system, the decryption key is never disclosed in any circum-
stance and used data are always protected by encryption in system memory
so that the confidentiality of the data is always protected from any adver-
sary with administrative access. Our proposed system not only protects the
database data, but also any intermediate data generated on-the-fly during
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query processing.
Performance. The protection mechanism is of high performance. By high
performance we mean the overhead on the query execution time is minimal.
The overhead mainly comes from encrypting and decrypting the data for se-
curity purposes. Our design aims to reduce this overhead using architectural
techniques. Our design objective is to have a performance close to optimal.
By optimal performance we mean to have the query execution time close to
that without any data protection.
Cost. The protection mechanism has to be cost-e ective to be applica-
ble in practice. By cost-e ective we mean the extra hardware/software re-
sources and memory storage are minimal and reasonable while maintaining
high-performance query execution in cloud database services. Our proposed
solution aims to optimize the architectural design for e ective query execution
over encrypted data at minimal cost.
Deployment in the cloud. We have designed a protection mechanism that
can suit the cloud computing environment. In particular, the encrypted data
can move dynamically in the cloud for parallel processing. Our design objec-
tive is to maintain the five essential characteristics [35] of Cloud Computing
according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) def-
inition. The five characteristics are on-demand self-service, broad network
access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service.
1.4 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, CypherDB is the first to use a processor architec-
tural design to successfully protect remote operation on encrypted databases
against any honest-but-curious administrator. Our main contributions are
summarized as follows:
• System Architecture: We have developed a framework that can use a
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secure processor in cloud database services. A protocol is designed for
the cloud database users to request a secure query execution in our pro-
posed system and architecture. The impact of this architecture toward
virtualization is also qualitatively discussed.
• Database Encryption Scheme: We have developed a novel encryption
scheme to protect databases which can be executed under our secure pro-
cessor with high performance. The proposed encryption scheme requires
custom instruction support and minor modification of the database appli-
cation program. The encryption scheme is validated through an integra-
tion to SQLite1 and is proven to be robust through extensive simulation
and execution on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) platform.
• Secure processor architecture: We have developed a secure processor ar-
chitecture to 1) provide architectural support for our proposed database
encryption scheme, and 2) provide an e cient protection mechanism,
based on cache line encryption [36], to protect all intermediate data gen-
erated on-the-fly during query execution. The e ciency, robustness and
the cost of our novel processor architecture are validated and evaluated
through extensive simulation and implementation on the FPGA.
• FPGA implementation2: We have implemented our proposed secure pro-
cessor on a FPGA platform. There are three key advantages of our FPGA
implementation. Firstly, the implementation forces the architecture de-
sign to be complete. It further enables us to discuss some practical
issues of the secure processor implementation. Secondly, it can evalu-
ate the cost of the design by measuring the resource consumption in the
FPGA. Lastly, it enables us to evaluate our proposed solution over a large
database on a FPGA platform, which is prohibitively slow to run in sim-
1The modified SQLite program, written in C, is available at https://github.com/
hkbonychen/CypherDB-SQLite.git
2The FPGA implementation, written in Verilog, is available at https://github.com/
hkbonychen/CypherDB-FPGA.git
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ulations. This thesis provides an accurate and comprehensive evaluation
of our proposed encryption scheme and secure processor architecture.
1.5 List of Publications
• B. H. K. Chen, P. Y. S. Cheung, P. Y. K. Cheung, and Y. K. Kwok,
“Cypherdb: A novel architecture for outsourcing secure database pro-
cessing,” IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 2016, accepted for
publication and to appear.
• B. H. K. Chen, P. Y. S. Cheung, P. Y. K. Cheung, and Y. Kwok, “An
e cient architecture for zero overhead data en-/decryption using recon-
figurable cryptographic engine,” in Proceeding of 2015 International Con-
ference on Field Programmable Technology, 2015, pp. 248–251.
1.6 Organization of the Thesis
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss some
background information that is related to our work and assists readers to
better understand it. In Chapter 3, we provide a literature review of earlier
research work and existing solutions that are relevant to our work. We also
provide a detailed comparison of our proposed solution with these prior work.
In Chapter 4, we present an overview of CypherDB cloud system architecture
and discuss the framework for deploying secure processors in cloud database
services. In Chapter 5, we present our novel look-ahead encryption scheme
and qualitatively discuss its security and performance impact. In Chapter 6,
we present our secure processor architecture. We first present a scrutiny of the
processor execution profile of a database application. This scrutiny motivates
our processor architectural design. We then present the architectural design
to support our look-ahead encryption scheme and the protection of interme-
diate data generated during query processing. In Chapter 7, we first present
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our implementation of our secure processor on the FPGA and then describe
our modification on SQLite to support our look-ahead encryption scheme. In
Chapter 8, we present our evaluation of our proposed scheme and secure pro-
cessor design in simulations and execution on a FPGA platform. In Chapter 9,
we conclude the thesis and discuss some future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents some basic background knowledge on three aspects:
Database as-a-Service, Processor architecture and Cryptography. These three
aspects are individually a huge topic to be described in detail such that we
may not be able to cover them all in this thesis. Instead, this chapter intends
to discuss some of this background information that can facilitate the under-
standing of readers in regard to the work reported in this thesis. We first
discuss the model and architecture of cloud database services. We then intro-
duce the processor architecture on which the database management system is
running. Finally, we describe the cryptography that is employed in this thesis.
2.1 Database-as-a-Service
To provide DBaaS, a DBMS has to be installed into the cloud server to man-
age the database. We first discuss the deployment model of the DBMS in
this section. We will then go through the database system from data model,
schema design and database query to the architecture of distributed databases,
database fragmentation and query decomposition in cloud database models.
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2.1.1 Deployment Model
There are numerous notable database vendors o ering cloud database ser-
vices, which is mainly in one of these two deployment models: VM image or
Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS). In the first deployment approach, the DBMS
is installed and run on a VM. Users can upload the VM image (with a DBMS
installed) to the cloud. The CSP is responsible for the infrastructure support
while the users have to perform database management and administration.
In the DBaaS approach, the DBMS is installed on the host computer in the
cloud. The users only need to request and pay for the service while the CSP
is responsible for all the management and administration work. While each
deployment model has its own benefits and drawbacks, it is shown in [37] that
consolidation in logical databases is much more cost-e ective and performance
e cient than the “DB-in-a-VM” approach. Recently, the Oracle pluggable
database [38] also adopted logical database consolidation to provide DBaaS.
Our research focus is thus on the DBaaS deployment model.
2.1.2 Relational Data Model
Cloud databases can be stored in one of these two data models: Structured
Query Language (SQL) databases or Non SQL (NoSQL) databases. SQL
databases organize the data in its relational model, where the data are stored
in columns and rows. On the contrary, NoSQL databases organize the data
in non-relational model. Although NoSQL can scale better in a cloud envi-
ronment, it is still disputable as to whether SQL or NoSQL databases are
more suitable and e cient for cloud computing [39]. However, SQL databases
are still the most commonly used data model nowadays [40]. Our research
therefore targets on SQL database rather than NoSQL databases.
The relational model is the most common data organization in SQL databases.
It organizes data into collections of two-dimensional tables as shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. Attribute refers to a column while tuple/record refers to a row in a
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table. Attribute data are a cell/entry in a specific column and row. A database
usually contains a collection of tables.
Figure 2.1: The organization of a two-dimensional table in the relational data model
A relational database is designed to have a profound e ect on how easy the
data can be accessed and managed. To connect multiple tables together, each
record has a unique identifier that serves two major purposes: 1)it facilitates
the process of locating a correct record upon request and 2) links records in
a table to records in other tables which can obtain and integrate information
from multiple tables. Relationships are a logical connection between di erent
tables. Depending on the design strategy, connection of tables can be in the
form of either a one-to-one, or a one-to-many relationship.
2.1.3 Database Three Schema Concept
The aim of three schema concepts is to separate each user’s view of a database
from the way it is physically represented by abstracting the underlying layer
with a new schema on top. Starting from the bottom layer as depicted in
Figure 2.2, physical schema pertains to the actual storage of data and its
form of storage like files, indices, etc. It presents the storage location of an
attribute in a memory page. Logical schema defines the structure of a table
and relationships in the database. External schema is simply the user’s view of
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the database. In relational databases, it is common that the external schema
is the same as the logical schema.
Figure 2.2: The database three schema model
2.1.4 Database Query
To extract data from the outsourced database, the database owner can send a
query to the cloud for data lookup or modification. A query is simply a state-
ment requesting either retrieval or modification of information. In database
languages, data definition language (DDL) is used to specify a database schema
and data manipulation language (DML) enables the database owner to access
or manipulate data. Among the various query languages, Structured Query
Language (SQL) is the dominating well-known standard for expressing lan-
guage. We will therefore describe six di erent kinds of queries (CREATE
TABLE, DROP, SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE) in SQL format.
CREATE TABLE and DROP statement is DDL language that is used to
establish a new table or abandon an existing table. To create a table, the
statement has to describe the scheme of the table – the set of column name
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and data type. Dropping a table is easier by specifying the table name only.
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE statements are DML language
that requires data manipulation. INSERT and DELETE statements are used
to add or remove records from a table. UPDATE statement is to modify
attribute data from a record. SELECT statement is able to retrieve selected
data that match the criteria specified in the statement. A brief description of
the queries and the corresponding formats are shown in Table 2.1. Readers are
also referred to [41] for the detailed syntax and usage of the SQL statements.
Table 2.1: Description of the format of SQL queries. The basic syntax of the queries
is bolded.
Query Query format and description
CREATE CREATE TABLE [table name] ([column definitions])
DROP DROP TABLE [table name]
SELECT
SELECT [column names] FROM [table name] WHERE
[conditions]GROUP BY [column name]ORDER BY [col-
umn name]
INSERT INSERT INTO [table name] VALUE ([values])
UPDATE UPDATE [table name] SET [VALUES] WHERE [condi-tions]
DELETE DELETE FROM [table name] WHERE [conditions]
2.1.5 Distributed Database
As the database grows huge, it is impossible to store the entire database in
one single storage device due to hardware constraints and it is also ine cient
to use one single server to query a huge database. A distributed database sys-
tem allows a database to be partitioned/fragmented into multiple databases
of smaller size. Each of these small databases is connected to an individual
computing node so that the database is managed in a distributed manner.
By storing the partitioned database in multiple nodes, it not only relieves the
hardware burden of having an extremely large storage device and powerful
server but also makes it more e cient because the partitioned database is
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now much smaller to be processed and such processing can be massively per-
formed in parallel. These advantages however come at the expense of a more
complicated system architecture and database synchronization.
Architecture
In a distributed database system, all application servers and storage nodes
are connected to each other as shown in Figure 2.3. The application server
possesses a global view of all the partitioned data belonging to the database
owner. When the database owner talks to the application server using SQL
language, the application server can draft an optimal solution to decompose the
query into sub-queries and distribute the sub-queries workload to local storage
nodes to which the related databases are connected. Each storage node has a
local DBMS installed to perform the sub-query execution. The result of each
sub-query execution in each storage node is then sent to the corresponding
application server to combine and join the data together in order to produce
the final query output to the database owner.
Database Fragmentation
A table can be fragmented into several tables so that the original table can
be reconstructed from the fragments. The fragments, as stated above, are
scattered and stored in di erent geographically separated storage nodes. There
are basically two schemes of fragmentation: 1) horizontal fragmentation that
splits the table by assigning records to di erent fragments and 2) vertical
fragmentation that divides the table by splitting the columns. Because vertical
fragmentation requires a more complicated strategy to split and combine the
fragments afterwards, we consider horizontal fragmentation as our case study
in this thesis.
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Figure 2.3: The architecture of a distributed database system
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Query Decomposition
Query decomposition and rewriting are necessary when the application server
needs to distribute the query workload to local storage nodes. Because it
remains a huge topic in database systems, the detailed theory and technique
will not be discussed in this thesis. Instead, we use a simple example to
describe query decomposition and rewriting in distributed databases as shown
in Figure 2.4.
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 2.4: An example showing the concept of query decomposition: (a) Query
statement for illustration; (b) Relational algebra of the query statement; (c) One of
the query decomposition plans in a distributed database system
The aim of query decomposition is to convert a high-level query into a re-
lational algebraic query so as to rewrite the query and find an optimized query
plan. Consider a SELECT query as shown in Figure 2.4(a). The query can be
decomposed into relational algebra as shown in Figure 2.4(b). This includes a
join operator to collect the set of records in S and E that are equal on the com-
mon attribute name “number”, a select operator to filter the records with the
attribute “hours” larger than 10, and a project operator to unify all attribute
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“name” from the filtered records. Figure 2.4(c) shows the corresponding query
plan in a distributed database. Assume database S and E are partitioned into
S1, S2 and E1, E2 respectively. The select operation is first pushed to the
storage nodes having S1 and S2 to filter the record that has attribute “hour”
larger than 10. Then the filtered records are sent to other storage nodes con-
taining E1 and E2 for further join operation. After the join operation, the
resulting filtered records are then unified for project operation.
2.2 Processor Architecture
The DBMS of each computing node in a cloud database system has to be
executed on the underlying hardware. The first step to understand how this
works is to realize the memory addressing model which outlines the method
of converting a piece of software into a memory model that the processor can
execute. We will then describe the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) that
is an interface of the processor and the memory model so that the software
program converted in this memory model can be executed in the processor.
Finally, we will describe the architectural model of the processor which serves
as the fundamental hardware system that performs the actual execution.
2.2.1 Memory Addressing Model
Although a DBMS consists of a number of complicated software layers, these
software layers are eventually compiled into a fragment of machine codes and
some static data to be executed on a computing platform. These machine
codes are stored in memory, which can be presented in its virtual addressing
space as shown in Figure 2.5. Apart from these codes and data, the remaining
memory space will be statically allocated as a stack or dynamically allocated
as a heap to be used during program execution. During execution, database
data are most likely to be stored in heap memory and will be accessed in
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accordance with the program execution.
Figure 2.5: The DBMS program and run-time allocated memory in virtual memory
addressing space. This will be translated into physical memory addressing space
during actual execution.
This virtual addressing space is provided by the operating system so that
the actual physical memory space can be abstracted from the programmer.
Eventually, the program and data have to be stored in the physical memory
space that is the actual physical memory location in the o -chip memory. A
page table, managed by the operating system, is thus used to store the virtual-
to-physical memory address translation. During the execution, the program
executes the code according to the virtual memory addressing space while this
will be translated to the physical memory addressing space by the operating
system in run-time.
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2.2.2 ISA architecture
The compiled program (ready-to-be-executed code) stored in the main mem-
ory is in the form of machine codes that consist of a sequence of commands.
These commands are known as instructions, which are the basic elements to
communicate with a processor and act as an interface between a computer’s
software and hardware. An instruction consists of an op-code and operands.
The structure and format of the op-code and operands varies among di erent
processor architectures. The format and organization of an instruction is re-
ferred to ISA. There are mainly two types of ISA: 1) complex instruction set
architecture (CISC) and 2) reduced instruction set architecture (RISC). CISC
involves many specialized instructions, some of which may only be rarely used
in practical programs. Its structure is usually more complex than RISC. On
the other hand, instruction of RISC has a much simpler structure. The idea of
RISC is to optimize the processor architecture for processing some frequently
used instructions, while the less common operations are implemented as sub-
routines. Because RISC is simpler and is used throughout our implementation,
we discuss the detail of RISC instruction structure and format. In particular,
ISA of MIPS architecture is used as an illustrative example.
RISC instruction consists of two components, namely op-code and operands.
An op-code specifies the operation to be performed while operand specifies the
data that the op-code will process. MIPS instructions fall into three categories:
R-type, I-type, and J-type.
R-type instructions refer to register-type instructions where the format
and semantic is shown as Equation 2.1. The processor performs operations as
specified in op-code on the value stored in $rs and $rt and stores the operation
result in $rd.
opcode $rd,$rs,$rt (2.1)
I-type instructions refer to immediate-type instructions where the format and
semantic is shown as Equation 2.2. The processor performs operations as
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specified in op-code according to the value stored in $rs and the value indicated
in immed and stores the operation result in $rt.
opcode $rd,$rs,$rt (2.2)
J-type instructions refer to jump-type instructions where the format and se-
mantic is shown as Equation 2.3. PC is the program counter that stores the
current address of the instruction being executed. Jump-type instructions up-
date the PC with the value specified in the target.
opcode target (2.3)
2.2.3 Architectural Model
A processor consists of three major sub-systems, including processor core,
cache memory system and memory management unit. A simplified proces-
sor architecture is shown in Figure 2.6.
The processor core is responsible for executing the instructions. It involves
a 5-stage pipeline to fetch the instruction from memory (fetch stage), decode
the instruction to figure out the operation and data involved (decode stage),
perform arithmetic operations on the data (execution stage), load/store the
data from/to the memory (memory stage) and write back the result of the
arithmetic operation to the destination register (write-back stage).
The cache memory is used to reduce the average cost of loading the data
from o -chip memory to the processor core for processing. It is a small and
fast on-chip memory which stores frequently used data from o -chip memory.
Most processors have multiple levels of cache that form a hierarchy of cache
levels. The first-level cache is usually split into separate data and instruction
cache while other higher levels consist of a larger and unified cache. There
are two di erent cache architectures, namely write-through and write-back
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Figure 2.6: A simplified processor architecture showing the major components which
include core, cache memory system and memory management unit
cache. In write-through cache, every write (store) to the cache causes a write
to the o -chip memory. In write-back cache, a write (store) to the cache is not
immediately written to the o -chip memory. Instead, the cache containing the
data being written over is marked as dirty. The dirty cache line is written back
to the o -chip memory only when it has to be evicted from the processor.
The memory management unit is responsible for the translation of virtual
memory address to physical address. It consists of a small and fast on-chip
memory but it is, unlike cache memory which is used to store data, used to
store the virtual-to-physical memory translation table and is called translation
look-aside bu er (TLB). Similar to the idea of cache memory, it is used to store
the virtual-to-physical memory page table on-chip so that the translation can
be performed instantly without spending time on accessing the page table
entries in o -chip memory.
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2.3 Cryptography: Encryption
Cryptography is used to construct a protocol that can prevent third parties or
the public from tampering with private messages. An adversary can tamper
with a private message through various methods such as eavesdropping the
communication channel, modifying the messages, etc. In this thesis, we will
focus on using encryption to protect the confidentiality of data as discussed in
Chapter 1. There are two major encryption methods: symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy and asymmetric-key cryptography, each of which has its own advantages
and disadvantages. We will show a practical use of combining these two en-
cryption methods for Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and describe a
mechanism of using digital signatures to authenticate and protect the integrity
of a message.
2.3.1 Symmetric-key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography uses the same cryptographic keys (K) for both
encryption of plaintext1 (D) and decryption of ciphertext2 (C). The symmetric-
key encryption function (Enc) takes the cryptographic keys and plaintext (or
ciphertext) as inputs to compute the ciphertext (or plaintext) as the output.
This can be seen from the following equations:
Encryption :C = Enc(D,K) (2.4)
Decryption : D= Enc(C,K) (2.5)
There are two categories of encryption algorithm, namely stream ciphers
and block ciphers. Stream ciphers (e.g. one-time-pad) are based on generating
an “infinite” cryptographic keystream (K) to encrypt the data (D) one bit
at a time. There is a strict requirement of the keystream that it has to be
1Plaintext refers to original data without encryption.
2Ciphertext refers to the data after encryption.
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random and never be reused. This usually requires the length of keystream to
be almost identical to the length of the data to be encrypted. Block ciphers
(e.g. AES, DES, Blowfish) work on larger chunks of data (i.e. blocks) at a
time. The encryption function usually takes a block of data and applies the
same cryptographic key (unlike stream cipher that requires an “infinite” long
keystream) to encrypt the data. The encryption function itself involves key-
dependent permutation of values and is composed of di erent chaining modes
of operation that makes it secure even though the same cryptographic key is
used on di erent blocks of data.
The cryptographic keys (K) represent a shared secret between two or more
parties. They must be identical to encrypt and decrypt the plaintext and ci-
phertext so that the same value can be retrieved from the encryption algorithm.
This secret key also represents a critical secret in any symmetric-key encryp-
tion which means a private and secure channel has to be set up to exchange
this shared secret key for symmetric-key cryptography. Although there are
few block cipher approaches that are proven to be fast and e cient in encryp-
tion and decryption, the requirement that both parties have to share the same
secret key is one of the main disadvantages of symmetric-key cryptography.
2.3.2 Public-key Cryptography
Public-key cryptography (a.k.a. asymmetric cryptography) is designed to over-
come the weakness of symmetric cryptography because the secret key does not
need to be shared in this cryptographic system. It uses a pair of keys: public
key (PK) that is not a critical secret and can be disseminated widely and a
private key (SK) which is a critical secret known only to the owner. To encrypt
a message (D), any person can encrypt it using the public key of the receiver
using an appropriate public encryption function (EPK). RSA and ElGamal
are some typical algorithms of Public-key cryptography. This encrypted mes-
sage (or ciphertext) (C) can only be decrypted with the receiver’s private key
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(SK) using the same encryption function but with SK as the cryptographic key
(ESK). This can be seen from the following equations:
Encryption :C = EPK(D) (2.6)
Decryption : D= ESK(C) (2.7)
The security of the public-key cryptographic system relies on a mathe-
matical problem that there is currently no e cient solution to solve without
knowing the private key. This mathematical problem usually involves integer
factorization, discrete logarithm and elliptic curve relationships which requires
complex computation. It is therefore computationally ine cient and is usually
used only for small blocks of data. One practical use of public key cryptography
is key encapsulation. Key encapsulation is an encryption technique designed to
make hybrid use of symmetric and asymmetric encryption so as to take advan-
tage of the fast encryption of symmetric cryptography and without the need to
set up a private and secure channel for secret key exchange in asymmetric cryp-
tography. In general, the data are encrypted using symmetric cryptography
while its secret key is further encrypted using asymmetric encryption. In other
words, the private and secure channel is setup via asymmetric cryptography.
2.3.3 Digital Signature
Public key cryptography is not only used to encrypt the data to protect con-
fidentiality, but also used to sign digital signatures (Sig(M)) to authenticate
a digital message (M). Authentication can prevent man-in-the-middle attack
where an adversary uses a forged message to replace the original one. To sign
a digital signature, the user uses the private key (SK) to encrypt the message
(M) so as to generate a digital certificate. Any person can use the correspond-
ing public key (PK) to decrypt the signature and verify that the signature
(Sig(M)) is indeed from the one with the proper private key.
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Digital signature is often used in conjunction with a cryptographic hash
function to protect the integrity of the message. A cryptographic hash function
is a one-way function that maps data of arbitrary size to a fixed size bit string.
It is infeasible to find two di erent messages with the same hash value and also
computationally infeasible to generate the input message from its hash value.
These properties favour the protection of the integrity of the message. As a
result, a typical way to authenticate a message is first hashing the message
with a cryptographic hash function, then generating a digital signature of the
hashed value using public key cryptography. It is as illustrated in Figure 2.7(a).
To create a digitally signed message, the message (M) is first hashed using
a cryptographic hash function to generate a bit string. The hashed value
(Hash(M)) will then be encrypted using the private key (ESK(hash(M))) to
create a signature. By combining the original message (M) and the digital
signature, a digitally signed message (Sig(M)) can be generated.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: The mechanism of (a) creating a digitally signed message and (b) veri-
fying the received digitally signed message
To verify the digitally signed message, the verifier reverses the procedure of
creating Sig(M). On one hand, the message (M0) contained in Sig(M) is hashed
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and waits for further verification. On the other hand, the signature contained
in Sig(M) is decrypted using the corresponding public key (EPK(signature))
and the hashed value (Hash(M)) obtained is computed during the creation of
Sig(M). By comparing these two hashed values, the verifier can ensure the
integrity of the message.
Under this protection mechanism, an adversary is unable to forge the mes-
sage (M) because of the cryptographically hashed value. An adversary can also
forge the message and also hashed value but it is also forbidden with the use
of a digital signature because the signature cannot be forged without knowing
the private key SK.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
As discussed in Chapter 1, the goal of our research is to protect the confiden-
tiality of outsourced data against any honest-but-curious adversary. In this
chapter we survey some earlier research work and existing solutions that are
relevant to our work. This chapter covers three separate approaches taken in
the relevant prior works.
The first approach is to use homomorphic encryption [18, 20, 21, 42–44]
throughout the system. As homomorphic encryption allows computation to be
carried out directly on the ciphertext without prior decryption, this approach
provides a pure software solution to secure the outsourced data processing
against the curious-but-honest adversary model. This solution can be pro-
cessed on existing available hardware without any modification or addition.
The use of commodity hardware security features [11, 22, 23, 45, 46] to
provide enhanced data security is then considered. Such an approach poten-
tially o ers stronger security and higher performance when compared to the
software-based approach. At the same time, it employs existing hardware secu-
rity features and minimizes or even avoids hardware modifications to existing
commodity systems. Potentially it o ers an economical solution to the data
security problem. Nevertheless, whether such commodity systems are able to
provide su cient security support to guard against attacks on outsourced data
is investigated and examined.
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Lastly the use of dedicated novel hardware architectures [24–27, 33, 47–51]
to improve the security of a general-purpose computing platform is considered.
These solutions move the root of trust to the processor chip and modify the
processor architecture in order to better secure the data and the system as a
whole. Our solution mainly focuses on architectural support towards secure
data outsourcing. Although some of these techniques do not directly address
the problem of securing outsourced data processing, our proposed solution can
leverage and build upon these techniques.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
The advantage of homomorphic encryption is that it allows computations to be
performed directly on the ciphertext. As a result, the encrypted data can be
processed without any information leakage. The result from such computation
is a new ciphertext, which can be later decrypted (with a proper decryption
key) by the user to recover the result in plaintext. In general, such encryp-
tion technique can be categorized into either fully or partially homomorphic
encryption.
3.1.1 Fully homomorphic encryption
Fully homomorphic encryption [18] can evaluate an arbitrary number of ad-
ditions and multiplications (and thus any operation) on encrypted data. It
is an excellent way to protect the confidentiality of outsourced data in Cloud
Computing. The data owner can encrypt their sensitive data and send them
out to the cloud. The encrypted data can be manipulated on the remote ma-
chine without any information leakage to the cloud administrator or a third-
party. The result can then be sent back to the data owner, who recovers the
results through the use of the secret decryption key. Because the data are
never decrypted in the cloud, its privacy is fully protected. However, fully
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homomorphic encryption su ers from a serious problem: the computation is
prohibitively slow [52], which makes it impractical to use. Subsequent research
attempts to use fully homomorphic encryption for secure data processing [19]
also incurs unacceptable computational overheads.
3.1.2 Partially homomorphic encryption
Due to the impracticality of fully homomorphic encryption, partially homo-
morphic encryption is used as an alternative to secure outsourced data with-
out compromising much on performance. Although partially homomorphic
encryption is much more e cient in terms of computation, it can only sup-
port limited operations (either addition or multiplication but not both). For
example, Paillier encryption [42] can only support addition of actual value by
multiplying the encrypted data. ElGamal encryption [43] is multiplicatively
homomorphic so that multiplication on ciphertext is equivalent to that on
plaintext. In some cases, security is traded for e ciency. For instance, Order
Preserving Encryption (OPE) [44] preserves the order of plaintext after en-
cryption. It can strongly facilitate order comparison operation but it leaks the
order in the first place.
Because there are limited operations supported by partially homomorphic
encryption, a natural solution is to leverage its best computational capability
to extract a subset of encrypted data and then o oad it to the data owner
for the remaining computation. Prior work [53] proposed to partition the
encrypted database into buckets and augment them with indices. Querying
the outsourced database results in extracting buckets of encrypted data to the
data owner, of which indices match with the query. Ge et al. [54] demonstrated
the use of Paillier encryption to support summation and average operation
over an encrypted database. Agrawal et al. [55] proposed to use OPE to build
database indices and to perform range queries. These solutions all rely heavily
on the data owner to complete the tasks that cannot be done in the cloud.
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There are also hybrid approaches which make use of more than one partially
homomorphic encryption to support additional, but still limited, operations.
CryptDB [20, 37] integrates various partially homomorphic encryption schemes
to serve the major functionalities required in database applications. Each da-
tum is encrypted with various encryption schemes, one on top of another, form-
ing multiple encryption layers. It can only support a few operations including
equality check, range check, summation, word search, equality join and range
join operations, and is barely su cient for a typical Online Transaction Pro-
cessing (OLTP) workload. To support Online Analytical Processing (OLAP)
workload, MONOMI [21] proposed to use a split server/client approach to
extend the functionality of CryptDB. In brief, it optimizes the system by ex-
ecuting as much of the query as possible that can be e ciently accomplished
over encrypted data in the cloud, and o oading the remaining execution to
the data owner. In terms of performance, CryptDB reduces throughput by
27% on the OLTP benchmark while MONOMI introduces an overhead rang-
ing from 3% to 133% on OLAP. In terms of security, these solutions are still
not perfect. As it uses some weaker encryption schemes (e.g. OPE) that trade
performance over security, it requires careful design from the administrators
to balance security and performance.
Homomorphic encryption, though powerful, su ers from a lot of shortcom-
ings. It is either unacceptably ine cient or provides only limited support for
operations, resulting in it not being useful in solving practical cloud-based
computational problems.
3.2 Commercially Available Architecture
In this section, we review some existing security solutions in commercial prod-
ucts. In general, they fall into one of two categories: 1) a secure co-processor
approach that executes sensitive information on a standalone and secure com-
puting platform, or 2) a generic approach that builds roots of trust in hard-
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ware, either as a co-processor or as a main processor, that ensures that the
computing platform is trustworthy.
3.2.1 Secure Co-Processor
The IBM 4758 secure co-processor [56, 57] is a self-contained, tamper-resistant
and responsive computing device attached to the host computer via a Periph-
eral Component Interconnect (PCI) interface. It also contains a factory-built
private key of a public and private key pair and uses the public key cryp-
tographic algorithm to enable attestation and symmetric key exchange with
remote parties. Internally, there are cryptographic accelerators to perform data
en-/decryption and digital signatures. It also contains limited memory to store
the encrypted or decrypted data inside the platform. Because it is designed as
a general purpose secure co-processor, it remains a high cost solution.
TrustedDB [22] employs the IBM 4764 secure co-processor [58], a successor
of IBM 4758, to protect the data confidentiality of an outsourced database in
the cloud. Due to the limited computational power and storage capacity of
the secure co-processor, it still relies on the host computer to execute non-
sensitive data and store the outsourced database. The secure co-processor is
responsible for most query executions, including parsing the encrypted queries
sent from the client. The queries, after parsing, are further re-written into
public sub-queries or private sub-queries. Public sub-queries are handled by
the host computer to process unencrypted data while private sub-queries are
executed by the secure co-processor to compute encrypted data. The final
query result is assembled and encrypted by the secure co-processor. Under such
architecture, sensitive data can only be decrypted and stored inside the secure
co-processor. However, its limiting computational power and high latency data
communication cause 1.03⇥ to 8⇥ slowdown on OLAP workloads.
A FPGA provides an alternative to a custom secure co-processor. It ex-
hibits the feature of hardware security and reconfigurability, making it a good
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alternative to build a trusted computing platform. Eisenbarth et al. [59]
proposed to build the root of trust on FPGA with the same Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) functionalities, which allows flexible updates to TPM function-
ality. Eguro et al. [60] proposed to use a FPGA to build a custom execution
engine for secure data processing, where the encrypted data can be decrypted,
computed and re-encrypted inside the reconfigurable logic. The bitstream is
protected by encryption and securely loaded into the FPGA via the on-board
secure boot logic. These proposals provide a general discussion on the possi-
bility of using a FPGA to build a trusted computing platform but lacks an
in-depth discussion of its performance impact.
Inherited from Eguro’s proposal, Cipherbase [23] proposed to use a FPGA-
based query co-processor to process an encrypted database in the cloud. Sim-
ilar to TrustedDB, it also relies on the host computer to execute non-sensitive
data and store the outsourced database. But it leverages the framework in
CryptDB, so the majority of the query execution is done at the host computer.
The FPGA is only responsible for those operations that CryptDB cannot sup-
port or can barely support with low e ciency (e.g. addition, multiplications).
This has two major benefits over TrustedDB. First, the major query execu-
tion is o oaded to the host computer, which has higher computational power.
Second, it reduces data communication over the PCI bus. However, it also
poses a potential hazard for performance because the FPGA generally runs at
a slower clock frequency than Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
and data communication over the PCI bus is still quite costly. Its evaluation
over OLTP workloads shows 17% to 20% throughput degradation but the per-
formance over OLAP workloads is still largely unknown. The authors also
suggested that it may not perform well over OLAP workloads because data
mining queries typically touch a large number of records. It greatly amplifies
the performance overhead caused by the FPGA and data communication.
A secure co-processor often has limited computational resources. Relying
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on a secure co-processor to execute a large amount of sensitive information can
cause significant performance overhead.
3.2.2 Trusted Platforms
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) has specified TPM [11], a small
chip mounted on the motherboard, to provide a root of trust for a computing
platform. Its main objective is to protect the platform from software attack by
providing a remote attestation and protected storage mechanism. The attesta-
tion is based on a white-list approach that compares the hashing measurement
of all the software layers with the approved value stored inside the chip. It
means that any software attack on the system would alter the hashing mea-
surement and therefore TPM can detect and respond to the tampering. TPM
provides specific access control on the encrypted data called sealing. A sealed
storage can only be deciphered in a specific system configuration. A number of
works propose using TPM to provide a trusted platform in Cloud Computing
[61, 62]. However, a major disadvantage of TPM is that it o ers protection
of encryption keys but does not protect the encryption key and the decrypted
data once unsealed. Thus, the decrypted data and encryption key can still be
obtained by an attacker through cold-boot attack [14].
Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [45] also builds upon TPM
to provide protected execution. The processor support extends the security of
TPM in that it erases the memory content in o -chip memory if any tampering
is detected by TPM. This targets against memory snooping software attacks
but not against physical attacks. Intel AES-NI [63] provides instruction sup-
port to use the on-chip Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic
engine. It also has an on-chip Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG)
[64] to generate the encryption key. However, they are originally designed
for acceleration purposes where the encryption key can be stored and the de-
crypted data are stored outside the processor chip. Sensitive information thus
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remains unprotected in o -chip memory.
ARM TrustZone [46] introduces a set of security extensions to the ARM
processor to provide a trusted execution environment by virtually partition-
ing all hardware resources into two isolated subsystems - “secure world” and
“normal world”. The root of trust is provided in hardware by implementing
an additional bit in the system bus, cache and Translation Lookaside Bu er
(TLB) for strong isolation between these two subsystems. Security sensitive
applications can run in a secure world and is protected from any software at-
tack in a normal world. ARM TrustZone architecture also enforces secure boot
mechanisms and secure I/O paths via trusted peripherals. Unlike TPM and
secure co-processor approaches, there is no cryptographic engine or factory-
installed private key burnt into the processor. In fact, ARM’s model provides
a generic but isolated system for executing security sensitive applications. It
does not consider the privacy protection of o -chip memory.
Maxim Integrated (formerly Dallas Semiconductor) manufactures the DS5250
secure microprocessor [65]. As its architecture is very similar to the secure pro-
cessor approach, we include it in Section 3.3.1 below for ease of discussion.
Commercial architecture usually aims at providing a trusted platform for
software to run (the software stack is securely booted). It relies on software to
perform security critical tasks but does not consider physical attacks.
3.3 Academically Proposed Architecture
Architectural support for building a secure computing platform has been widely
studied in academia. Its advantage regarding security is two-fold. First, it
builds the root of trust in the processor core. This is a more secure approach
than building it on software, based on the assumption that probing the in-
ternal components of the processor chip is su ciently di cult. Second, it
greatly reduces the attack surfaces in software because software can lever-
age the hardware support to reduce its code size. Hardware architecture can
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provide security support in various ways. It includes, but is not limited to, o -
chip memory protection in secure processors, enhanced hypervisor’s isolation
between virtual machines, and data-centric security.
3.3.1 Secure Processor
The concept of a secure processor is fundamentally based on bus encryption
proposed by Best [66, 67] in 1979. In his proposal, all data and instructions
are encrypted and only decrypted inside the microprocessor chip. Based on
this architecture, VLSI technology [68] proposed having an on-chip memory
management unit for encrypted instruction and data transfer from an o -chip
memory on a page-by-page basis. General Instrument Corporation [69] fur-
ther optimized the system using a triple Data Encryption Standard in block
chaining mode for encryption and a keyed hash algorithm for authentication.
The Maxim DS5250 secure microprocessor [65] is designed to meet the physical
security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140
and Common Criteria certifications. In addition to the triple-DES bus encryp-
tion, it has a microprobe shield and environmental sensors to trigger a rapid
“zeroization” of secure information as a tamper response. All these industrial
e orts target standalone embedded processor applications where software is
pre-loaded into the system during manufacturing.
Until recently, there are a number of works targeting DRM, in which soft-
ware is dynamically and remotely installed into the system requiring similar
but more sophisticated architecture. In general, each secure processor is as-
sociated with a factory-built private key. To protect the application software,
software vendors encrypt their application’s binary using a symmetric-key en-
cryption, where the key is distributed to each secure processor using its public-
private key pair. Their security goal is to protect application code and data
as a whole.
The Execute-Only Memory (XOM) [24] architecture assumes that operat-
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ing systems are untrusted. It provides an isolated memory compartment in
hardware for each application. Each compartment has its own session key and
this key is used to en-/decrypt the associated instruction and data. At any
time there is only one memory compartment active and the corresponding ses-
sion key is loaded for on-chip en-/decryption. To manage the session keys and
the hardware resources, a XOM Specific Operating System (XOMOS) [70] is
also developed. The XOMOS virtualizes the session key table to support as
many applications to be run in its own memory compartment as possible.
AEGIS [25], having a similar security model, provides more flexibility of
the protection mechanism. Apart from the untrusted operating system solu-
tion, AEGIS also develops a scheme which uses a trusted security kernel to
handle multi-tasking and provide security features for applications. The secu-
rity kernel can be securely booted using the root of trust in the processor chip.
It further replaces the root of trust from a factory-installed private key to a
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) [71]. It also uses a One-Time Pad (OTP)
encryption scheme proposed by Yang et al. [36] to address the performance
overhead in XOM architecture. In XOM, the encryption latency is added di-
rectly to the memory access critical path which results in high performance
penalty. The proposed OTP encryption yields significant improvement in per-
formance because it allows the en-/decryption to be performed in parallel to
memory access from o -chip memory.
Secure architecture is also designed to protect sensitive data in portable
devices. Relying on a permanent private key inside the processor simply re-
stricts the portability of trust from one device to another. Secret-Protected
(SP) architecture [26] and Bastion [33] focus on the management of keys. They
propose new architectures to bind the critical secret to a user-defined master
key instead of a factory-installed private key.
In SP [26] architecture, a user master key is generated by hashing a passphrase
from the user’s input via a secure I/O. After the master key is generated, a
38
hierarchical key chain can be further developed for various cryptographic op-
erations. A Trusted Software Module (TSM) is used to manage the key chain,
including the user’s master key. The TSM’s functionalities can vary for vari-
ous applications depending on the security requirement. The SP architecture
supports a concealed execution mode to protect the execution of TSM. In this
concealed execution mode, all instructions and data going to the o -chip mem-
ory are protected by encryption and hashing. In a new version of SP [72], it
extends local trust of a user’s secret on his own device to a remote trust model
on multiple devices owned by a single authority.
Bastion [33] architecture, based on SP architecture, provides scalable TSM
establishment and individual attestation through a trusted hypervisor. The
Bastion architecture first secures the execution of hypervisor, which in turn
provides execution protection to the multiple TSMs invoked in the system.
Each TSM has its own isolated memory compartment enforced by access rules
implemented in TLB. On-chip cryptographic engines are used to protect run-
time memory used by the trusted hypervisor and the TSMs.
Iso-X [27], similar to Bastion, provides hardware enforced isolation on TLB
and o -chip memory encryption to multiple trusted processes. The major dif-
ference between Iso-X and Bastion is that it eliminates the trusted hypervisor
and pushes the management of multiple trusted processes into hardware. This
is achieved by reserving a memory region for storing management information,
where it is only accessible by the Iso-X hardware. The management informa-
tion involves a compartment vector and a compartment table. Compartment
vector is used to map the physical memory page to each compartment, while
compartment table describes each compartment created in the system.
A secure processor provides o -chip memory encryption and an integrity
check mechanism for application code and data as a whole. It does not consider
an application scenario that the data provider and software provider are from
di erent parties. Also, when the application and data need to be migrated from
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one to another secure processor, the data have to be re-encrypted because of
the di erent encryption keys used in di erent secure processors.
3.3.2 Secure Hypervisor
With the emergence of Cloud Computing, hypervisors are becoming more com-
plicated and thus more vulnerable to attacks. Besides, the lack of physical
control and transparency of computing platforms also raise security concerns
from users. In view of the existing vulnerabilities of hypervisors, there are
a number of works proposed to use new hardware architecture to reduce the
attack surface of hypervisors.
NoHype [47] proposed to allocate resources to each guest VM without any
hypervisor. The guest VM has full control and direct access to the underlying
dedicated hardware. Each VM is allocated a single processor and hardware-
enforced partitioned memory. As each VM owns a core and a block of par-
titioned memory, the hardware resource is not shared with other tenancies.
This eliminates the vulnerability caused by a multi-tenant and shared resource
environment, but also lessens the advantage of resource pooling in Cloud Com-
puting.
HyperWall [48], on the other hand, does not remove the entire hypervisor.
Instead, it uses new hardware architecture to enhance the isolation between
virtual machines by extending the root of trust in the processor to hypervisor.
This is achieved by implementing a confidentiality and integrity check logic
in TLB. Akin to Iso-X, a portion of o -chip memory is reserved to store a
Confidentiality and Integrity Protection (CIP) table when the computer boots
up. The CIP table storing the mapping of hypervisor and access rights to the
physical memory pages is only accessible by the hardware. Thus, the isolation
of memory partition among guest VMs is strictly enforced in hardware.
While HyperWall focuses on VM isolation, HyperCo er [49] protects VMs
through cryptographic methods. It adopts AISE [28] encryption and BMT
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[28] integrity check techniques. AISE and BMT were originally designed for a
secure processor to remedy the disadvantage of OTP encryption [36] so that
it can extend the protection to permanent storage. HyperCo er leverages
the concept of “shim” in Overshadow [73], which is a piece of software to
mediate all data communications between the protected VM and the untrusted
hypervisor. Each VM is encrypted with its own encryption key, which is stored
inside the processor during execution. Similar to secure processor architecture,
it has a factory-installed private key in the processor for attestation and key
exchange of the VM encryption key. Because each VM is encrypted with its
own encryption key, its data are strongly protected from other VMs.
Hardware-enhanced virtualization aims at providing strong isolation among
virtual machines. Again, it does not consider the SaaS execution model in
Cloud Computing.
3.3.3 Data-Centric Security
Protecting an application code and data as a whole is sometimes undesirable
in certain execution models (e.g. SaaS model in Cloud Computing). Some-
times users only want to protect a piece of data/document, regardless of the
applications running on it. There are two main scopes of data-centric security:
access controls and privacy protection, which are usually implemented at OS or
application level. Recently, Chen et al. [50, 51] proposed two architectures to
secure information sharing on multiple devices. They both leverage hardware
architecture to enhance the data access controls and policies.
The first proposed architecture [50] uses SP architecture [26] to build a
TSM at the application domain. The TSM is responsible for implementing
various policies for access controls. Since TSM is directly protected by SP’s
hardware mechanism, a trust chain is formed from the underlying hardware to
the application domain, bypassing the operating system which may be com-
promised. Upon receiving encrypted data/documents, the TSM first decrypts
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the data and evaluates the policies for access control. The decrypted data are
stored in the TSM bu er, a memory region protected by cache line encryption
in SP architecture. Then, the TSM authenticates the recipient and checks the
policies before granting access to the protected data/documents.
The second proposed architecture, DataSafe [51], further eliminates TSM
from the application. It allows data to be self-protected from any unvetted
third-party programs. To achieve this, the DataSafe architecture provides two
key protection mechanisms: 1) a run-time policy handler that translates high-
level policies expressed in software into hardware tags and, 2) fine-grained run-
time data tracking to propagate the hardware tags. The access control policies
are first associated with the protected data and then further translated into
hardware tags. Since application programs and the operating system are not
involved in this process, the protection is made independent of any third-party
programs. However, the DataSafe architecture relaxes the adversary model
from physical attacks and does not focus on protecting data confidentiality
during execution.
These solutions consider an execution model where protected data are dis-
associated from the application program. They focus on providing architec-
tural support toward access control policies. Our approach takes direct en-
/decryption support in hardware to protect the confidentiality of encrypted
data.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed three main categories of past work that aim at
providing a secure computing platform for data processing: 1) homomorphic
encryption, 2) commercially available architecture, and 3) academically pro-
posed architecture. All of these solutions su er from one of the following short-
comings: 1) ine ciency, 2) sharing a weaker adversary model, and 3) targeting
di erent application domains and a di erent execution model from ours. Our
42
approach explores opportunities to leverage hardware architecture techniques
to protect the confidentiality of outsourced data securely and e ciently. We
build upon existing techniques to build a hardware root of trust and create
secure execution environments, but propose new techniques to enable e cient
computations on encrypted data. Our techniques enable distributed and par-
allel data processing in the Cloud Computing environment and are comple-
mentary to existing techniques that create secure execution environments. A
comparison of past work with our approach is shown in Table 3.1.
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Chapter 4
CypherDB System Overview
In addition to protecting data confidentiality, our CypherDB computing plat-
form supports highly e cient computations on encrypted data in a distributed
Cloud Computing environment. To achieve this goal, each computing node in
the cloud must be able to execute the encrypted database with high perfor-
mance and security. This chapter first describes the general overview of the
system and the high-level architectural model of each secure node. We then
present the attestation protocol and the execution flow for the database owner
to start a secure query session. Finally, we discuss some virtualization issues
in the cloud.
4.1 General Overview
Figure 4.1 depicts our CypherDB cloud model as described in Chapter 1, which
involves two parties: a CSP and a database owner. To protect data confiden-
tiality, the database owner encrypts the outsourced database with symmetric
key encryption [32] before exporting it to the CSP for future querying. The
CSP hosts the database server and provides storage and database administra-
tion services to the database owner.
To process the encrypted database, a server/node in CSP has to be “em-
powered” with two features: 1) equipping a CypherDB secure processor and, 2)
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Figure 4.1: CypherDB application scenario
having the database encryption key Kdb stored inside the processor chip. In ad-
dition, a query encryption key KQ has to be stored inside the server’s processor
chip to protect the query result. We refer to these “empowered” servers/nodes
as secure servers/nodes. A normal server/node (without CypherDB secure pro-
cessor or database encryption key) is not capable of processing the encrypted
database.
We envision that CSP could set up a secure cluster which consists of a
collection of servers/nodes equipped with CypherDB secure processors. To
query the outsourced database, the database owner communicates with a single
secure server as if the entire database were stored in it. In CSP, the outsourced
encrypted database is partitioned and stored in a distributed manner within
the secure cluster. The secure server manages the query processing in such
distributed database and sends back the encrypted query result to the database
owner.
4.1.1 Application Scenario
For simplicity and without the loss of generality, we consider a scenario, as
shown in Figure 4.2, where the outsourced database is partitioned and stored
in two storage nodes, S1 and S2, each of which can perform a scan operation
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S1	 S2	
Metatext	 Record		
B1.t[i]*	 Enc(B1.t[i])		
B2.t[i]*	 Enc(B2.t[i])	
C	
Metatext	 Record		
B2.t[i]*	 Enc(B2.t[i])	
Database	Owner	
Cloud	Service		
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select	A	from	B1,	B2		
where	B1.K=B2.K	and	C1	and	C2	
Kdb	 Kdb		
KQ	
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select	B1.t[i]*,	Enc(B1.t[i])	
from	B1	where	C1	
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select	A	from	B1,	B2	
where	B1.K=B2.K	
Metatext	 Record		
B1.t[i]*	 Enc(B1.t[i])	
Figure 4.2: CypherDB execution model
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locally and filter out the useful data to a computational server C, for the corre-
sponding query execution. For example, the database owner can issue a query
to, but not limited to, the computational server in the form of “SELECT A
FROM B1 AND B2 WHERE B1.K = B2.K AND C1 AND C2” where A is the
set of data to be returned to the client, K is the attribute for join operation,
and C1 and C2 are the conditions over the attributes in B1 and B2 respectively.
This query may not need to be encrypted because it leaks almost no sensitive
information from the issued query. The computational server first pushes the
selection workload to the storage nodes. After that, the storage nodes send
back a set of selected records t[i] satisfying the specified conditions. The com-
putational server will then compute the final join or aggregation workload,
producing the final result to the client.
Before outsourcing the database to the cloud, the database owner first
encrypts each record of the database t[i] with an encryption key Kdb and
then appends it with a metatext t[i]⇤, transforming each record from t[i] to
[Enc(t[i],Kdb), t[i]⇤]. The metatext t[i]⇤, which is useful for the secure execu-
tion in the server, can be sent in clear form since it reveals no information
about the encryption. The details of this metatext will be explained in Chap-
ter 5. As a result, every storage node and the computational server now need to
handle each record in the form of [Enc(t[i],Kdb), t[i]⇤] instead of t[i] in storage,
communication, or execution.
In each secure server/node, the metatext of each record t[i]⇤ is used in
conjunction with the stored on-chip database encryption key Kdb to perform
computations on the encrypted records. The data confidentiality is strongly
protected by the CypherDB secure processor during execution. The query
result is further encrypted by query encryption key KQ in the secure server
before sending it back to the database owner.
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4.2 Architectural Model of a Secure Server/Node
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''''''Operating'System'(OS)
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Encrypted'
Database
(Owner'B)
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CypherDB'
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CypherDB'
Processor
Encrypted'
Database
(Owner'A)
Pivate'KeyPublic'Key
Kdb
Figure 4.3: Architectural model of each secure server/node. Components in grey
represent untrusted entities while those in white represent trusted entities.
The security goal of each secure server/node is to perform computation on
encrypted data without information leakage to any honest-but-curious adver-
sary. In other words, with the assumption that the processor is unbreakable,
the sensitive data have to be encrypted all the time outside the processor
boundary. To enable this feature, each CypherDB secure server/node pro-
vides architectural support for two important mechanisms: 1) secure on-chip
encryption key exchange and 2) e cient on-chip encrypted data computation.
Figure 4.3 depicts a high-level architectural model of a secure server/node.
CypherDB secure processor and software support work together to enable
computations on encrypted data inside the processor. The other hardware
components and operating system are all untrusted entities, which are unable
to obtain the actual value of the sensitive data.
4.2.1 On-Chip Encryption Key Exchange
To exchange the encryption key securely to the secure processor, we rely on
a unique private key burned into the processor chip, which is not accessible
by any software (no instruction to read or extract the key). Database encryp-
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tion key Kdb and query encryption key KQ can thus be sent to the processor
chip through KEM [74] - encrypting Kdb and KQ with the public key of the
processor and decrypting it using the on-chip private key. As a result, the
encapsulated database key and query key are EPK(Kdb) 1 and EPK(KQ) respec-
tively. Only a processor with a corresponding private key is able to extract
the key out from EPK(Kdb) and EPK(KQ). This allows di erent database own-
ers to perform on-chip key exchange of their Kdb and KQ to a single secure
server/node. Thus, secure servers/nodes can process the encrypted database
from any database owners. Such key exchange protocol only needs to be done
once for the database owner to use the service. The database owner’s creden-
tials including the encrypted database encryption key can be stored in a secure
server and brought up only when the database owner logs in to use the service.
4.2.2 On-Chip Computations on the Encrypted Data
With the database encryption key stored on-chip, the encrypted data can be
deciphered inside the processor chip so that computations can be performed
on the plaintext. If the data need to be modified, they are further enciphered
before writing them back to o -chip memory. A conceptual architecture for
such execution model is shown in Figure 4.4. However, a naive implementation
of such architecture results in both performance and security issues.
In terms of performance, these en-/decryption layers introduce additional
execution latencies to the overall execution. Moreover, such on-chip decrypt-
process-encrypt operation has to be performed on every o -chip processor-
to-memory data transaction. A simple database operation such as Query 1
in TPC-H [75] can result in millions of o -chip memory transactions. To
remedy this, a novel scheme, that can o oad the cryptographic latencies with
the assistance of the metatext of a record t[i]⇤, is developed. Comprehensive
instructions support is also proposed. The details of such scheme will be
1EPK() represents a public key encryption using the public key as described in Sec-
tion 2.3.2
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Figure 4.4: A conceptual architecture showing the operation of a secure processor
described in Chapter 5.
In terms of security, the intermediate data generated during execution and
the query result returning back to the database owner could leak sensitive
information of the encrypted data. To protect these data, a run-time o -chip
memory protection mechanism is employed. The query result is also protected
using the aforementioned look-ahead encryption scheme. The detail of these
protection mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter 6.
4.3 Attestation
Attestation has to be performed for the secure processor from CSP and also
the query key from the database owner. The purpose of attestation is to
ensure the trustworthiness of the corresponding parties. This is to avoid any
impersonation attacks [76] where an adversary can successfully pretend to be
a legitimate party in the system.
4.3.1 Secure Processor Attestation
Although the database and query encryption keys are secured by the on-
chip key exchange protocol, an adversary can send a forged public key to
the database owner and pretend the public key belongs to one of the secure
nodes in a secure cluster. If the database owner is unable to verify the trust-
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worthiness of the public key, the adversary can obtain the database encryption
key with ease.
Therefore, attestation of the secure processor is crucial to ensure that the
critical secret - the database encryption key is trustworthy. Attestation of
the secure processor can be achieved by certifying itself using Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) with the use of its unique on-chip private key. It works
by the following two-step protocol:
1. During manufacturing, the chip manufacturer generates a pair of public
and private keys for each secure processor. The private key is burnt into
the chip and is used to sign its corresponding public key. This generates
a digital certificate for the public key.
2. For attestation, the CSP sends the public keys and the certificates for
each secure node to the database owner. The database owner can thus
obtain the public keys and verify their certificates accordingly.
As the private key of the secure processor is always kept secret, an adversary
is unable to forge the digital certificate. This certificate can thus be used to
attest the secure processor.
4.3.2 Query Key Attestation
At the user’s side, an attacker can get the encrypted database key EPK(Kdb)
and encrypted query key EPK(KQ) from the communication channel. Having
obtained EPK(Kdb), the attacker can send a forged query key KF in an attempt
to obtain the query result. This can be done by encrypting KF with the
public key of the secure processor to obtain EPK(KF). These EPK(Kdb) and
EPK(KF) can then be sent to the secure processor. Due to the fact that the
secure processor is unable to identify the ownership of the encryption keys,
an attacker can easily obtain the query result without knowing the database
encryption key.
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To ensure that the query key indeed originated from the database owner,
she has to, following the discussion in Section 2.3.3, create a digitally signed
query key to authenticate the query key and ensure that it has not been tam-
pered with. In short, the database owner first hashes the encapsulated query
key Hash(EPKC(KQ)) and encrypts it using her own private key to create a
digital signature. Similarly, she can also authenticate the database encryption
using the same digital signature by embedding the hash value of the encapsu-
lated database key Hash(EPKC(Kdb)). She can then send the digitally signed
query key Sig(EPKC(Kdb),EPKC(KQ)) to the server.
At the server side, the query key can be extracted and verified using the
digital signature. The hashed value is extracted by decrypting the digital
signature Sig and is compared with the immediate hashing of the received
encapsulated query key (EPKC(KQ)).
4.4 Execution Flow
Database 
owner Secure Server Secure Nodes
Send {EPKi(Kdb)}
Encrypt the database 
with Kdb
Outsource the encrypted database to the Cloud
Build indices on 
the index fields
Issue query Push selection workload to 
storage nodes
Send back the encrypted data
Compute the aggregation 
workload on the selected data 
Send back query output encrypted with KQ
Encrypted database outsourcing completed
Send EPKC (KQ), Sig(EPKC(Kdb), EPKC (KQ))
CSP
Request
a query
session
Send {PKi} and {Sig(Pki)}
Figure 4.5: CypherDB execution flow
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Figure 4.5 depicts the execution flow of outsourcing and querying the en-
crypted database outsourcing. This can be seen as an execution setup of secure
query processing from the application perspective. The database owner first
encrypts the database with Kdb and specifies the columns to be built as in-
dices before outsourcing it to the CSP. The distributed encrypted database is
managed by multiple secure nodes whereas the indices are built accordingly.
To query the outsourced database, the database owner can set up a secure
query session by sending Kdb and a query encryption key KQ to the allocated
CypherDB secure processors. In summary, it involves the following procedures:
1. The database owner requests a secure query service from CSP and spec-
ifies the resources needed (e.g. number of cores, bandwidth).
2. The CSP allocates the resources as requested and sends all the public
keys {PKi} and digital certificates {Sig(PKi)} of the secure processors
involved to the database owner.
3. The database owner checks the trustworthiness of the secure processor
by verifying {Sig(PKi)} and then encrypts Kdb with all verified public
keys, resulting in a set of encapsulated database keys {EPKi(Kdb)}. KQ is
only encrypted with the public key of the secure server PKC he talks to,
resulting in encapsulated query key EPKC(KQ).
4. The database owner sends all encrypted database encryption keys
{EPKi(Kdb)}, query encryption key EPKC(KQ), the verification metric
Sig(EPKC(Kdb),EPKC(KQ))
2 to the CSP.
5. The CSP distributes {EPKi(Kdb)} to the appropriate secure processors in
order to store Kdb securely on-chip. It further stores KQ into the secure
processor chip of the secure server and checks the verification metric
Sig(EPKC(Kdb),EPKC(KQ)).
2The verification metric Sig(EPKC(Kdb),EPKC(KQ)) is used to authenticate the database
and query key at the same time.
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Upon receiving the query from the database owner, the secure server first
pushes the selection workload to the pre-allocated secure nodes. After that,
the secure nodes send back a set of relevant encrypted records. The secure
server then computes the final join or aggregation workload. Finally, the query
output is encrypted with KQ before returning to the database owner.
4.5 Database Virtualization
As we envision that CSP could establish a secure cluster formed by a collection
of secure servers and nodes, resource pooling can be performed in this secure
cluster for secure query processing. In this section, we discuss five impor-
tant virtualization features that may be potentially impacted by our proposed
solution as follows:
• Resource Allocation: Because each CypherDB secure processor can ac-
commodate the database encryption keys from di erent database own-
ers, the CSP can allocate any available secure server/nodes, following
the aforementioned key exchange protocol, to the database owners upon
a request for a secure query session.
• Resource Re-allocation: Migration of processes may be necessary due to
load balancing and fault tolerance in the Cloud (i.e. move the query pro-
cessing process from one secure server/node to another). In this case, the
CSP can re-allocate some secure server/nodes and send the correspond-
ing secure processors’ public keys to the database owner for exchanging
the database encryption key with those “new” secure server/nodes. On
the other hand, database owners may also request more resources by
repeating the secure query session request.
• Distributed Storage and Processing: In CypherDB, the database is en-
crypted at a logical level that eases the partitioning process. Horizontal
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partitioning (i.e. on a record basis) can be performed directly on the en-
crypted database without involving any re-encryption. The distributed
database can also be processed in parallel using di erent secure nodes.
• Multi-tenancy: With di erent database and query encryption keys, the
CypherDB secure processor is capable of processing encrypted databases
from various database owners. Through switching the use of the database/
query encryption key, each secure server/node is able to support multi-
tenant query processing.
• Abstraction to End-User: The protection mechanism is abstracted to
the end user. From the user’s perspective, data are protected by strong
encryption while the encryption keys are protected by the secure pro-
cessor. Our proposed solution guarantees that data are only decrypted
inside the processor chip without information leakage to o -chip hard-
ware components. Also, the user only needs to talk to the secure server
whereas the back-end resource allocation and query processing are all
hidden from users.
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Chapter 5
Proposed Encryption
Mechanism
The architecture of the CypherDB secure processor requires additional encryp-
tion (or decryption) operations at the secure processor boundary that encrypts
(or decrypts) the data to (or from) memory. One major disadvantage of this
architecture is that the en-/decryption operation is on the memory access crit-
ical path. This chapter presents our novel look-ahead encryption scheme to
solve this problem. We first describe the encryption mechanism and its impact
on our scheme. Then, our proposed encryption scheme and its performance
impact are discussed. To illustrate the usage of our scheme, we present our
technique to encrypt an outsourced database with the look-ahead encryption
scheme. Finally, a security analysis of our proposed data encryption scheme is
discussed.
5.1 Block-Cipher Encryption
Our proposed look-ahead encryption scheme relies on block cipher encryption
in two di erent modes: 1) Counter-Mode (CTR) and 2) output feedback mode
(OFB). These two encryption modes [77] make use of a data-independent and
unique seed value s to decouple the en-/decryption computation from the ac-
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of AES-CTR and AES-OFB encryption
1: /* AES-CTR encrypt data with less than or equal to 128 bits */
2: function Encctr(s,d,Kdb)
3: Input: s = seed value, d = l-bit data, Kdb = database key
4: Output: y = l-bit ciphertext
5: p= AES(s,Kdb)
6: for i= 1, ..., l do
7: yi = di  pi
8: /* Decryption: ai = yi  pi */
9: end for
10: return y
11: end function
12:
13: /* AES-OFB encrypt data with larger than 128 bits */
14: function Enco f b(s,d,Kdb)
15: Input: s = seed value, d = l-bit data, Kdb = database key
16: Output: y = l-bit ciphertext
17: p0 s /* seed value s is used to get the first encryption pad p1 */
18: m d l128e /* to calculate the number of encryption pads needed */
19: for h= 1, ...,m do
20: ph = AES(ph 1,Kdb)
21: end for
22: p= p0p1...pm
23: for i= 1, ..., l do
24: yi = di  pi
25: /* Decryption: ai = yi  pi */
26: end for
27: return y
28: end function
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tual data value, which are formalized in Algorithm 1. AES [78] is used as
the block cipher encryption because of its e ciency in hardware [79] and its
well-proven security.
CTR encryption encrypts any data less than or equal to 128 bits. The
function Encctr takes 128-bit seed value s, l-bit long data d and the database
key Kdb as inputs and generates a l-bit long ciphertext as the output. In this
function, an encryption pad p is generated using AES encryption AES(s,Kdb)
which takes the 128-bit seed value s and database key Kdb (line 5). The en-
cryption is done by performing an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation on the most
significant l bits of the encryption pad with the data (lines 6-9). To encrypt
the attribute longer than 128 bits, OFB encryption function Enco f b takes the
same input and generates the same output as Encctr but with a longer input
data d and ciphertext y. It first generates a series of 128-bit encryption pads
to be encrypted with the data (lines 17-21). These pads are then concatenated
together (line 22). The most significant l bits of the concatenated encryption
pad p0p1...pm are then used to encrypt the attribute data (lines 23-26). De-
cryption is also done by performing an XOR operation on ciphertext with the
same encryption pad (lines 8 and 25).
The use of these two modes of encryption achieves two important objectives:
1) pre-computing the en-/decryption operations and, 2) transforming block
cipher into stream cipher. Their impacts on our look-ahead encryption scheme
are described as follows:
1. Latency o oading: Prior to actual data processing, the encryption seed
can be pre-fetched to compute the encryption pad in advance (lines 4 and
15). Thus, the actual data en-/decryption latency is reduced to simple XOR
operations (lines 5 and 19). This o oads the en-/decryption latency of block
cipher from the actual data processing path.
2. Execution-friendly encryption interface: Encrypting the data in stream-
ing fashion simplifies the code generation task for accessing the encrypted at-
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tribute data because the data manipulations on attribute data are often byte
or word, instead of block, oriented. Padding of byte-wide attribute data is
thus unnecessary, unlike the use of any block-cipher encryption.
5.2 Look-Ahead Encryption Scheme
Our novel encryption scheme takes advantage of the aforementioned proper-
ties of CTR and OFB encryption (latency o oading and execution-friendly
encryption interface) to alleviate the shortcoming of our proposed architecture
through the use of custom instruction support. Table 5.1 describes the func-
tion of each of the four custom instructions. l.seed and l.shi f t are used to
manipulate the seed encryption. l.sload and l.sstore are similar to the normal
load/store instructions l.load and l.store, except that data are now decrypted
and encrypted accordingly.
Table 5.1: Custom secure instructions
Instructions Functional Description
l.seed to pre-compute the encryption pad using the seed value
taken from the general purpose register or immediate
value in operand
l.shift to shift the encryption pad in accordance with the value
indicated in the operand
l.sload / l.sstore to load/store the data in byte (l.slbz/l.ssbz), half-word
(l.slhz)/l.sshz) or word (l.slwz/l.sswz) length with de-
cryption from/into the general-purpose register
The mechanism of our proposed scheme can be best illustrated using an
example as shown in Figure 5.1, which demonstrates the necessary software
modification (in red) of a segment of code both in C and assembly language.
The function of this simple program is to find a particular character in an
array of name. Consider the case where name = “alex”, which is stored as a
32-bit string 0x616c6578, is now encrypted as 0xa358 f2bc. To process this
encrypted data, the program first searches the seed value using a mapping
function seed(). The returned value, which is the seed value, is then loaded
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into an on-chip register Regseed through l.seed instruction. The encryption pad
0xc23497c4..... can then be pre-computed before the actual data are loaded.
To decrypt the data, the load instruction l.lbz is replaced by a secure load
instruction l.slbz. This takes the first byte of the encryption pad to perform
an XOR operation with the data being loaded. Finally, l.shi f t is issued to
shift the encryption pad by a byte. Through shifting the encryption pad, the
encrypted data can be loaded and decrypted iteratively. The encryption pad
only needs to be generated once for each data item. The same mechanism
also applies to storing the encrypted data to the memory (replace l.slbz with
l.ssbz).
(ASCII)  name =  alex
(Hex) name =  0x616c6578
(Cipher)   name  = 0xa358f2bc
(Enc Pad) pad = 0xc23497c4…
Data
// return the seed value of the input item
int seed(void *item);
asm(l.seed  %0, 0x1:"r" (seed(name)));
for (i=0; i<strlen(name); i++) {
if (name[i] == ‘e’) { 
... do something; 
 break; 
}
asm(l.shift 0x1);
}
l.seed r5, 0x1
.loop: 
l.slbz r2, 0(r3) 
l.sfnei r2, 0x65
l.bf .L2
l.shift 0x1 
... 
.L2:
... do something
Figure 5.1: The modification of a software program that uses the custom secure in-
structions to pre-compute and shift the encryption pad in C and Assembly language
It can be seen that if the l.seed instruction is issued before the l.sload/l.sstore,
the encryption pad can be pre-computed and the encryption latency can be
hidden from the program execution. Moreover, the shifting of the encryption
pad can be made in accordance with the encrypted data being loaded. It
makes the en-/decryption be performed seamlessly with the actual program
execution.
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5.2.1 Performance Impact
Ideally, the en-/decryption latency can be completely hidden from the overall
execution time with our proposed scheme. In reality, the performance impact of
our scheme, however, relies on how early the pre-computation of the encryption
pad can be performed. In this section, we discuss qualitatively the performance
implication of our scheme for the total execution time.
We first consider the case where the encrypted data are already fetched
into the on-chip data cache. Without our scheme, the decryption latency is
directly added to the total execution time as shown in Figure 5.2 (a). Our
scheme can result in two possible scenarios, depending on the overlapping
time of encryption pad computation and program execution. If l.seed is issued
early enough so that the encryption pad is generated before l.sload is executed,
it can hide the entire encryption latency and result in almost zero overhead
execution (see Figure 5.2 (c)). Otherwise, the execution has to be delayed until
the computation on the encryption pad is finished (see Figure 5.2 (b)).
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Figure 5.2: A diagram illustrating the performance impacts of decryption of the data
residing in the on-chip cache where (a) the look-ahead encryption is not used, (b)
the program execution is delayed by the look-ahead encryption mechanism and (c)
the look-ahead encryption mechanism can completely hide the encryption latency
On the other hand, if data are residing in o -chip memory, the encrypted
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data have to be loaded into the processor before actual data decryption occurs.
The memory access latency is thus added directly to the total execution time
as shown in Figure 5.3 (a). Although this memory access further delays the
execution, it provides more time margin for the encryption pad computation
in our scheme (see Figure 5.2 (b)). If the encryption latency is less than
memory access latency, the total execution time will not be delayed by the
data en-/decryption in our scheme (see Figure 5.2 (c)).
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Figure 5.3: A diagram illustrating the performance impacts of decryption of the data
residing in o -chip memory where (a) the look-ahead encryption is not used, (b) the
delay caused by the look-ahead encryption mechanism is alleviated by the o -chip
memory access and (c) the look-ahead encryption mechanism can completely hide
the encryption latency
5.2.2 Discussion
Despite the advantages of CTR and OFB encryption, these encryption modes
require the encryption seed s to be di erent from each other under the same
encryption key Kdb [80]. Thus, the encryption seed used in our scheme not
only has to be loaded prior to the encrypted data for latency hiding, but also
needs to be unique to each encrypted datum for security purposes.
As a result, the encryption seed has to be carefully chosen depending on
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the application. If we naively assign a random unique seed to each datum,
it can introduce both performance and storage overhead. This is because the
additional seed value requires o -chip memory storage and extra execution
cycles to fetch it into the processor for encryption pad computation. In the
next section, we describe how to encrypt an outsourced database using our
proposed scheme.
5.3 Database Encryption
From the perspective of the database owner, the data to be outsourced are
organized in a two dimensional logical table. We refer to a cell and a row of this
logical table as attribute and record respectively. The outsourced database can
therefore be protected by encrypting each attribute in this table. Our design
also reduces the storage of encryption seed significantly. In this section, we
first describe how to encrypt each attribute using AES-CTR and AES-OFB
encryption. Then, the detail of the corresponding encryption seed is presented.
Finally, some auxiliary database protection mechanisms are discussed.
5.3.1 Attribute Encryption
Each attribute is encrypted in either AES-CTR or AES-OFB. AES-CTR is
used to encrypt attributes less than 128 bits like INTEGER or REAL data type
while AES-OFB is used; otherwise, on data type like VARCHAR or BLOB.
An encrypted record, Enc(t[i],Kdb) (as described in Chapter 4), is therefore a
collection of the corresponding encrypted attributes.
5.3.2 Attribute Encryption Seed
To maintain the uniqueness of the encryption seed, each attribute across a
database must own a distinct seed to each other (spatial uniqueness), whereas
the seed for the same attribute must not repeat upon every update operation
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on that attribute (temporal uniqueness). The design of seed components has
to satisfy spatial and temporal uniqueness, while the logical data structure is
leveraged to formulate the seed during program execution.
Seed Components
Due to the security concerns on seed uniqueness, our design is to leverage the
logical schema of the database to formulate the seed. In the structure of a
logical schema, if each element of the schema has its own identifier (ID), each
attribute can be identified by (databaseID, tableID,rowID,columnID) which
is spatially unique across various databases and tables. Temporal uniqueness
can be achieved by appending a global incremental counter cntr to each record,
which is shared by each attribute within that record. This counter is the record
metatext t[i]⇤ as described in Chapter 3. Although having a record counter
introduces a penalty on re-encrypting a non-updated attribute within that
record, this penalty is insignificant because most workload is read-intensive
rather than write-intensive. The update-intensive workload also requires ex-
tensive read operations to search for appropriate records to write [81].
Seed Formulation
In a typical database application, a logical schema is used in most operating
layers and is eventually translated into its physical schema in order to locate
the record in a database file. The formation of the logical schema identifier
can thus be embedded into the logical-to-physical schema translation software
process. In other words, the actual program execution is able to “generate”
the encryption seeds by re-using some software execution parameters, at run-
time. Take SQLite [82] as an example. The address of an attribute in a record
is stored in an array aO Set[ColumnID] where ColumnID is the index. This
array, including the index, is used for every record access during execution. If
the l.seed instruction is issued immediately after this translation process, the
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index is possibly still stored inside registers or the on-chip cache. Thus, using
this index as one of our attribute seed components can reduce additional load
operations on fetching the encryption seed from the o -chip memory.
In summary, using the logical schema and record counter to formulate the
attribute seed exhibits three main advantages: 1) ensuring the spatial and
temporal uniqueness, 2) reducing the storage overhead and, 3) minimizing
performance overhead by reducing o -chip memory access. Most seed com-
ponents can be “generated” during program execution, except that the record
counter requires external storage.
5.3.3 Query Output Protection
After processing the query on the encrypted database, the query output has to
be sent back to the user. Protection of the query output is necessary because
it contains aggregation results or the actual data of the encrypted database.
The query output is protected by encrypting it in the same way as attribute
encryption. This can be achieved because the result of the SELECT query can
always be organized in a database table where the select-list right after the
SELECT clause defines the columns of the table. For instance, the callback
function in SQLite returns a row of the query output at a time, where the items
in the select-list are stored in an array. Each item of the query output can
therefore be encrypted by AES-CTR and AES-OFB, except that the attribute
seed is in the form of (queryID,rowID,columnID).
5.3.4 Index Protection
If the index contains no sensitive information, the corresponding attribute can
be outsourced in plaintext without encryption. The index can thus be built on
this attribute. In some cases, the index may be part of the sensitive information
to be protected (e.g. personal identifier). Index protection is thus necessary.
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However, encrypting the attribute with either AES-CTR or AES-OFB pro-
hibits B+-tree indexing, which is one of the most commonly used indexing
strategies in a database system. To allow remote indexing and protect the
indices at the same time, we employ OPE to encrypt the indices [83].
OPE is an encryption scheme that can perform order operations on ci-
phertexts in the same way as plaintexts (i.e. Enc(x) > Enc(y) i  x > y) and
is well-proven to reveal no additional information about the plaintext values
besides their order [44, 84]. The use of OPE to encrypt the indices can achieve
two important objectives: 1) to allow remote indexing in the cloud for scala-
bility and elasticity and, 2) to leverage the order-preserving property of OPE
for e cient B-tree index search because decryption is not required for range
check operation.
5.3.5 An Illustrative Example
ID Name Remark
16 Alex He is …
ID Name Remark IDOPE
0x28abdc72 0x46c17a6e 0x87c3fd1… 23738492
AES-CTR
3
AES-CTR AES-OFB
Index field
ROW ID
ROW ID
3
databaseID = 2, tableID = 2
(2,2,3,1) (2,2,3,2) (2,2,3,3)
Kdb OPE
Figure 5.4: An example showing how an outsourced database record and index are
encrypted
Figure 5.4 shows an example of a record of a database table containing
three attributes in a database table. Attributes longer than 128 bits (Remark)
is encrypted with AES-OFB, and otherwise (ID, Name), encrypted with AES-
CTR using Kdb. Each corresponding attribute seed is shown in the format of
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(databaseID, tableID, rowID, columnID). Assume the attribute ID is used as
an index; it is further encrypted by OPE and the output IDOPE is appended
to the encrypted tuple. While the encrypted tuple is sent to the Cloud, the
column IDOPE is used directly (without decryption) to create the indices in
the Cloud. The encrypted record is stored according to the storage strategy
of the DBMS.
5.3.6 Remote Database Modification
As a database can dynamically change over time, a mechanism to support re-
mote modification of the encrypted database is necessary. The major challenge
in CypherDB is that users can easily lose track of the attribute seeds being
used in encrypting the data. To overcome this challenge, a dynamic database
attribute seed management is developed to ensure the uniqueness of the at-
tribute seed used. The key idea is to let users do bookkeeping of the attribute
seed table.
For any database management system, CREATE TABLE, INSERT, DELETE
and UPDATE are the most commonly used operations in modifying any database.
We therefore discuss the working principles of the attribute seed management
under these operations in Figure 5.5.
It can be seen that the attribute seeds are used and updated by these op-
erations. As a result, synchronization of the attribute seed table between the
user’s side and the cloud’s side is needed so that both sides have the most
updated attributed seed. This attribute seed management can be automated
by a software layer, which consists of 234 Line Of Code (LOC)s in our imple-
mentation prototype.
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•  CREATE TABLE 
1.  Issue the CREATE TABLE query statement. 
2.  Receive databaseID and tableID allocated by DBMS. 
 
•  INSERT 
1.  Chooses an unused rowID and attribute counter from the attribute 
seed table. 
2.  Encrypts the record with the corresponding attribute seed. 
3.  Insert the encrypted record to the Cloud. 
 
•  DELETE 
1.  Retrieve the rowID of the records being deleted from the outsourced 
database. 
2.  Update the attribute seed tables by incrementing the counter value of 
the corresponding rowID. 
3.  Delete the records from the outsourced database. 
 
•  UPDATE 
1.  Retrieve the records that needs to update. 
2.  Delete the records from the outsourced database. 
3.  Update the attributes in local server. 
4.  Re-encrypt the records with an unused rowID and attribute counter. 
5.  Insert the updated and encrypted records. 
Figure 5.5: Algorithm of remote database modification and attribute seed manage-
ment
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5.4 Security Analysis
The security of AES-CTR and AES-OFB is well-proven [85], except that they
pose a strong requirement on the encryption seed which must be unique for
each datum under a single encryption key; otherwise, the confidentiality of
the data may be compromised due to the “two-time” pad attack caused by
re-using the same encryption pad. In our proposed encryption scheme, each
attribute seed is spatially and temporally unique across the databases for the
same database owner, as described in Section 5.3.2. Various database own-
ers have their own unique database encryption keys Kdb such that the seed
uniqueness concern is confined to a single party. It therefore greatly simplifies
the attribute seed management and relies on the DBMS to handle the seed
uniqueness. Re-encrypting the database with a new encryption key may be
necessary when any of the attribute seeds, either the logical schema ID or tu-
ple counters, overflow. These parameters are set to a su ciently large value
to avoid frequent re-encryption. Although these two encryption modes intro-
duce additional parameters (attribute seed) that require special management
to maintain its uniqueness, they are more secure than the conventional AES
encryption because the encrypted data are now non-deterministic due to the
unique encryption seed being used. It means that even if two attributes are of
the same value, the encrypted data look completely di erent.
Our design does not rely on encrypting the query statements. One poten-
tial drawback is the information leakage from the query statements. We refer
to it as indirect information leakage. Take a query statement like “SELECT
NAME, AGE FROM TABLE WHERE ID=‘1234’;” as an example. An adver-
sary can learn from this unencrypted query statement that the user is searching
for NAME and AGE with a certain ID number. However, he is unable to learn
the exact information because all the query outputs are encrypted. The cor-
responding information leakage is at most the number of entries satisfying the
WHERE clause. Such indirect information leakage can be solved by sending
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dummy output results but this is not considered in our study.
The use of OPE to encrypt indices can leak the order of the sensitive infor-
mation due to the nature of the encryption algorithm. However, we note that
this information leakage is inevitable with the use of B+tree indexing, even if
the indices are encrypted with strong encryption. B+tree uses a binary search
tree which stores and accesses the indices in ascending/descending order. An
adversary can passively observe the storage of these indices or the access pat-
tern in order to learn the order of the indices. Since the use of B+tree naturally
discloses the order of the indices, the use of OPE can thus achieve better per-
formance (without any decryption) and does not sacrifice any security at the
same time.
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Chapter 6
Processor Architecture
This chapter describes CypherDB secure processor architecture. The main
goal of this processor architecture is to provide architectural support to our
proposed look-ahead encryption scheme (see Section 5.2) and protect the pri-
vacy of any intermediate data stored in o -chip memory in high performance.
This chapter is organized as follows. We first investigate a typical database
application to identify the sensitive data that need protection. Based on this
investigation, we then present an overview of the architecture, which provides
three separate data paths for secure execution. After that, the design of each
of these three data paths is discussed. Finally, a query execution example is
presented, and the security of this architecture is discussed.
6.1 Database Profiling
Figure 6.1 presents the memory layout of a typical database application which
outlines the necessary data in a typical database application. The database
records are packed and stored in a format called a payload. This payload
contains a record header to describe the features of the record and attribute
o set to locate each attribute within a record. Multiple payloads are organized
on a database page. Each database page has its own page header and record
pointer array. During the execution, the DBMS allocates a segment of heap
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STACK
attribute1
Database Page Buffer
 Header Attribute Offset attribute2 ...
Page Header
Record Pointer Array
   
 Payload
 
...
...
DBMS Virtual memory 
Data Page (DBPage)
Payload
Figure 6.1: The memory layout of a typical database application process. The
database records are formatted in a structure of database pages where the database
pages are stored in bu ers allocated in heap memory.
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memory, forming a Database Page bu er, to accommodate multiple database
pages. It can be seen that all of the aforementioned database data can be
classified into three types:
• Attribute data: the database record outsourced by the database owner.
• Metadata: the non-sensitive information such as page header, record
o set, payload header and attribute o set that is useful for the DBMS
to manage the storage or access of the database records.
• Execution data: the intermediate value generated on-the-fly during pro-
gram execution stored in heap or stack memory.
In order to evaluate the performance impact of these three types of data
accesses during a database query operation, we investigated the o -chip mem-
ory access profile, which is reported as having the most impact on execution
time when performing database queries [86]. Our investigation is based on
executing the 22 queries in TPC-H [75] on SQLite using a cycle accurate sim-
ulator, SimpleScalar [87]. Figure 6.2 depicts the breakdown of each type of
data contributing to the last-level cache miss, which shows three important
observations and insights:
• Almost half of last-level data cache misses are caused by loading the
metadata. These data contain non-sensitive information, and thus en-
cryption is not required.
• Execution data are used frequently which results in a high cache hit rate
(95%). However, over 14% to 63% of last-level data cache misses are
caused by loading these execution data from o -chip memory. These
data need to be encrypted at the processor boundary due to the high
data reuse profile in the last-level cache.
• Last-level data cache misses on loading the attribute data vary from 2%
to 34%. These data are protected by our proposed look-ahead encryption
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Figure 6.2: A quantitative analysis of total stall time caused by the last-level data
cache miss by executing the 22 queries in TPC-H using SQLite in SimpleScalar. The
stall time contributed by the three di erent types of data: attribute data, metadata
and execution data, are measured.
scheme, where encryption latency can occasionally be hidden from the
o -chip memory data access (see Section 5.2.1).
6.2 Architectural Overview
Figure 6.3 depicts the architectural model of the CypherDB processor. The
key idea behind the CypherDB architecture is to deploy dedicated hardware
data paths to separately handle the aforementioned three di erent types of
data commonly found in any database application. These three di erent types
of data are stored in di erent locations in o -chip memory, which are desig-
nated as “compartments”: Seed Memory Compartment (SeedMem) for storing
encryption seeds, Secure Memory Compartment (SMC) for storing execution
data, and Database Page Compartment (DBPage) for storing attribute data
and metadata. Three data paths are designed to load the data into the proces-
sor in DBPage and SMC memory compartments securely and e ciently (see
Figure 6.3):
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ALU
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L1 D-Cache
Random number generator
L2 D-CacheDBPage seed buffer
SMC seed buffer
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(execution data)
SeedMem
(encryption seeds)
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(attribute data, metadata)
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AES Encryption 
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Encryption Key Registers
AES Encryption 
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Non-volatile memory Volatile memory Protection Boundary
S bit
S bit
Figure 6.3: Proposed architecture of the CypherDB secure processor. O -chip mem-
ory is partitioned into three compartments. Three data paths are set up to execute
the three di erent types of data. The components in grey indicate additional hard-
ware features.
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• Data path 1 : It is an unmodified data path akin to that used in a
conventional processor to process non-sensitive metadata, which causes
no processing penalty.
• Data path 2 : The attribute data are executed on this data path with
the use of our proposed look-ahead encryption scheme. Since registers
are the only visible storage for software, the AES encryption engine is
therefore placed between the level 1 data cache and the register files.
• Data path 3 : All execution data have to follow this data path where
the AES encryption engine is placed closest to the chip boundary. The
encryption or decryption is done on the entire cache line which is com-
pletely transparent to the application software.
Four new special registers are used to store the encryption keys. There is no
instruction to read the contents of these registers, which protect these encryp-
tion keys from any malicious software. A random number generator is used
to create random bit vectors for security purposes. An addition bit (S_bit)
is appended to each data cache line entry to indicate whether protection is
required. DBPage and SMC seed bu ers are on-chip memory used to store
the attribute seeds and the SMC encryption seeds, respectively. The purpose
of these on-chip bu ers is to reduce the o -chip memory access of fetching the
seed for encryption.
6.2.1 Private Key Registers
There are four encryption keys employed in our secure query processing: on-
chip private key, database encryption key, query encryption key and SMC
encryption key. Their functionalities are summarized in Table 6.1.
An on-chip private key is written into the on-chip non-volatile register dur-
ing chip manufacturing. There is no instruction support to modify or extract
this key from the register. For the other three encryption keys, there is only
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Table 6.1: A summary of the functionality of the four encryption keys used in secure
query processing
Encryption Keys Functionality
On-chip Private Key
Encrypt or decrypt the database encryption
and query encryption key in key encapsulation
mechanism, and sign the digital certification for
secure processor attestation
Database Encryption Key
Encrypt or decrypt the attribute data during
secure query processing in our proposed encryp-
tion scheme
Query Encryption Key Encrypt the query result using our proposed en-cryption scheme
SMC Encryption Key Encrypt or decrypt the cache line in SMC toprotect execution data during query processing
instruction support to store the keys in these on-chip registers but not to ex-
tract them. Database and query encryption keys are obtained from the key
encapsulation mechanism described in Section 4.2.1. They can be dynamically
stored in the on-chip registers with special instructions. A SMC encryption
key is generated by the on-chip random number generator at the beginning of
a secure query execution.
6.2.2 New Security Instructions
The new instructions and their functionalities to support CypherDB are sum-
marized in Table 6.2. The architecture of these new instructions on OpenRISC
(our implementation prototype) is presented in Appendix A.
During the key exchange process between the database owner and the
cloud servers, the database encryption key Kdb and query encryption key
KQ are stored in the on-chip registers via the load_encKey instruction. The
load_encKey instruction takes EPK(Key) as the input which contains either
an encrypted database or query encryption keys and decrypts it using the
on-chip private key. The switch_encKey instruction is used to switch the
use of encryption key, between database encryption key and query encryption
key, along data path 2 . The verify_encKey instruction verifies the certifi-
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Table 6.2: New Instructions in CypherDB
New Instructions Description
start_cypherdb_query Allocate SMC and generate SMC encryption key, andinitiate the encryption seed in SeedMem
end_cypherdb_query Dis-allocate SMC and destroy SMC encryption key
l.seed Load/Store attribute seed for attribute decryp-tion/encryption
l.shift Shift the encryption pad according to the value indi-cated in the operand of the instruction
l.sload/l.sstore Decrypt/encrypt attribute data with the encryptionpad
set_sr Set a security register value which stores the param-eter to be used in the proposed architecture
load_encKey
Load the encrypted database key and encrypted
query key; and decrypt the keys with private key and
store in on-chip registers
switch_encKey
Switch the encryption key used in the AES encryption
engine along data-path 2 between database key and
query key
verify_encKey
Verify the database key and query key by checking
the digital signature Sig(EPKC(Kdb),EPKC(KQ)) for on-
chip verification of the query encryption key
sign_cert Sign a certificate with on-chip private key for proces-sor attestation
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cate Sig(EPK(Kdb,KQ)) by checking the signature, decrypting EPK(Kdb,KQ) and
comparing the Kdb and KQ with the on-chip key value. The sign_cert instruc-
tion uses the on-chip private key to generate a digital certificate for processor
attestation.
To start the query execution, the start_cypherdb_query instruction is ex-
ecuted to perform three tasks: 1) allocate the SMC memory, 2) generate a
per-query SMC encryption key and 3) initiate the encryption seed in Seed-
Mem. The l.sload, l.sstore, l.shift and l.seed instructions are used to realize
our proposed encryption scheme. The set_sr instruction is used to write or
read some parameters in our proposed architecture to security registers (e.g.
SMC and SeedMem memory boundary address). To end the query execution,
the end_cypherdb_query instruction is executed to free the SMC memory and
destroy the SMC encryption key.
6.3 Virtual to Physical Memory Mapping
The concept of memory compartment is realized in virtual and physical mem-
ory addressing space as shown in Figure 6.4. There are two contiguous memory
blocks separately allocated to be the SMC and SeedMem while the other mem-
ory space can be freely allocated to the application process. The starting and
ending address of these two contiguous memory blocks (SMC_start, SMC_end,
SMC_seed_start, SMC_seed_end) can be stored in the security registers via
the set_sr instruction.
To make use of these memory compartments in physical memory, the
database application process first sets up its own virtual memory space. The
DBMS can still use the stack and heap memory as normal except that these
memory regions in virtual memory are mapped to the SMC in physical memory.
Meanwhile, the DBPage bu er and the array of attribute seed can be freely
allocated to other physical memory space. Two custom memory allocators
are used to allocate the heap memory separately towards execution data and
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Physical Memory
SMC
HEAP
STACK
DBPage Buffer
DBMS Virtual memory 
Array of Attribute Seed
SMC_start
SMC_end
SMC_seed_start
SMC_seed_end
stack_top
start_brk
TEXT, DATA, BSS 
Segment
Figure 6.4: The virtual to physical memory mapping of the three memory compart-
ments. The DBPage bu er is freely mapped to any available physical memory space
while the remaining stack and heap memory is allocated to a contiguous memory
block as SMC. A contiguous memory block is also allocated to store the encryption
seed as SeedMem.
database pages, which we define as smalloc and dpmalloc, respectively. The
smalloc allocates the memory in SMC for execution data while the dpmalloc
freely assigns the non-SMC memory region to database pages. The memory
allocation mechanism of smalloc and dpmalloc is the same as the malloc in
GNU C [88] library except that smalloc and dpmalloc monitor the memory
usage of di erent memory regions.
The SMC encryption seed is stored in SeedMem. The cache controller
fetches the encryption seed from SeedMem to the SMC seed bu er to en-
crypt/decrypt the cache line in SMC. On the other hand, the attribute seeds
are stored in the heap memory in an array so that they are stored consecutively
in distinct (non-consecutive) memory pages. The attribute seeds have to be
explicitly loaded into the DBpage seed bu er or written back to the o -chip
memory via the l.seed instruction.
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6.4 Data Protection
The attribute data are protected by our proposed look-ahead encryption scheme.
It uses the l.seed instruction to load the encryption seed into an on-chip regis-
ter Regseed and compute the encryption pad, l.sload/l.sstore to load (or store)
and decrypt (or encrypt) the data, and uses l.shi f t to shift the encryption pad
accordingly (see Section 5.2). As this l.shi f t instruction is used every time
to shift the encryption pad, it introduces additional instruction and execution
overhead. To alleviate these drawbacks, a hardware shifter is used to shift the
encryption pad automatically after each l.sload/l.sstore instruction based on
the observation that the attribute data are usually accessed in sequence from
the first byte to the last byte.
Figure 6.5 depicts the flow chart of the hardware shifter. The key idea of
this hardware shifter is to perform encryption pad shifting implicitly after each
l.sload/l.sstore instruction but allows explicit shifting using l.shi f t and l.seed
instructions. The hardware shifter is able to implicitly shift the encryption pad
in accordance with the granularity of the l.sload/l.sstore instruction. l.shi f t
can override l.sload/l.sstore to shift the encryption pad to the value indicated
in the operand. The total number of bits being shifted is recorded and stored
in a special register Regshi f t . When the encryption pad is shifted to the end
(Regshi f t   16), a new encryption pad is generated for the use of AES-OFB en-
cryption. To decrypt/encrypt another attribute datum, the l.seed instruction
can generate a new encryption pad and reset Regshi f t to zero.
6.4.1 DBPage Seed Bu er
The purpose of the DBPage seed bu er is to store a subset of attribute seeds to
on-chip memory, so that the attribute seeds can be served faster when needed.
As described in Section 5.3, each attribute datum requires an attribute seed in
our proposed look-ahead encryption scheme. This attribute seed is formulated
with the use of logical schema, which can be “generated” during program
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l.sload/
l.sstore?
Regshift = 16?
encPad = AES(encPad)
Regshift = 0
START
l.seed?
encPad = AES(seed)
Regshift = 0
END
l.shift?
encPad << y
Regshift = y
YES YES YES
YES
NO
Regshift:  Total number of bits being 
shifted
encPad: encryption pad
x: Granularity of l.sload instruction
y: Number of bits to shift indicated 
by the l.shift instruction
xl.sload/l.sstore
4load/store word
2load/store half
1load/store byte
encPad << x
Regshift = Regshift + x
Figure 6.5: A flow chart describing the hardware shifter that implicitly shifts the
encryption pad for di erent granularity of l.sload/l.sstore instructions. The l.shi f t
and l.seed can override the operation of hardware shifter to explicitly set the value
of Regshi f t .
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execution. The only seed component requiring extra storage is the record
counter, which is shared by all attributes within a record. A mapping table is
used to take rowID as the input to retrieve the corresponding record counter.
Without the DBPage seed bu er, o -chip memory access of the record
counter is necessary to encrypt/decrypt each attribute being stored/loaded.
One of the key ideas of our proposed encryption scheme is to pre-compute
the encryption pad so as to hide the encryption latency from the program
execution. An o -chip memory access of the record counter virtually lengthens
the latency of the encryption pad computation by an o -chip memory access
latency. This requires l.seed to be issued even earlier which makes the task of
encryption latency hiding much more di cult (see Section 5.2.1).
The DBPage seed bu er can reduce the frequency of o -chip memory access
by keeping a number of record counters in the bu er. As fetching the record
counters in an on-chip bu er can be achieved in a few processor cycles, it is
much faster than o -chip memory access which takes hundreds of cycles to
complete. Figure 6.6 depicts a flow chart of our proposed encryption scheme
with the assistance of a DBPage seed bu er. We can see that l.seed is used
to fetch the record counter in SeedMem. This operation is redirected to the
DBPage seed bu er. The DBPage seed bu er calls a function seed(rowID)
to search for the record counter locally. If the record counter is stored in
the bu er, it can be used directly to compute the encryption pad; otherwise,
the record counter is fetched from the o -chip memory. The execution flow
along data path 2 is very similar to data path 1 , except that the data
being fetched/stored need to wait for the encryption pad until it is ready and
undergoes decryption/encryption (XOR operation) before being written into
cache/o -chip memory.
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Figure 6.6: A flow chart describing the execution flow of data path 1 and data path
2 with the assistance of a DBPage seed bu er. The DBPage bu er can reduce the
frequency of o -chip memory access to fetch the attribute seed.
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6.5 Execution Protection
We employ the cache line encryption technique proposed in [36] and use a
random SMC encryption key for each query session requested by the database
owner. This design is based on the following observations:
• From the perspective of the database owner, execution data are only use-
ful during query processing but not after the query result is generated.
The execution data can thus be discarded after each query execution.
Generating a random per-query session key is thus viable in our archi-
tectural design.
• As shown in our architectural profiling of a database application (see
Section 6.1), the execution data in the last-level data cache are frequently
reused. Encrypting these data at the processor boundary can reduce
encryption frequency and thus alleviate the encryption penalty.
• As the caching system is transparent to the application software, encrypt-
ing the cache line can thus reduce the necessary software modification to
protect execution data.
6.5.1 Cache Line Encryption
Algorithm 2 presents the pseudo-code of the cache line encryption/decryption
in write-back mode. Write back cache is employed in our architecture so that
each cache line in the SMC is decrypted/encrypted using AES-CTR when it
is loaded into (or written back from) the processor. AES-CTR is used to
o oad the encryption penalty from the critical path by parallelizing the seed
encryption and o -chip memory access of the cache line. As the last-level
cache line usually consists of multiple 128-bit cache blocks, multiple hardware
encryption engines can be operated in parallel on those cache blocks. Thus,
the entire cache line can be decrypted/encrypted at most in a single cycle.
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Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code of cache line encryption and decryption
1: l = cache line size (bytes)/16 /* to calculate the number of cache block
within a cache line */
2:
3: /* Decryption of an incoming encrypted cache line */
4: function DecryptCacheLine(ECLin,KSMC,SMC_IV,TAG,count_val)
5: Input: ECLin = encrypted cache line to be fetched, KSMC = SMC en-
cryption key, SMC_IV = initialization vector for SMC encryption, TAG =
Tag portion of physical memory address, count_val = the counter value of
SMC encryption seed
6: Output: CLout = decrypted cache line
7: for 1 i l do /* decrypting each cache block in parallel */
8: CLout [i] = ECLin[i] AES[SMC_IV k TAG+ i k count_val,KSMC]
9: end for
10: CLout =CLout [1] kCLout [2] k ... kCLout [l]
11: return CLout
12: end function
13:
14: /* Encryption of outgoing cache line */
15: function EncryptCacheLine(CLin,KSMC,SMC_IV,TAG,count_val)
16: Input: ECLin = cache line to be evicted, KSMC = SMC encryption key,
SMC_IV = initialization vector for SMC encryption, TAG = Tag portion
of physical memory address, count_val = the counter value of SMC en-
cryption seed
17: Output: CLout = encrypted cache line
18: for 1 i l do /* encrypting each cache block in parallel */
19: ECLout [i] =CLin[i] AES[SMC_IV k TAG+ i k count_val,KSMC]
20: end for
21: ECLout =CLin[1] kCLin[2] k ... kCLin[l]
22: return ECLout
23: end function
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To ensure security, a unique seed is generated for each cache line for the
entire SMCmemory space. This unique cache line seed,CLSeed, is produced by
concatenating two fields: 1) the tag portion of the physical memory address
TAG, and 2) a unique counter value count_val, while the remaining bit is
padded with a random bit vector SMC_IV :
CLSeed = SMC_IV k TAG k count_val (6.1)
The count_val associated with each cache line is stored in SeedMem, and
is incremented every time the cache line is written back to o -chip memory.
The TAG and SMC_IV are obtained from on-chip address bus and security
register, respectively.
To obtain the count_val from SeedMem, the cache controller uses the
physical address of the cache line (ADDRCL) and the SeedMem_start stored
in the security register to calculate the physical address of the count_val
(ADDRSMCseed) to be fetched as shown in the following equation:
bit_shi f t = log2(cache line size(bytes))  log2(count_val_size(bytes))
ADDRSMCseed = ((ADDRCL SMC_start)>> bit_shi f t)+SeedMem_start
(6.2)
We can see that it first takes the o set of the cache line address in the SMC
and replaces the base address from SMC_start to SeedMem_start. Then, the
o set value is divided by the cache line size so that the o set value is now
incremental towards consecutive cache lines. As the count_val can be larger
than a byte, it is further multiplied by the size of count_val. The size of
the SeedMem is therefore proportional to the SMC size, cache line size and
count_val size as shown in the following equation:
SeedMemsize = (SMC_end SMC_start)>> bit_shi f t (6.3)
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For a computing system which uses a 64-byte cache line size and 2-byte
count_val as encryption seed, the memory overhead caused by SeedMem is
around 3%. This shows that the memory overhead caused by SeedMem is
acceptable.
6.5.2 SMC Execution Setup
To allow protection of execution data along data path 3 , an execution en-
vironment has to be setup which mainly involves four procedures: START-
QUERYEXEC, ENDQUERYEXEC, FETCHCACHELINE and EVICTCACHE-
LINE as described in Algorithm 3.
To start a secure query execution, STARTQUERYEXEC function is called
to initialize the SMC_encryption_key, SMC_IV, and to set up the SMC by
obtaining its starting address SMC_start and ending address SMC_end. All
count_val stored in o -chip memory is also initialized to zero while the SMC
seed bu er entries are all invalidated. The initialization of count_val is to
indicate that the cache lines in the SMC are all unencrypted. Our algorithm
ensures that the encrypted cache lines always have non-zero count_val.
To fetch a cache line from o -chip memory, the cache controller calls
FETCHCACHELINE to load the corresponding count_val and decrypt the
cache line in the SMC. All the fetched cache lines in the SMC assert the S_bit
in the data cache entries, but only those encrypted cache lines undergo decryp-
tion. The unencrypted cache line can be directly stored in the on-chip data
cache. EVICTCACHELINE is called in two scenarios: to write back or to
flush the cache lines. Both operations evict the cache lines to o -chip memory.
To encrypt the cache line, the count_val is incremented to avoid the CLseed
from being reused. The cache lines with S_bit asserted are encrypted before
writing them to the o -chip data buses.
The secure query execution is ended with function ENDQUERYEXEC.
This erases the SMC_encryption_key, SMC_IV and abandons the SMC by
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setting the corresponding registers to zero. However, the memory content in
the SMC does not need to be erased because it is protected by encryption. As
the SMC_encryption_key is destroyed, the content cannot be recovered. This
can save the time-consuming o -chip memory clean-up operation.
Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code of execution setup in the SMC
1: randomBit(k) = obtain a k-bit vector from random number generator
2: f etchCountVal(addr) = obtain the count_val with address equals to addr
3: writeCountVal(addr,count_value) = store the count_val to SeedMem with
address equals to addr
4: S_bit(TAG) = the secure bit of an on-chip cache line with the tag address
equal to TAG
5:
6: /* Start of the secure query execution */
7: function startQueryExec
8: SMC_encryption_key= randomBit(128)
9: SMC_IV = randomBit(128  lengthO f (TAG)  lengthO f (count_val))
10: Obtain SMC_start & SMC_end
11: Set all count_val = 0
12: If SMC encryption seed bu er exists, invalidate all entries
13: end function
14:
15: /* Fetching an encrypted cache line from o -chip memory */
16: function fetchCacheLine(CLRAM, CLCACHE)
17: Input:CLRAM = cache line fetched from o -chip memory
18: Output:CLCACHE = cache line to be stored in on-chip cache
19: if (SMC_start  addr  SMC_end) then
20: S_bit(tag) = 1
21: count_val = f etchCountVal(addr)
22: if count_val 6= 0 then
23: CLCACHE = DECRYPTCACHELINE(CLRAM)
24: else
25: CLCACHE =CLRAM
26: end if
27: else
28: CLCACHE =CLRAM
29: end if
30: end function
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Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code of execution setup in the SMC (continued)
31: /* Evicting a cache line to o -chip memory */
32: function evictCacheLine(CLCACHE , CLRAM)
33: Input:CLCACHE = cache line to be evicted from on-chip cache
34: Output:CLRAM = cache line to be stored in o -chip memory
35: if S_bit(tag) = 1 then
36: count_val = f etchCountVal(addr) + 1
37: writeCountVal(addr,count_val+1)
38: CLRAM = ENCRYPTCACHELINE(CLCACHE)
39: else
40: CLRAM =CLCACHE
41: end if
42: end function
43:
44: /* End of the secure query execution */
45: function endQueryExec
46: Set SMC_encryption_key= 0
47: Set SMC_start = SMC_end = 0
48: Set SMC_IV = 0
49: end function
6.5.3 SMC Seed Bu er
Because count_value is the only component that requires o -chip memory
storage in CLSeed, the SMC seed bu er is used to store this value on-chip
so as to minimize the o -chip memory access. Similar to the DBPage seed
bu er, the purpose of the SMC seed bu er is to store a portion of count_value
on-chip so that they can be served fast when needed. Figure 6.7 presents the
flow chat of the cache line encryption with the use of a SMC seed bu er. The
overall execution can be divided into three types: normal execution, cache line
decryption and cache line encryption.
In normal execution, a cache line is loaded into the on-chip cache or written
back to the o -chip memory without any encryption/decryption. This execu-
tion flow is to serve any data execution outside the SMC or unencrypted cache
line in the SMC.
FETCHCACHELINE function is called to decrypt the cache line, if neces-
sary, when a cache line is fetched from the SMC. The f etchCountal function
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first tries to retrieve the corresponding count_value from the SMC seed bu er.
The best case is that the count_val is found in the SMC seed bu er. This value
can be used to pre-compute the encryption pad. The computation of encryp-
tion pad can thus be made parallel with the o -chip memory access of fetching
the cache line. If the count_val is unfortunately not found in the bu er, it has
to be fetched from the o -chip memory before fetching the cache line. After
that, the encryption pad can still be pre-computed before the cache line is
loaded. However, this causes additional o -chip memory access to fetch the
count_val. The worst case scenario is that there is a conflict miss in the SMC
seed bu er. Due to the conflict miss, the dirty seed (the seed being incre-
mented) has to be first written back to the o -chip memory before fetching
the correct count_value from it. This results in two additional o -chip memory
accesses.
EVICTCACHELINE function is called to encrypt a cache line when it is
to be evicted to the SMC. Again, the f etchCountal function is used to get the
count_value from the seed bu er. As the cache line can be evicted immedi-
ately, the computation of the encryption pad has nowhere to hide. The cache
controller has to wait for the encryption pad computation before evicting and
encrypting the cache line. Similar to the cache line decryption, the best case
is to have the count_value stored in the bu er which introduces encryption
latency only. The worst case is to have a conflict miss, which causes two addi-
tional o -chip memory access latencies plus encryption latency. Nevertheless,
the performance penalty caused by the cache line encryption can be greatly
alleviated with the use of an on-chip victim bu er. A victim bu er can be
used to hold the cache lines being written to the o -chip memory. In other
words, it postpones the operation of writing back the cache line. This pro-
vides more timing margin to write back an incremented count_value, load the
correct count_value and encrypt CLseed to generate the encryption pad.
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6.6 Query Execution Example
The query processing over an encrypted database is protected by executing
di erent kinds of data along the three data paths in our design. In this sec-
tion, we use a query “SELECT Name, Remark FROM table WHERE IDOPE <
24675431” (see Figure 5.4) as an illustrative example to demonstrate how these
three data paths provide protection for query processing. In this query, the op-
eration involves a B+tree search on the index (IDOPE), copying the relevant at-
tributes (Name, Remark) to some temporary variables (dataBu f in Figure 6.8)
and returning back the query result (dataBu f ) to the user. Figure 6.8 shows
the data paths and the involved hardware components of this query operation
in CypherDB. The data flow is explained as follows.
Before the start of query execution, the database application follows two
steps to set up the secure execution environment: 1) load and verify the
database and query encryption keys via the load_encKey and verify_encKey
instructions respectively, and 2) call STARTQUERYEXEC function to generate
the SMC encryption key and set up the SMC via the start_cypherDB_query
and set_sr instructions (see Section 6.5.2). The database encryption key is
set as the default encryption key along data path 2 .
The query execution starts by following data path 1 to process some meta-
data and search for the index as shown in Figure 6.8(a). Note that the index
is encrypted with OPE such that no decryption is needed for the index search.
For a matched condition (IDOPE < 24675431), the corresponding encrypted at-
tribute has to be processed along data path 2 as illustrated in Figure 6.8(b).
Before accessing the encrypted attribute, the seed value is first loaded into the
seed register Regseed via the l.seed instruction. The encryption pad is generated
using a database encryption key with the value stored in Regseed and the at-
tribute counter in the DBPage seed bu er. To access the encrypted attribute,
the encrypted data are loaded into the processor via the l.sload instruction.
The result of the operation has to be stored in the SMC. It is first stored
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.8: Diagrams demonstrating how the data are executed during a query
processing example. The Encrypted Data are loaded along data path 2 and copied
to dataBuf. The dataBuf is protected by cache line encryption along data path
3. The data paths used are highlighted in BLUE, the encryption keys used are
highlighted in RED and the encryption seeds used are highlighted in GREEN. (a)
Execution along data path 1 for non-sensitive data. (b) Execution along data path
2 to load the encrypted attribute data from DBPage memory. (c) Execution along
data path 3 where the cache line is encrypted before evicting it from the processor.
(d) Execution along data path 2 for query output protection where a query key is
used to encrypt the query result
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in on-chip cache until the cache line needs to be evicted from the processor.
As seen in Figure 6.8(c), prior to storing the modified cache line (cache line
3) back to the o -chip memory, the whole cache line is encrypted with the
SMC encryption key and an incremented counter value in the SMC seed bu er
together with the physical address along data path 3 . At the end of the query
processing, the data stored in dataBu f has to be sent back to the user as a
query output. This has to be done in three steps (see Figure 6.8(d)):
• Load the encrypted cache line along data path 3 ;
• Switch the encryption key on data path 2 from the database encryption
key Kdb to query encryption key KQ via the switch_encKey instruction.
• Encrypt the query output using KQ and our proposed encryption scheme
(see Section 5.3.3) along data path 2 .
6.7 Discussion
6.7.1 SMC Allocation
In CypherDB architecture, it requires a contiguous physical memory space to
allocate the SMC. This is to assist the hardware protection circuit to identify
the SMC using the boundary addresses. There are various methods to allocate
a secure memory compartment.
One approach to obtain this contiguous physical memory region is to use
Contiguous Memory Allocator (CMA) [89]. CMA is developed to allow big
physically contiguous memory allocations which have already been used to
support x86 and ARM architecture. It was originally designed to support de-
vice drivers that use a large physical memory. This can however be leveraged
to allocate the SMC in our system where the kernel can thus map the heap
and stack memory in virtual memory space to this physical contiguous memory
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region. The disadvantage of this memory allocator is that it has to be initial-
ized early at boot time, which means that the SMC and SeedMem have to be
defined at the system bootup. Regarding the large Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) in modern computing systems, a su ciently large SMC can
be set up at boot time to support the secure query execution. As this approach
relies on the kernel to set up the SMC, a secure launch or boot technology [11]
has to be employed to launch the kernel module that is responsible for the
memory allocation and address mapping.
Another approach is to employ some existing hardware-assisted isolated
execution solutions such as Iso-X [27] or Bastion [33]. This approach has two
advantages. First, it can dynamically set up isolated memory compartments
at run-time. Second, the isolation among memory compartments is enforced at
hardware level which provides better protection to the memory compartments.
This approach uses a hardware-assisted mechanism to set up the memory com-
partment and perform the virtual to physical memory mapping, which does
not rely on any security kernel. For example, Iso-X uses a bit vector to indicate
whether each physical page belongs to any compartment. This bit vector is
stored in a reserved memory region at system bootup and is only accessible
by the processor. When a new physical memory page is allocated to a com-
partment, the corresponding bit in the bit vector is asserted. Similarly, this
bit vector can be leveraged to specify whether the physical page belongs to
the SMC and SeedMem in our design so that the SMC and SeedMem can be
dynamically allocated.
6.7.2 Comparison with Alternative Approaches
One proposed solution to protect the intermediate value generated on-the-fly
during execution is to use the technique of Information Flow Tracking (IFT)
[90, 91]. This method taints all the intermediate data that have an implicit and
explicit relationship with the sensitive information. For example, architectural
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supported Dynamic Information Flow Track (DIFT) [90] is proposed to identify
spurious information flows from the I/O and monitor their use so as to protect
the program execution from this spurious information. Although IFT provides
a solution to track the data, it does not provide any solution to protect spurious
or sensitive information. How to protect the privacy of the execution data in
our design remains an unknown and challenging question. Nevertheless, IFT
can potentially exhibit false positives or false negatives which make it still
challenging to put it into practice [92].
Cache line encryption using AES-CTR has been extensively studied in
[25, 36]. However, these approaches use cache line encryption to protect the
entire memory space where application and data are encrypted as a whole. In
[50], it is suggested to encrypt/decrypt the user’s data using a TSM and store
it in a TSM bu er, while the TSM bu er is protected by cache line encryp-
tion. This however introduces an additional encryption/decryption layer to
re-encrypt the encrypted user’s data into application data, which can poten-
tially result in tremendous performance overhead in a database application.
For example, with a limited size of DBPage bu ers, the database pages, which
contain the user’s data, have to be frequently swapped in/out from/to the
persistent storage. This requires frequently re-encrypting the user’s data into
application data (or vice versa). Our proposed lookahead encryption scheme
can e ectively eliminate this re-encryption layer. Also, the separation of the
memory compartments can result in a smaller SMC. A smaller SMC requires
less encryption seed. It turns out that it not only reduces memory overhead
of storing the encryption seed in the SeedMem but also minimizes the perfor-
mance overhead. In an ideal case where the SMC seed bu er can accommodate
all SMC encryption seeds, the performance overhead caused by cache line en-
cryption can be extremely small.
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6.7.3 Extension on Speculative OoO multicore proces-
sor
Speculative execution allows instructions to be executed before it is known
whether they are needed. A common form of speculative execution is based on
branch prediction so that the non-yet-determined instructions (i.e. instructions
after a branch) can be executed ahead of the branch. Although the instructions
are executed, they are only committed if the branch prediction is true.
Under our proposed architecture, the look-ahead encryption which involves
l.seed, l.shi f t, l.sload and l.sstore can be speculatively executed and committed
to only when the prediction is correct. More resources (e.g. encryption pad
bu er) are needed to store the speculatively executed result. The description
of each instruction is as follows:
• l.seed/l.shi f t: The encryption pad can be speculatively computed/shifted
to store the pad in a temporary data bu er. The result is committed to
by overwriting the encryption pad used in the pipeline.
• l.sload/l.sstore: The incoming data can be decrypted and stored in the
load store unit (LSU). The outgoing data can be encrypted and stored
in a store bu er. Similar to normal load/store instructions, the result
is committed to by writing the value into register/o -chip memory until
the prediction is proven to be true.
The other security instructions (e.g. start_cypherdb_query) do not sup-
port speculative execution. These instructions are mainly used to set up or
quit the secure execution which occurs infrequently during program execution.
Therefore, speculatively executing them is expected to have little performance
improvement but is costly on reverting the execution if the branch prediction
is wrong.
The attribute encryption can be extended to an out-of-order (OoO) pro-
cessor. The problem associated with OoO execution is due to the fact that
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the instruction executed in the processor pipeline is not of the same order as
compiled in software. In our attribute encryption model, the additional in-
structions are assumed and supposed to be issued in the following order: 1)
l.seed (to generate the encryption pad), 2) l.shift (optional, to shift the en-
cryption pad) and 3) l.sload/l.sstore (to load and decrypt/encrypt the data).
These instructions do not necessarily need to be issued consecutively but hap-
pen to follow the above sequence within a piece of code. Hazards occur when
the execution is not in accordance with the above sequence:
• The l.sload/l.sstore instruction is executed before the l.seed/l.shift in-
structions
• The l.shift instruction is executed before the l.seed instruction
To tackle these hazards, a similar scoreboard approach can be used to figure
out the above dependency in hardware. That is to say l.sload/l.sstore will not
be executed when l.shift/l.seed has not completed its execution. Also, l.shift
will not be executed when l.seed has not completed. The dependency among
these instructions can be identified in hardware through setting priority for
the decoded signal in the instruction decoder. This signal priority information
will be stored in the scoreboard to avoid the hazard.
In multi-core systems, the process may run using di erent cores from time
to time. If the OS migrates the process between cores, the on-chip private key
has to be migrated to another core as well. Under our current architecture,
the database and query encryption key can be migrated by first destroying the
keys in the core and then loading the encrypted database and query encryp-
tion key to another core (i.e. use load_encKey instruction to load EPK(Kdb)
and EPK(KQ) into the core to be migrated). A better approach would be to
perform an on-chip key migration. Since the cores all reside within a single
chip (i.e. within the protection boundary), the encryption key can actually be
transferred from one core to another using the on-chip bus. In this case, some
ISA design may be needed to support such operation.
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6.8 Security Analysis
CypherDB architecture employs three di erent encryption keys for various
encryption purposes: 1) database encryption key to encrypt an outsourced
database, 2) query encryption key to encrypt query results, and 3) SMC en-
cryption key to encrypt cache lines which contain sensitive execution data.
These encryption keys are stored securely in on-chip key registers. The ad-
vantage of using three separate encryption keys is two-fold. First, it isolates
the encryption protection of attribute data and on-the-fly execution data by
employing di erent encryption keys. Even if one can break the encryption
in the SMC, the most critical secret - the database encryption key Kdb is still
safe from tampering. Secondly, the uniqueness of the seed used in database en-
cryption can remain “unpolluted” regardless of the execution in the SMC. This
makes the re-encryption of the attribute data with a new seed value become
data-update dependent rather than program-execution dependent.
The protection of execution data is achieved by encrypting each cache line
in the SMC using AES-CTR encryption. As discussed in Section 5.4, the
security strength of AES-CTR relies on the uniqueness of the encryption seed
being used. In our proposed architecture, each cache line uses CLSeed as the
encryption seed. This seed is spatially unique among the cache lines with
the use of the TAG portion of the physical address, and is temporally unique
with the use of an incremental counter value count_val. The last component of
CLSeed is SMC_IV . It is an initialization vector to make theCLSeed even more
unpredictable as recommended in [93]. The use of a random SMC encryption
key per query session can also refresh the spatial uniqueness and temporal
uniqueness of the physical address and incremental counter. By having a per
query session SMC encryption key and a su ciently larger incremental counter,
re-encryption of the execution data in the SMC can be avoided.
To crack database encryption, an adversary can send a forged seed value to
the seed register in order to perform a “two-time-pad” attack. This is however
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outside the scope of this thesis because such attack has to alter the program
execution which can be protected by [34]. Also, it will also result in an incorrect
database operation, which violates our curious-but-honest administrator threat
model.
Another possible attack can be performed by sending a forged SMC bound-
ary address (altering the SMC_start and SMC_end value in set_sr instruction)
to the processor so that the execution data are no longer protected by cache
line encryption. This can be achieved by tampering with the setup process
of the SMC. However, it is strongly prohibited due to the protection of the
securely launched kernel module or the hardware assisted memory compart-
ment setup (see Section 6.7.1). The detailed security analysis of these two
approaches can be found in [25, 27]. Alternatively, one can also modify the
address value in set_sr instruction even though the SMC is securely set up.
Again, since the program execution of the DBMS can be protected by [34],
such attack is also impossible.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
We implemented the look-ahead encryption scheme and the CypherDB secure
processor on a FPGA to validate and evaluate our designs. We also used
a concrete example of a database application (SQLite [82]) to investigate the
practicability and performance impact of our proposed solution. The hardware
design is specified in Verilog and is synthesized using the ALTERA Quartus
14.0 design tool. The processor runs at 50MHz on the DE2i-150 board with a
Cyclone IV SoC FPGA with 64MB o -chip Synchronous Dynamic Random-
Access Memory (SDRAM). The SQLite is written in C language and is com-
piled using the OpenRISC-specific GCC compiler. The database software is
able to run on top of Linux on our implemented FPGA platform. This chapter
discusses the implementation detail of our design. We first give an overview of
our hardware design. Then we describe our implementation of the CypherDB
secure processor in more detail. Finally, the realization of the look-ahead en-
cryption scheme on SQLite is further discussed.
7.1 Overview
Our implementation is based on the OR1200 core from the OpenRISC project.
The OR1200 core is a simple 4-stage pipeline 32-bit RISC processor, where the
EX and MEM stages of a typical MIPS processor are combined into one stage.
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The OpenRISC project was chosen as our implementation prototype because
it provides comprehensive simulation tools and debugging support for devel-
opment. It is also supported by a 32-bit GNU toolchain to compile bare-metal
applications and Linux applications using newlib and uClibc libraries, respec-
tively. The toolchain support can compile the database application program
to be run on Linux, which abstracts the file management layer to store the
database.
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Figure 7.1: An overview of CypherDB secure processor implementation. The grey
components are the additional security modules implemented in our design. A per-
formance counter (shaded) is also implemented to measure the evaluation metrics
in hardware.
Figure 7.1 illustrates our CypherDB secure processor implementation. An
encryption module and a switch module are implemented inside the processor
core to realize the look-ahead encryption scheme. The switch module is used
to switch from data path 1 to data path 2 and vice versa.
The SMC seed bu er and cache line encryption module are implemented to
encrypt/decrypt the cache line in the SMC. This sets up the protection along
data path 3 . SeedMem Init Unit is used to initialize SMC encryption seeds
(count_val) in SeedMem.
Because the SDRAM is not large enough to accommodate the database to
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be executed in our experiments, the databases to be executed are stored in a
SD card and a SD card controller is implemented accordingly. As the Open-
RISC project does not provide SD card controller implementation support, the
implementation in [94] is employed. A self-developed performance counter is
also implemented to measure the evaluation metrics in hardware.
7.1.1 Impact on the Processor Pipeline
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Figure 7.2: A diagram showing the impact of our implemented modules on the
processor pipeline. The grey components represent our additional security modules
for the CypherDB secure processor.
Figure 7.2 shows how the additional security modules of our design in-
fluence the processor 4-stage pipeline. The security modules that are used to
implement the look-ahead encryption scheme are at the EX stage and the data
path selection module is at the WB stage. The SMC encryption modules are at
the EX stage (or MEM in a traditional 5-stage pipeline), which are operating
between data cache and o -chip memory. As a result, the operation latency of
these security modules could have a direct impact on the processor pipeline.
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Figure 7.3: A block diagram of the CypherDB secure processor core implementation
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7.2 Processor Core
The goal of our processor core design is to support the look-ahead encryption
scheme. Figure 7.3 depicts a high-level overview of our secure processor core
implementation. The blocks in grey are the original OpenRISC components
whereas the white blocks, the encryption module and switch module, are the
additional modules implemented for our look-ahead encryption scheme. Our
modification to OpenRISC is minimal - mainly two components are modified in
our system: (1) instruction decoder - to identify the custom secure instructions,
and (2) Load Store Unit (LSU) - to bu er the data for encryption/decryption
and notify the encryption module about the arrival of data.
Our design aims to minimize the interference with the processor pipeline,
so that the processor can operate at its maximum frequency. We therefore
avoid integrating the encryption Finite State Machine (FSM) into the processor
control unit. Instead, a separate encryption control unit is built which takes the
secure instructions and processor states as inputs. The output of this control
unit is an encryption stall to the processor pipeline. The only combinational
logic added to the OpenRISC pipeline is the switch module which is designed
to have minimal logic delay. In this section, each additional component of the
encryption module is separately described in detail.
7.2.1 Encryption Engines
AES is one of the most widely used type of symmetric encryption which has
outstanding performance in hardware [63, 95]. We employ the open source
AES core [1] released in the OpenCore Community [96]. The implemented
128-bit AES engine can complete the encryption in 12 clock cycles at maximal
160MHz clock frequency on our FPGA platform.
Figure 7.4 shows the block diagram of the implemented AES engine. The
encryption engine takes a 128-bit key for key expansion, and 128-bit data in-
put to perform 10 rounds of permutation, which consists of four transformation
107
Control Unit
Key Expansion
Initial 
Permutation
Round 
Permutation
Final 
Permutation
BytesSub
ShiftRows
MixColumn
AddRoundKey
BytesSub
ShiftRows
AddRoundKey
AddRoundKey
Encryption Key
Plaintext Input Ciphertext output
Encryption start Encryption done
Encryption engine
Figure 7.4: The AES encryption engine employed in our implementation [1]
functions: AddRoundKey, BytesSub, ShiftRows, and MixColumn. Two sepa-
rate encryption engines for load and store data paths are implemented to avoid
any resource contention.
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Figure 7.5: Our implementation of the encryption controller. It controls the encryp-
tion in CTR or OFB mode by switching the data input to the encryption engines
between the attribute seed bu er and the encryption pad bu er.
108
Figure 7.5 depicts the implemented circuit of the encryption controller,
which serves three purposes. First, it provides an asynchronous interface to
the AES encryption engine since the encryption engine can be operating at a
di erent frequency than the processor core. Second, it consists of an encryption
pad bu er (encPad) to store the encryption output from the encryption engine.
This bu ered value is either forwarded to the encryption pad shift module or to
the switch module. Last, it formulates the attribute seed and controls the data
input to the encryption engine. The control unit decodes the l.seed instruction
to store the attribute seed value in an attribute seed bu er from the register
file. It selectively chooses the attribute seed bu er or encryption pad bu er to
be encrypted to support AES-CTR and AES-OFB encryption, respectively.
7.2.3 Encryption Pad Shift Module
The purpose of the encryption pad shift module is to shift the encryption
pad according to the flow chart described in Section 6.4, which provides three
di erent operations: 1) shifting the encryption pad according to the value
specified in the l.shi f t instruction, 2) shifting the encryption pad according to
the l.sload/l.sstore granularity, and 3) storing the newly generated encryption
pad to the shift registers.
As the shift module is within the processor pipeline, its operation latency
is critical to the overall performance. The most performance-critical scenario
is that two l.sload (or two l.sstore) instructions or l.sload/l.sstore and l.shi f t
instructions are executed consecutively. This requires the shifting operation
to be completed in two processor cycles (or one processor cycle in a 5-stage
pipeline) (see Section 7.1.1). A näive implementation is to shift the 128-bit
encryption pad with arbitrary bits in one single cycle. However, such imple-
mentation could consume a lot of resources (almost half the size of the Open-
RISC core). The challenge of the shift module implementation is therefore to
meet the performance constraint with reasonable resource consumption.
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Our shift module design is based on the observation that the shifting op-
eration caused by the l.sload/l.sstore instruction takes place much more often
than the l.shi f t instruction. In fact, our implementation on SQLite shows that
a careful design can eliminate the use of the l.shi f t instruction to shift the en-
cryption pad. Thus, our design only supports quick shifting operation for the
l.sload/l.sstore instruction in one single cycle. The l.shi f t instruction can only
shift the encryption 8 bits at a time in multiple cycles, whereas the proces-
sor is stalled until the shifting is completed. Our design reduces the resource
consumption by 4⇥ as compared to the näive approach. Figure 7.6 shows
the implementation of our shift module which supports the aforementioned
operations. Our implementation also provides an encryption pad forwarding
path for performance consideration. The detail of this encryption pad for-
warding can be seen in Section 7.2.6. The output of the shift module is taken
from the most significant 32 bits from the shift registers (see encPad_load and
encPad_store signals in Figure 7.3)
7.2.4 Data Path Switching Module
Because the switch module is located along the memory access critical path, it
has to be simple and fast. It consists of only two 2-to-1 multiplexers on both
load and store data paths. They are used to switch the incoming and outgoing
data with or without decryption and encryption, respectively. Together with
the XOR operation, the added latency is only the accumulated combinational
logic delay of the multiplexers and XOR gates.
Upon detecting any secure load/store instruction, the processor pipeline
sends a signal to the control unit. The control unit schedules these signals
with the data arrival signal (data_ready) from the load store unit. It then
controls the multiplexers in the data path switch module accordingly.
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7.2.5 Control Unit
The purpose of the control unit is to set up the control path for di erent compo-
nents in the encryption module upon receiving the custom secure instructions.
It is composed of a FSM to generate the control signals and combinational
circuit to decode the secure instruction. It receives the custom secure instruc-
tions from the instruction decoder and intervenes in the processor pipeline via
datapath_select and encryption_stall control signals. These two signals are
used to control the data path switch module and stall the processor pipeline.
7.2.6 Pipeline Stall
Encryption hazard occurs when the processor has to be stalled due to the en-
cryption pad computation. This not only includes the latency of the encryption
engine but also the encryption pad shift module, which takes one additional
cycle to store the encryption pad in the shift registers. To minimize the en-
cryption stall, the encryption pad bu er (encPad) in the encryption controller
is forwarded to the switch module (encPad_load/encPad_store). Meanwhile,
encPad is shifted prior to being stored in the shift registers. This further
eliminates the additional cycle to shift the encryption pad.
7.2.7 OpenRISC Core Modification
A minor modification of OpenRISC is necessary to support the look-ahead
encryption scheme. It includes the instruction decoder to decode the custom
secure instructions and the load store unit to bu er the data to be decrypted.
1) Instruction Decoder: The instruction decoder is modified to decode the
secure instructions. A forwarding path is implemented from the register file to
the encryption controller so that the l.seed instruction can store the attribute
seed value to Regseed. The l.sload/l.sstore instructions are handled as normal
l.load/l.store instruction except that a data path switching signal is passed to
the control unit of the encryption module.
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2) Load Store Unit: Pipeline stalling due to encryption can lead to timing
error when the data have to be fetched from the o -chip DRAM via the cache.
Since cache line filling accesses DRAM in blocks, any pipeline stall due to seed
encryption could lead to wrong data being written to the register.
Figure 7.7 shows the timing diagram of this subtle fault which occurs in the
load store unit. If there was no encryption stall, the data value (0x0000FC00)
would be written into the register. The subsequent data value would then be
used to fill the cache line. However, the encryption stall, if it occurs, delays
the register write signal until the encryption finishes. Consequently, a wrong
value (0x00004BFF) will be written into the register. To tackle this subtle
data fault, we use a data bu er, DATA_BUF, to store the right value to be
written and set up two data paths for DATA and DATA_BUF.
Figure 7.7: A diagram showing the timing error without the data bu er in the load
store unit. DATA is the incoming data from the data cache. DAT_BUF is the data
bu er implemented to tackle this problem. ENC_STALL asserts when the data are
ready but the encryption has not yet finished. REG_WE is the control signal to
write DATA into the register.
7.3 SMC Encryption Modules
The goal of our SMC encryption modules design is to encrypt the cache line
in the SMC for setting up data path 3 as described in Section 6.5. Since
the data cache access heavily relies on the behaviour of the SMC seed bu er
access (see Figure 6.7), the challenge of the actual implementation is thus how
to schedule and coordinate the o -chip memory accesses for the data cache
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and the SMC seed bu er.
Our implementation redesigns the original cache controller so that the
scheduling and coordination of the o -chip memory accesses is tightly cou-
pled into one single controller module. This approach is cost-e ective because
a lot of hardware resources can be reused. In addition to the cache controller, a
SMC seed bu er, a cache line encryption engine, and a SeedMem initialization
unit are also implemented.
7.3.1 SMC Seed Bu er
The SMC seed bu er has the same structure as the data cache   1-way direct-
mapped cache architecture, each with a 16-byte line size. Both seed bu er and
data cache operate in write-back mode. The address to locate a bu er entry
can be calculated using Equation 6.2 in Section 6.5.1.
7.3.2 Cache Controller
The implementation of the cache controller can be best illustrated using a state
diagram. The overall implementation consists of 12 states, into which four
additional states are introduced to perform SMC seed bu er access. For ease of
illustration, separated state diagrams are used to describe the executions along
di erent data paths. They are however from the same FSM. The execution
flow can be multiplexed so that a single cache controller can serve multiple
execution flows.
Figure 7.9 presents the state diagram for the execution along data paths 1
and 2 where cache line encryption is not involved. It is the original unmodified
cache controller in the OpenRISC design. The cache controller consists of eight
states, where the function of each of these states is described in Table 7.1.
To implement data path 3 with cache line encryption, the SMC seed
bu er has to be accessed for every o -chip memory access in order to get the
encryption seed for cache line encryption/decryption. If the seed is stored
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inside the seed bu er, it is referred to a bu er hit where the corresponding
value can be used to compute the encryption pad. A bu er miss occurs when
the encryption seed is not inside the seed bu er, which requires additional
o -chip memory access to fetch/write back the seed entry. The detail of the
SMC seed bu er execution flow is shown in Figure 6.7 (see Section 6.5.3). Our
implementation to realize such execution flow involves four additional states
in addition to the original cache controller, which is described in Table 7.2.
The modification of the state diagram involves redirecting some executions to
access the seed bu er before the actual designated execution to be performed.
Figure 7.10 depicts the state diagram of the execution along data path 3
with cache line encryption. Since there is no victim bu er in OpenRISC, the
write back operation of data cache has to be stalled until the encryption pad
is computed at STORESTALL state.
It should be noted that the state diagrams in Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10
are from the same FSM, where the original eight states are reused in both
executions. The execution is multiplexed at LOADSTORE, LOOP3 and
FLUSH states. The control signal is generated in the circuit as shown in
Figure 7.8, which checks whether the secure execution has been set up and
whether the cache line is within the SMC. The pulse generator is used to
assert an internal signal upon detecting the start_cypherdb_query until the
end_cypherdb_query. It is to indicate the secure query session in hardware.
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AND
Physical Address from TLB/
Virtual Address from the core
Pulse 
generator
start_cypherdb_query
end_cypherdb_query
AND
SMC boundary address
Signal to multiplex the 
execution flow in 
cache controller FSM
Figure 7.8: A circuit to generate the control signal for multiplexing the execution
flows in cache controller FSM. Cache line encryption is only executed when these
two conditions are both satisfied: 1) the secure execution has been set up via the
start_cypherdb_query instruction and 2) the cache line is within the SMC.
IDLE
LOADSTORE
LOOP2
LOOP3
FLUSH
Flush a specific 
cache lineCache 
access
Cache miss:
Fetch/write back 
a cache line
Write back a 
dirty cache line
LOOP4
Go back to IDLE state
Finish up loading/storing
Finish loading/storing the 
cache line
WAITSPRCS
INVALIDATE
Finish up flushing
Invalidate only
(no need write back)
It was a write back
Now fetch the cache line
Cache 
hit
Go back to IDLE state
Go back to IDLE state
Figure 7.9: A FSM diagram of the original cache controller from the OpenRISC
project. This is used for the execution along data paths 1 and 2.
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Table 7.1: FSM states involved in the execution along data paths 1 and 2
FSM State Description
IDLE Wait for one of the following data cache access operations:load/store/invalidate/flush/write-back.
LOADSTORE
Perform o -chip memory access to fetch or write-back the
cache line. It also support cache inhibit memory access oper-
ation.
LOOP2
Perform consecutive load/store operations to the o -chip
memory for the entire cache line. Each operation read/write
4 bytes data.
LOOP3
Determine the next FSM state for operation. It either ends
the data access operation at LOOP4 or WAITSPRCS or con-
tinues loading data from o -chip memory at LOOP2.
LOOP4 End the data access operation and return to IDLE state.
FLUSH
Perform flush operation in one of the following ways: 1) inval-
idate the cache line only at INVALIDATE, 2) write back the
dirty cache line at LOOP2, or 3) do nothing at WAITSPRCS.
INVALIDATE Invalidate the cache line and return to IDLE state.
WAITSPRCS Wait until the operation has completed and return to IDLEstate.
Table 7.2: Additional FSM states involved in the execution along data path 3
FSM State Description
SEEDACCESS
Perform a seed bu er access and determine one of the
following operations: 1) compute the encryption pad and
fetch/write-back a data cache line for a seed bu er hit, or
2) perform o -chip memory access to fetch/write back a seed
bu er entry for a seed bu er miss.
STORESEED Write back a seed bu er entry to the o -chip memory.
LOADSEED Fetch a seed bu er entry from the o -chip memory.
STORESTALL
Stall the data cache access operation and wait for the en-
cryption pad computation. The corresponding seed value is
incremented in the seed bu er.
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7.3.3 Cache Line Encryption
Cache Block 1 Cache Block 2
128 bits 
AES-CTR
128 bits 
AES-CTR
Tag ǁ Count_Val 
Tag+1 ǁ Count_Val 
Cache Line
Encrypted Cache Line/Cache Line
...
...
S bit
Figure 7.11: A diagram showing a cache line encrypted with multiple encryption
engines in parallel. The S-bit associated with each cache line is used to determine
whether the cache line needs to be encrypted.
Figure 7.11 depicts the cache line encryption mechanism in hardware. Upon
the availability of the count_val in the SMC seed bu er, the CLseed is en-
crypted to pre-compute the encryption pad which is later used to encrypt the
cache blocks in parallel using multiple AES encryption engines. The circuit in
Figure 7.8 is used to set the S-bit in each cache line and this bit is later used
to multiplex the data path with or without encryption.
As discussed in Section 6.3, the SMC should be allocated to a block of
physically contiguous memory block. The tool used for allocating the contigu-
ous memory region (see Section 6.7.1) is however unavailable in our evaluation
setup. We take an alternative approach that uses a virtual memory address
from the core to set up the SMC. The SMC boundary address is thus the start-
ing address of stack and heap memory. A process identifier (PID) is further
used to ensure that the virtual address used is from the same process.
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7.3.4 SeedMem Initialization Unit
The FSM of the SeedMem initialization unit is as shown in Figure 7.12. Its
purpose is to set the count_val in o -chip memory to zero upon the start of
the secure query execution (see Algorithm 6.5.2). It is made up of a 2-stage
FSM which stalls the processor pipeline and issues a write request to the cache
controller over the memory region in the SeedMem.
IDLE SETSEEDZERO
Upon receiving the 
start_cypherdb_query 
instruction
All count_val are 
set to zero
Set another 
count_val = 0
Figure 7.12: A stage diagram describing the operation of the SeedMem Initialization
Unit
7.4 SQLite Modification
SQLite is an embedded SQL database engine which is widely deployed nowa-
days, including high-profile projects from Apple, Facebook, Dropbox, etc. Al-
though SQLite is not a client/server database application, it is used as our
application case study due to three reasons. First, SQLite is light-weight
enough to be executed in our resource-constrained FPGA evaluation platform.
Its library size can be less than 500KB. Second, it is open-sourced so that
modification of the source code is made possible. Last, it consists of a SQL
database engine which can parse and execute standard SQL queries over a
relational database. The study of SQLite application can thus be extended to
other SQL database engines easily.
To apply the look-ahead encryption scheme to a practical database appli-
cation, the modification of SQLite mainly involves two components: 1) issuing
the l.seed instruction to store the attribute seed in an on-chip seed register
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Regseed, which involves identifying the logical schema identifier used in the
application software, and 2) constructing a separate secure data access layer
which uses l.sload/l.sstore to access the data instead of normal l.load/l.store.
Our implementation shows that actual modification is minimal which consists
of 208 additional LOCs in total.
In this section, we first describe the Virtual Database Engine (VDBE) in
SQLite. The VDBE is the heart of SQLite which touches almost all library
functions in a virtual machine language. Based on this VDBE, “SELECT”
statement is used as a SQL query example to illustrate how the attribute
seeds are identified practically. Finally, the modification of the data access
layer is discussed.
7.4.1 Background: Virtual Database Engine
Figure 7.13 depicts the architecture of SQLite. The VDBE implements an
abstract computing engine to perform SQL specified executions over the un-
derlying database files. It is able to run a program written in its virtual
machine language, where the goal of each program is to interrogate or change
the database. The program is made up of VDBE-specific instructions. Each
instruction contains an opcode and at least three operands labelled as P1, P2
and P3. Operands P1 and P2 are an integer value while P3 is a pointer to
a data structure or a string. There are 158 opcodes defined by the VDBE.
The reader is referred to [97] for a detailed description of each opcode used in
SQLite.
7.4.2 Attribute Seed
As described in Section 5.3.2, the attribute seed of each attribute datum is
(databaseID k tableID k rowID k columnID k cntr). While cntr has to be ob-
tained from external storage, other components can be generated from the
logical-to-physical schema translation. To illustrate this feature in SQLite, we
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SQL Command 
Processor
VDBE
B-Tree
Pager
OS Interface
Tokenizer
Parser
Code 
Generator
Core SQL CompilerBackend
Application
Interface
Figure 7.13: The architecture of SQLite [2]
use a SQL query example to show how to leverage the VDBE execution to
obtain these attribute seed components.
Consider a query statement “SELECT * FROM region;” which is used to
extract all records from a database table named “region”. The corresponding
VDBE program (sequence of VDBE instructions), which is generated using
SQLite built-in query plan analysis via the “EXPLAIN” command, is shown
in Table 7.3. The instructions are executed in sequence starting at Addr 0 and
the operation of the instruction is also described in the table. The attribute
seed components can be obtained from this VDBE program execution in the
following procedures:
• Obtain databaseID from P1 in the Transaction instruction (Addr 11).
• Obtain tableID from P2 in the OpenRead instruction (Addr 2).
• Obtain columnID from P2 in the Column instruction (Addr 4-6).
The missing rowID is obtained from the the execution of the Column in-
struction. As shown in Figure 6.1, each record is packaged into a format called
payload. In SQLite, this payload header contains the corresponding RowID.
In the execution of the Column instruction, the payload header is scanned via
a function called getCellInfo().
122
Table 7.3: The VDBE program of the query statement “SELECT * FROM region;”.
The bolded number is used as one of the attribute seed components.
Addr Opcode P1 P2 P3 Description
0 Trace 0 0 0
1 Goto 0 11 0 Jump to address 11
2 OpenRead 0 11 0 Open the table in P2(region)
3 Rewind 0 9 0
The next use of Column instruction will re-
fer to the first record in the database table.
Jump to address 9 if the table is empty
4 Column 0 0 1 Extract column 0 and store it in register 1
5 Column 0 1 2 Extract column 1 and store it in register 2
6 Column 0 2 3 Extract column 2 and store it in register 3
7 ResultRow 1 3 0 Construct the query result from register 1 to3
8 Next 0 4 0 Find the next record in the table and jumpto address 4
9 Close 0 0 0
10 Halt 0 0 0
11 Transaction 0 0 0 Start a read-transaction on database in P1
12 VerifyCookie 0 22 0
13 TableLock 0 11 0 Lock the table in P2 (region)
14 Goto 0 2 0 Jump to address 2
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7.4.3 Data Access Layer
The purpose of modifying the data access layer is to replace the normal
l.load/l.store with l.sload/l.sstore so that the encrypted attribute can be en-
/decrypted within the processor chip using our CypherDB secure processor.
SQLite provides two functions: sqlite3VdbeSerialGet() and sqlite3VdbeSerialPut()
for reading and writing the attribute data, respectively. These two functions
are leveraged to incorporate the look-ahead encryption scheme.
Since the encrypted database may contain unencrypted data (e.g. unen-
crypted index field), the DBMS must be able to access both types of data. We
therefore implemented separate data access functions, SerialGetScopy() and
SerialPutScopy(), for encrypted data whereas the SQLite can selectively call
di erent functions to access encrypted or unencrypted data.
One implementation issue is that the data access function provided by
SQLite passes the string type data via a data pointer. This implies that the
actual data access process is done at each individual library function within
SQLite. To ease the implementation, a bu er is used to store the attribute
data where the data pointer is redirected to this bu er. This moves the actual
data access process from each individual function to the SerialGetScopy() or
SerialPutScopy() functions. Although this may incur a performance penalty
on copying the attribute data into the redirected bu er, it should be noted
that this is solely an implementation issue. Better implementation can make
use of a compiler to track the flow of the data pointer so that the attribute data
access function can be modified in each individual SQLite library function.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation
This chapter evaluates various aspects of the CypherDB secure processor de-
sign and implementation. Experiments on simulation and the FPGA plat-
form were conducted to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the look-ahead
encryption scheme and processor design. Our evaluation employed two ap-
proaches. First, simulation allowed us to evaluate the performance under
various processor parameters flexibly. We thus could study the performance
implication of various architectures. Then we further implemented it on the
FPGA to complete the architectural design in hardware. This further enables
us to discuss some practical issues of the actual implementation, evaluate the
cost of resource consumption (the additional hardware resource usage for the
implemented new security modules and the storage overhead of the encrypted
database were also studied) and evaluate the execution on a larger dataset
which is prohibitively slow when run in simulations. We first present the
performance evaluation in simulations before proceeding to the discussion of
FPGA evaluation.
8.1 Performance Evaluation: Simulation
This section evaluates the CypherDB secure processor through simulations.
We conducted detailed characteristic studies on the additional security com-
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ponents or features, including DBPage Bu er, SMC Bu er and the query
output protection mechanism. After that, performance studies using various
representative workloads were performed.
The performance evaluation was based on comparing the total execution
cycles between the execution on an encrypted database using CypherDB tech-
niques and the execution on a normal (non encrypted) database. Here, we refer
to the execution on a normal database as the baseline execution in the rest of
this thesis. The result of the comparison is reported as slowdown percentage.
CypherDB incurs performance overhead in two places: 1) extra instruction
executions when copying the on-chip database seeds into Regseed to perform
on-chip data decryption/encryption; 2) extra memory accesses when fetching
the counter value of the record counters or SMC seeds from o -chip mem-
ory. Our simulation studies thus focus on these two aspects. The performance
model is shown in the following equation:
Slowdown= 1/Cb ⇤ (Cenc+Cinsn+DBBu f_miss_num⇤ (MemLat+EncLat)
+SMCBu f_miss_num⇤ (MemLat+EncLat))
(8.1)
where:
Cenc is the cycle used in the XOR operation in data encryption/decryption
Cinsn is the cycle caused by executing additional security instruction for data
encryption/decryption
DBBu f_miss_num is the total number of bu er misses in the DBPage seed
bu er
SMCBu f_miss_num is the total number of bu er misses in the SMC seed
bu er
MemLat is the cycle used in o -chip memory access
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EncLat is the cycle used in computing the encryption pad
Cb is the cycle used in baseline execution (execution over a normal database)
8.1.1 Simulation Framework
We evaluated CypherDB architecture using the SimpleScalar tool set [87]. We
modelled a speculative out-of-order processor with a two-level cache hierar-
chy with separate data and instruction caches. The parameters used in the
simulations are shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Parameters used in simulations
Parameters Specifications
Processor Architecture MIPS ISA
L1 I/D cache Split, 32KB, 2-way, 32B blocks size,
2 cycles latency
L2 I/D cache Split, 2MB, 4-way, 64B blocks size,
6 cycles latency
Load/Store queue size 64
Register update unit size 128
TLB 4-way, 128 entries
Main Memory 4GB, 200 cycles latency
AES latency 80 cycles
For each measurement, we executed the query twice. The first query was
to fill the pipeline and the data page bu ers in main memory. All performance
measurements, including the query output protection, were only taken on the
second query execution. In the simulations, we ignored the database/query
encryption key exchange and random per-query key initialization overhead
because it is negligible when compared to the steady-state performance.
8.1.2 Workloads
In our study, we 1) used a data access kernel to evaluate the performance
impact of the on-chip decryption/encryption on data path 2 ; and then 2) ran a
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scaled down workload, DBmBench [98], on a real database system, SQLite [82],
in order to study the e ect of the cache line decryption/encryption engines 3 ;
3) Finally, a comprehensive performance evaluation of di erent representative
query executions was conducted with the use of the TPC-H [75] benchmark.
In all experiments, the data set was generated by the TPC-H data generator
and encrypted with our database encryption method described in Section 5.
Table 8.2 summarizes the queries used in our three kinds of workload.
Table 8.2: Queries used in the evaluations
Kernel Benchmarking
Q1 SELECT sum(a3) FROM T1 WHERE Lo < a2 < Hi
Q2 SELECT sum(a3+a4) FROM T1 WHERE Lo < a2 < Hi
Q3 SELECT sum(a3+a4+a5/100+a6/100) FROM T1 WHERE Lo
< a2 < Hi
DBmBench [98]
uSS SELECT distinct(a3) FROM T1 WHERE Lo < a2 < Hi ORDERBY a3
uIDX SELECT avg(a3) FROM T1 WHERE Lo < a2 < Hi
uNJ SELECT avg(T1.a3) FROM T1, T2
WHERE T1.a1 = T2.a1 AND Lo < a2 < Hi
TPC-H
Q1-Q22 The queries are listed in [75] in detail
SQLite[82] was chosen due to its simplicity and open-source feature. Al-
though it is di erent from a server-based DBMS, we believe that our implemen-
tation can also be made on these server-based DBMSs. Our implementation
shows that modification of the DBMS happens in two places: 1) at the begin-
ning and end of the query execution and 2) the data access kernel. These two
places can be easily located in the DBMS. The modification of the data access
kernel lies in the translation between logical to physical schema which exists
in almost all DBMSs but just in di erent approaches.
Data Access Kernel: Our data access kernel was configured to perform
a sequential scan and B+-tree non-clustered index scan on a 100MB data file
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consisting of 600k records. These two scan operators were chosen because they
are the most dominant data access operators in any DBMS. They represent
two major data access patterns: predominantly sequential (sequential scan)
and predominantly random (non-clustered index scan) record access. We fur-
ther compared the performance impact of AES-CTR in CypherDB with an
alternative approach that uses a conventional AES block cipher to perform
the same on-chip decryption/encryption of the attribute data. The AES en-
cryption/decryption was also executed on-chip where the data being loaded
were first decrypted before undergoing further computation or immediately
encrypted when the data were to be stored under the l.store instruction. The
purpose of this experiment was to investigate the performance gain of our look-
ahead encryption as compared to conventional data encryption using 128-bit
AES encryption. In this approach, we assumed that each attribute is encrypted
with 128-bit AES (e.g. encrypting a 32-bit integer to 128-bit ciphertext). This
assumption was made due to the fact that some related work like CryptDB
[20] or Cipherbase [23] also encrypts the attribute data in such granularity.
During the execution, the ciphertext is first loaded. Since it is now in 128 bits,
more load instructions and more o -chip memory access (if the ciphertext is
stored across two cache lines) are needed. Extra execution cycles are needed
for the AES encryption/decryption. The performance model of this simple
AES implementation is thus as follows:
Slowdown= 1/Cb ⇤ (Cload+Cmem+Cenc) (8.2)
where:
Cload is additional cycles caused by ciphertext loading
Cmem is additional cycles caused by memory access
Cenc is additional cycles caused by encryption/decryption
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Cb is the cycles used in baseline execution (execution over a normal database)
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the attribute seed is composed of databaseID,
tableID, ColumnID, rowID, and cntr, among which only cntr needs to be stored
in o -chip memory to maintain temporary uniqueness. Therefore, look-ahead
encryption requires an extra o -chip memory access to fetch the cntr for the
computation of the encryption pad. To remedy this performance overhead,
the DBPage seed bu er is used to fetch or pre-fetch a portion of the cntr value
on-chip to serve fast when they are in need. The record access pattern (i.e.
the sequence where records are accessed upon query processing) hence causes a
performance impact due to the DBPage seed bu er architecture. Each DBPage
bu er entry consists of multiple cntr which is the minimal block size to be
fetched each time from o -chip memory. Because the record cntr is stored in
sequential order, sequential record access benefits most from this architecture
but not random record access.
DBmBench: DBmBench contains three representative queries that ac-
curately mimic the well-known TPC database workload [98] at the micro-
architecture level. These queries include three dominating operators: 1) se-
quential scan (uSS); 2) index scan (uIDX) and; 3) join query (uNJ).
To compare the performance of CypherDB architecture with the same
query execution over an encrypted database using homomorphic encryption, we
created a homomorphically encrypted database using the same methodology
in [20]: the database is encrypted with OPE for range check, Paillier Encryp-
tion for summation, and blowfish for equality check. To construct a similar
query execution environment over the homomorphically encrypted database
in line with [20], an application program written in C is used to perform the
aforementioned three representative queries using the unmodified SQLite li-
braries. To perform summation operation, gmp library is used to multiply the
encrypted data.
TPC-H: We evaluated the performance of CypherDB over the 22 queries in
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TPC-H. In our experiments, the evaluation was performed on a 100MB dataset,
which is the largest volume of data that can be processed in a reasonable time
under our simulation environment.
For all the above workloads, all records were encrypted with our database
encryption technique. Indices were encrypted with OPE and appended to the
record. These workloads are repeatedly used in our FPGA evaluation.
8.1.3 DBPage Bu er Characteristic Study
We analyzed the DBPage bu er behaviour on running the data access kernel.
We first evaluated the DBPage bu er miss rate against di erent bu er block
size which is shown in Figure 8.1(a) and Figure 8.1(b) on sequential scan
and index scan, respectively. The o -chip memory access fetches a block of
data which contains multiple bytes. The conducted experiments evaluated the
optimal block size to be used in the DBPage bu er.
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Figure 8.1: The DBPage bu er miss rate on increasing bu er block size in our kernel
benchmarking with 20% selectivity on (a) sequential scan and (b) non-clustered
index scan
A miss of DBPage bu er refers to a failed attempt to locate the corre-
sponding record counter. Not surprisingly, the bu er miss rate decreases with
increased bu er block size on the sequential scan operator but remains con-
stant for the index scan due to the corresponding sequential and random tuple
access pattern. In the index scan, the bu er miss rate reduces proportion-
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ally with the number of attributes being evaluated within a record due to the
shared record counter.
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Figure 8.2: The performance evaluation of the sequential scan and non-clustered
index scan operators with increasing bu er block size
To investigate its performance impact, Figure 8.2 depicts the percentage
slowdown of these two scan operators on various bu er block sizes. The perfor-
mance slowdown is caused by the DBPage bu er misses and the execution of
the additional instructions to copy the seed into Regseed. The result shows that
only a small bu er block size with 8 bytes can reduce the slowdown percentage
significantly from more than 300% to around 40%. However, a large block size
can cause significant performance overhead on the index scan because of its
high bu er miss rate and the memory access overhead on loading a large bu er
block. As a result, a small DBPage bu er block size of 8 bytes can give fairly
good performance on both sequential and index scan operators.
8.1.4 SMC Bu er Characteristic Study
We analyzed the SMC bu er behaviour on running three representative queries
in DBmBench. We emulated the SMC bu er with the conventional cache
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architecture and investigated its characteristics using three metrics: 1) bu er
size; 2) associativity and; 3) bu er block size.
The analysis was based on the bu er miss rate. A bu er miss occurs when
there is an attempt to load/store a cache line from/to the o -chip memory, but
fails to fetch the corresponding cache line seed in the SMC bu er. Figure 8.3
shows the bu er miss rate with increasing bu er size with fully associative and
Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement policies.
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Figure 8.3: The SMC bu er miss rate on executing the three queries in DBmBench
with increasing bu er size
The result shows that the miss rate starts to drop at 1kB bu er in uIDX
while this happens in uSS and uNJ at 64kB bu er. This is because the frequent
B+tree access reduces the bu er miss rate significantly with increased bu er
size in uIDX. In contrast, uSS and uNJ are dominated by sequential operations,
resulting in an insignificant impact of the increased bu er size.
Although uSS and uNJ maintain a relatively high bu er miss rate, the seed
bu er access is only 16% and 19% of the total o -chip cache line transaction on
uSS and uNJ respectively. In other words, most of the cache line transactions
are done on the DBpage compartment but not on the secure memory compart-
ment. In contrast, almost all the cache line transactions in uIDX query happen
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on the secure memory compartment. This is because B+tree reduces the num-
ber of accesses to the database but, in return, generates more intermediate
data for execution.
We also evaluated the bu er miss rate with di erent associativity, ranging
from 2-way to 64-way. All three queries, however, maintained a steadily high
bu er miss rate with increasing bu er size.
Figure 8.4 shows the bu er miss rate on various bu er block sizes. Inter-
estingly, all three queries exhibited the same characteristic that the bu er miss
rate dropped significantly at an 8-byte block size. It shows that the working
data set of the DBMS is usually in the size of 256 bytes.
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Figure 8.4: The SMC bu er miss rate of (a) uSS, (b) uIDX and (c) uNJ with
increasing bu er block size
8.1.5 Query Output Encryption Sensitivity Study
In order to study the e ect of the enlarged query output data size and entries
towards the overall performance penalty, we further conducted two experi-
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ments to evaluate it.
The first experiment was performed to evaluate the overall performance
slowdown against the query output data size. The query output size was con-
trolled by a function substr() to extract a sub-string of some binary data from
a database containing very large images. We studied the slowdown percentage
caused by the query output protection with the query output data size ranging
from 1 byte to 1GB bytes. Figure 8.5(a) shows the corresponding evaluation.
It shows that the performance penalty was less than 0.1% when the query
output data size was less than 10k. More performance slowdown (up to 2.3%)
can be observed with increasing output data size because more output data
are being encrypted. When the data size starts to exceed 100MB, it starts to
drop o . This alleviation is due to the increased query execution cycles on
accessing more data pages, flushing and filling the data page bu ers.
The second experiment was performed to evaluate the performance slow-
down against the query output entries. In this experiment, we used the same
dataset in TPC-H as in our previous experiments. To control the number
of query output entries, we used a query - “SELECT attribute FROM table
LIMIT n;” to select the number of query output entries from the database by
varying the variable n. We studied the slowdown percentage caused by the
query output protection with the query output data entries ranging from 1
entry to 100M entries. The evaluation is shown in Figure 8.5(b). The perfor-
mance penalty increased with the number of query output entries (up to 0.9%)
but dropped o  when it exceeded 10k entries.
8.1.6 Performance on Data Access Kernel
In our experiments, a dedicated function sum(n) was used to add n attributes
within a record together. Such summation operation was performed on 20% of
the records. Based on the investigation in Section 8.1.3, DBPage seed bu er
of an 8-byte block size, which can accommodate four record counter values, is
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most e cient in both sequential and random record access.
Table 8.3 compares the performance of CypherDB approach with a di-
rect AES encryption approach. CypherDB executes additional instructions
of around 20% on a sequential scan and 1.2% on an index scan. Using direct
AES encryption introduces on-chip decryption latency for loading all encrypted
data. As each attribute is encrypted in 128-bit cipher blocks, the decrypted
data used up more space in cache memory, resulting in extra o -chip memory
accesses to fetch the data. It resulted in a 160% slowdown while CypherDB
had a steady performance of around 45% for the sequential scan operator. This
comparison shows that AES-CTR, in addition to its software-friendly charac-
teristic, performs better than a direct AES approach in terms of performance.
Table 8.3: The Slowdown Percentage of CypherDB and direct AES with the data
access kernel on a sequential scan and non-clustered index scan
CypherDB Direct AES
Sequential Scan
sum(1) 44% 103%
sum(2) 44% 116%
sum(4) 49% 160%
Non-Clustered Index Scan
sum(1) 25% 27%
sum(2) 25% 28%
sum(4) 25% 29%
8.1.7 Performance on DBmBench
As the SMC seed bu er stores the counter value for cache-line encryption, its
implementation is akin to conventional cache architecture. According to the
investigation in Section 8.1.4, a SMC seed bu er with an 8-byte block size,
fully associative, and with least-recently-used replacement policy yields the
best performance.
Based on this architecture, we evaluated the performance impact of CypherDB
with SMC bu er sizes ranging from 32kB to 128kB as shown in Figure 8.6.
This range of bu er size was evaluated because our investigation as shown
in Figure 8.3 indicated that uSS and uNJ have observable decreases in bu er
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miss rate when the bu er size increases from 32KB to 128KB. Without any
on-chip DBPage or SMC bu er, the performance overhead on DBmBench is
around 17% on average, ranging from 13% to 20%. The performance over-
head is not significantly higher even without an on-chip bu er because our
data path design introduces no processing penalty on the execution of non-
sensitive metadata, which is proven to be the culprit of most data stalls in
our benchmark profiling. To achieve better performance, on-chip bu ers can
significantly reduce the performance slowdown of uIDX query from 20% to
12%. A slight performance improvement can also be observed on uSS and uNJ
queries by reducing 2% and 3% slowdown percentage respectively. Less than
0.3% slowdown is attributed to the query output encryption for all queries.
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Figure 8.6: Performance evaluation of CypherDB with di erent SMC bu er size on
DBmBench
Table 8.4 shows the executed instruction overhead on the three queries in
DBmBench, as introduced by copying the record counter into seed register
Regseed. The instruction overhead of uNJ is relatively high because the execu-
tion involves a nested loop join on two tables. Extra instructions are used to
copy the corresponding tableID of the record counter on this query execution.
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In contrast, uSS and uIDX execution involves one table only, and therefore has
less instruction overhead than uNJ execution.
Table 8.4: Total executed instruction overhead in DBmBench
uSS uIDX uNJ
Overhead percentage 12% 19% 37%
8.1.8 Performance Comparison with a Homomorphically
Encrypted Database
We further compared the performance of CypherDB architecture with the ex-
ecution on a homomorphically encrypted database. Our evaluation, as shown
in Table 8.5, shows that the execution over a homomorphically encrypted
database su ers from a significant slowdown ranging from 52% on uSS to
1333% on uIDX. The slowdown on uSS is minimal because only equality and
range check are performed in this query, where blowfish and OPE encryption
are very e cient in these operations respectively. In spite of their e ciency in
these operations, blowfish and OPE encryption transform any data less than
64 bits into a 64-bit cipher. It thus induces extra execution overhead due to
handling the enlarged data throughout the DBMS execution, resulting in a
moderate performance overhead on uSS execution. On the other hand, uIDX
and uNJ both involve summation, which requires the multiplication of two
2048-bit Paillier encrypted data. By transforming a 32-bit integer summation
function into a multiplication operation of two 2048-bit data, the execution
cycles of uIDX and uNJ increases by 14⇥ and 8⇥ respectively. CypherDB, on
the contrary, maintains a steadily reasonable performance overhead of 11% to
17%, regardless of the operations involved.
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Table 8.5: Slowdown Percentage of CypherDB with a 128kB SMC Bu er and exe-
cution over a homomorphically encrypted database on DBmBench
CypherDB Homomorphic Encryption
uSS 11% 52%
uIDX 12% 1333%
uNJ 17% 705%
8.1.9 Performance on TPC-H
Figure 8.7 illustrates the performance of CypherDB on TPC-H queries. The
average performance overhead is only 10% ranging from 3% for query 11 to
23% for query 14. The query output encryption results in 0.35% slowdown on
average. We also evaluated the instruction count overhead of the 22 queries in
TPC-H as summarized in Table 8.6. On average, there are around 14% more
instructions being executed in our proposed solution, ranging from 8% in query
12 to 28% in query 14. This instruction overhead is the main contributor to
the performance degradation.
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8.2 Performance Evaluation: FPGA Platform
This section evaluates the performance of our look-ahead encryption scheme
and the secure processor implementation on a FPGA. We first evaluated the
proposed encryption scheme and the SMC encryption mechanism separately.
After that, an overall evaluation of running representative database queries on
SQLite is discussed. All experiments in this section were based on the FPGA
implementation and executions on the FPGA board.
The performance evaluation on the FPGA was based on comparing the to-
tal CPU time (during query processing) between the execution on an encrypted
database and the baseline execution. Similarly, the result of the comparison is
reported as slowdown percentage. The same set of workloads used in simula-
tion was also employed in FPGA evaluation.
8.2.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 8.8 shows the experimental setup on a FPGA board. The databases
to be queried (either encrypted or unencrypted) and the record counters were
stored in a SD card while the SQLite executable and Linux were loaded into the
SDRAM during system boot-up. A terminal was connected to the serial port
to send out queries to and receive query results from the FPGA. The Linux
UART and SD/MMC device driver were used to provide an abstraction of file
system and I/O to the SQLite. A host computer computer was connected to
the FPGA via Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) for debugging. The hardware
performance counter was observed with the use of the SignalTap Logic Ana-
lyzer [99]. The default parameters in Table 8.7 were used to implement the
soft core in the FPGA.
Four evaluation metrics were used in all the experiments on the FPGA:
total execution cycles, encryption stall cycles, SMC seed bu er miss rate and
total Central Processing Unit (CPU) time spent on execution. Total execution
cycles, encryption stall cycles and SMC seed bu er miss rate were measured
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Figure 8.8: Experimental setup on the FPGA
Table 8.7: The default OpenRISC processor parameters
Parameters Specifications
Processor OR1200 core, 50MHz
SDRAM 64MB, 100MHz
I/D cache 64KB, direct-mapped, 32B line
SeedBuf 32kB, direct-mapped, 16B line
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by the self-developed hardware performance counter. The CPU time spent on
execution was obtained by the timing function in Linux. The accurate timing
information was provided by a hardware tick timer implemented in the FPGA.
The correctness of the implementation was verified by checking the correctness
of the query output in response to the corresponding input query.
8.2.2 Look-ahead Encryption Scheme Study
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the encryption stalls caused by
the look-ahead encryption module described in Section 7.2. The encryption
stall is caused by two factors: 1) the time that the l.seed instruction is issued
to compute the encryption pad and 2) the encryption latency of the AES
encryption. In reality, the encryption engine can be operating at di erent
frequencies which could result in various encryption latencies. To investigate
this impact, the data access kernel described in Section 8.1.2 was executed on
the FPGA whereas the data file was stored in the SD card.
Figure 8.9: Total encryption stall cycles with increasing operating frequency of the
AES encryption engine
Figure 8.9 shows the total number of encryption stall cycles with varying
operating frequency of the AES engine. An exponential relationship between
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the encryption latency and the encryption stalls is observed because there are
multiple encrypted data being accessed in the kernel which are all a ected
by the lengthened encryption latency. The latency hiding of the look-ahead
encryption scheme relies on the clock ratio between the processor and the AES
engine. Our study shows that the encryption engine should not be 4⇥ slower
than the processor in order to hide most of the encryption latencies from the
program execution.
8.2.3 SMC Encryption Study
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the e ciency of the modified cache
controller and the cache line encryption described in Section 7.3. Since the
tool for allocating contiguous physical memory blocks for the SMC in Linux
was unavailable, we used four bare-metal applications instead in this study.
This is because these bare-metal applications can run directly on hardware so
that a custom page table can be created for SMC allocation, which does not
rely on Linux for the virtual-to-physical memory mapping. These four bare-
metal applications (QUICKSORT, MEDIAN, MAX, KMEANS) were chosen
because they represent various commonly used data processing functions and
are simple for development in a bare-metal environment.
The key modification of the cache controller is to manage the count_val
in the SMC seed bu er and compute the encryption pad if the corresponding
count_val is in the bu er. The major performance penalty is caused by a SMC
bu er miss and dirty seed write-back. We therefore evaluated the SMC bu er
miss rate and write-back rate for these four bare-metal applications as shown
in Figure 8.10. It can be seen that the SMC characteristic varied with di erent
applications. In some cases like MAX function which demonstrates a highly
sequential memory access pattern, the bu er miss rate and write-back rate
are constantly low. Other applications however show significant improvement
with a larger SMC seed bu er size.
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Figure 8.10: The (a) SMC bu er mis rate and (b) SMC bu er write back rate on
executing four bare-metal applications with SMC encryption on the FPGA
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Its performance impact is two-fold. First, a bu er miss or write-back causes
additional o -chip memory access to fetch or store the count_val. Second, if
the data cache line has to be written back, the cache line encryption has to
stall the processor (see Section 7.3.2). However, the current implementation
poses one limitation that the processor clock (50MHz) runs slower than the
SDRAM (100MHz). This diminishes the performance penalty caused by the
SMC seed bu er miss or write-back. To better reflect its performance in a
realistic setup, a delay circuit was implemented on the o -chip memory access
path to inject additional latencies in order to emulate a setup with a higher
processor clock (up to 1600MHz). The evaluation of this emulated processor
clock frequency can help us to study the characteristic of the SMC encryption
mechanism.
Figure 8.11 to Figure 8.14 show the performance of the four bare-metal
applications with various SMC seed bu er sizes at di erent (emulated) clock
frequencies. These show that the performance penalty is high (up to 80%
in QUICKSORT and MEDIAN) with a large processor’s clock to SDRAM’s
clock ratio but the performance is significantly improved with a large SMC
seed bu er size. Applications like MAX with a low SMC seed miss/write-back
rate show reasonable performance penalty. On the other hand, applications
like KMEANS which take few data inputs for intensive computation have very
little negative impact on the overall performance.
This study demonstrates that the SMC seed bu er behaves di erently to-
ward di erent applications. However, a larger SMC seed bu er is beneficial to
most applications in general.
8.2.4 Performance Study on SQLite
SQLite was used in our study of a practical database application. We first
evaluated the impact of our look-ahead encryption scheme on this applica-
tion before an overall evaluation with both the encryption scheme and SMC
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Figure 8.11: Performance evaluation of QUICKSORT on the FPGA
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Figure 8.12: Performance evaluation of MEDIAN on the FPGA
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Figure 8.13: Performance evaluation of KMEANS on the FPGA
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Figure 8.14: Performance evaluation of MAX on the FPGA
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encryption mechanism.
In all experiments, CPU time was taken as the metric of performance eval-
uation. CPU time only measures the amount of time spent on executing in-
structions (either from user or kernel space) in the processor, which can neglect
the time waiting for I/O operations. Since the performance impact is mainly
on the processor core and SDRAM, CPU time can provide a more meaningful
evaluation of the performance.
Besides, due to the fact that our study on the query output protection
mechanism in simulations demonstrates a negligible performance impact, this
was not evaluated in the following experiments so as to ease the correctness
verification process.
Look-ahead Encryption Only
DBmBench was used to evaluate the performance impact of the look-ahead
encryption scheme. In all experiments, each query was run five times and the
average CPU runtime was recorded. We ran the queries on a 100MB, 500MB
and 1GB database comprising around 0.6, 4 and 8 million records, respectively.
Figure 8.15 shows the total CPU time spent on processing the queries on
the 100MB, 500MB and 1GB databases. It was found that the performance
overhead caused by the look-ahead encryption scheme is negligible in uSS
and uNJ due to our careful design of hardware and modification over SQLite.
uIDX shows a modest performance penalty ranging from 14% to 26%. This
performance impact reduces with increasing database size.
To investigate the reason for these performance overheads, we analyzed the
CPU time spent on user codes and kernel codes separately. Our investigation
found that the CPU time spent on user code ranges from 1% to 11%. These
overheads are caused by the extra instructions since they were inserted in
user code space. On the other hand, the CPU time spent on kernel code
ranged from 20% to 43%. This is because the record counters occupied a small
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portion of the physical memory. With the reduction of the available memory,
more time is spent on the kernel to allocate and free memory for the query
execution. This overhead is observable due to an experimental limitation that
only a small memory (64MB) is available in our FPGA evaluation platform.
We believe that it would be alleviated with the use of a larger memory.
Look-ahead Encryption + SMC Encryption
The challenge of evaluating SMC encryption performance impact on SQLite is
that it requires contiguous physical memory space allocation which Linux does
not support. SQLite however relies on Linux libraries for execution. Our solu-
tion to this challenge was to remove the cache line encryption data path and
change it to a normal (unencrypted) data path, but still keep the encryption
control path active. Since our implementation constructed a control path and
data path separately and the actual data encryption was reduced to XOR op-
erations (with negligible performance penalty), disabling the encryption data
path caused no influence on the performance evaluation.
The evaluation was performed on 100MB and 1GB databases. We first
evaluated the SMC bu er miss rate on DBmBench query execution as shown
in Figure 8.16. The execution on both databases demonstrated a reduction in
miss rate with increasing bu er size. It can also be seen that the reduction of
miss rate was especially more significant when the bu er size increased from 8k
to 32k but tended to flatten out after 32k. This matches the similar evaluation
in simulations (see Figure 8.3).
The performance evaluation is depicted in Figure 8.17. The performance
slowdown was measured by a comparison with CPU time in the baseline exe-
cution. It can be seen that an increased SMC bu er size had no e ect on the
query execution over a 100MB database but improved the performance on a
1GB database. The reason is that the improvement accumulated su ciently to
be observable in the evaluation using the 1GB database. As compared to the
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Figure 8.16: The SMC bu er miss rate of executing the queries in DBmBench over
a (a) 100MB and (b) 1GB database on the FPGA
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similar evaluation in simulations (see Figure 8.6), both evaluations show that
index scan can benefit from an increased SMC seed bu er size than sequential
scan and nested loop join.
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Figure 8.17: Performance evaluation of DBmBench on the FPGA
We further evaluated nine queries in TPC-H with a 32kB SMC seed bu er
as shown in Figure 8.18. The reason only nine out of 22 queries were evaluated
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is mainly due to the limited resources of the FPGA evaluation board used. The
64MB SDRAM used was too small to accommodate the memory usage (stack
and heap memory) during SQLite execution. Meanwhile, for several queries
which needed to scan through the records one by one, it took a su ciently long
processing time on the FPGA. In addition, each query was run three times to
take an average result. This made the processing time even longer. Therefore,
these nine queries are the queries that could be executed on our evaluation
platform in a reasonable time.
The corresponding SMC seed bu er miss rate is depicted in Table 8.8. It
can be seen that the performance over an encrypted database outperformed
the unencrypted one in Q6 and Q22. We note that the database layout of
an encrypted database is di erent from the unencrypted one. This may cause
certain variation in the physical data access pattern, although the query exe-
cution procedure is the same. In Q3 and Q20, the performance significantly
improved because the index scan is extensively executed in these queries. The
time spent on allocating memory space is alleviated with a larger database size.
The performance on Q13 was constantly high over 100MB and 1GB databases.
Our investigation shows that it is due to the implementation issue described
in Section 7.4.3 where the string-type data are additionally bu ered for ease of
our implementation. In Q13, the query involves an operation to scan through
a large amount of string-type data which results in high performance penalty.
This can be alleviated with a more careful modification of SQLite. The SMC
seed bu er miss rate is kept constantly ranging from 11% to 30%. This shows
that the 32kB seed bu er is applicable for a reasonable performance.
Table 8.8: SMC seed bu er miss rate of the nine queries evaluated in TPC-H
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q6 Q8 Q13 Q16 Q20 Q22
100MB database 15% 24% 20% 21% 23% 28% 11% 21% 15%
1GB database 21% 27% 19% 20% 24% 20% 30% 25% 19%
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(b) 1GB database
Figure 8.18: Performance evaluation of the nine queries in TPC-H on the FPGA
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8.2.5 Resource Utilization
We evaluated the resource usage of our implemented system. Table 8.9 com-
pares the resource utilization of our implemented secure processor with the
original OpenRISC. The resource usage of the modified components in Open-
RISC and the additional modules are listed. The encryption engine, encryption
controller and shift module were duplicated for the separate secure data load
and store paths. The data cache controller was modified and cache line encryp-
tion engines were used. It can be seen that our implementation required 3⇥
more resources than the original OpenRISC implementation. However, 87% of
these extra resources was incurred by the encryption engines. This overhead is
mainly due to the extreme simplicity of OpenRISC where the AES encryption
engine is itself larger than the processor core. We believe that further opti-
mization (e.g. resource sharing) can reduce the resource consumption caused
by the AES encryption engines. Overall, the entire system consumes less than
24% of the available FPGA resources on the DE2i-150 board.
8.3 Storage Overhead
Our database encryption technique does not consume much extra storage be-
cause the attribute encryption often preserves the size of the attribute data.
The only exception is due to the compression technique in SQLite. In SQLite,
integer values are not stored in a fixed-size data container but varies from 1 to
4 bytes to save space. For example, an integer value of “229” is stored in two
bytes while the value of “2298336” is stored in three bytes. However, our ob-
servation is that this compression discloses the range of the integer value from
its storage size. We therefore disabled this feature and stored every integer
value in four bytes. Disabling this compression feature introduced 1% storage
overhead.
Most of the storage overhead comes from the index protection because the
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Table 8.9: Total resource utilization of the overall system. The displayed number
is in the format of (CypherDB/Baseline). # denotes that the value is the same
in CypherDB and baseline implementation. * denotes that the value is the total
resource consumption on the load and store execution path.
Logic Cells Dedicated Registers BRAM
Encryption Module* 11558 / 0 469 / 0 0 / 0
- AES Engine* 9912 / 0 261 / 0 0 / 0
- Encryption Controller* 546 / 0 60 / 0 0 / 0
- Shift Module* 1008 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0
LSU 388 / 162 0 / 0 0 / 0
Instruction Decoder 326 / 243 0 / 0 0 / 0
CPU core (others) 3595 / 3477 103 / 155 2 / 2
D-Cache 10026 / 598 356 / 113 111 / 69
- AES Engine ⇥ 2 8991 / 0 160 / 0 0 / 0
- Cache Controller 380 / 219 15 / 12 0 / 0
- Cache RAM 240 / 219 76 / 84 64 / 64
- Cache TAG 60 / 53 13 / 17 5 / 5
- Seed Bu er RAM 150 / 0 77 / 0 32 / 0
- Seed Bu er TAG 47 / 0 14 / 0 10 / 0
SeedInitMem Core 77 / 0 0 / 0 0 / 0
I-Cache# 323 39 69
SD Card Controller# 3079 685 2
SDRAM Controller# 3244 706 6
UART# 676 74 2
JTAG# 780 145 0
Others 1369 / 1216 123 / 167 4 / 4
Total 35441 / 13798 2700 / 2084 196 / 154
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indices are encrypted in OPE and appended to each record. A lengthened
record also consumes extra database pages to store, which in turn introduces
more database page headers which consumes additional storage. It consumes
28% storage overhead in total.
The remaining storage overhead comes from the record counter. The size
of this record counter depends on the total number of records (not the size) in
the database and the size of the record counter. Assume the record counter is
of the size of 4 bytes, which is large enough to avoid wrapping around. The
extra storage consumed is only 3.3% in a TPC-H dataset.
Therefore, the storage overhead caused by our database encryption tech-
nique can be at best 4% (indices are not encrypted) or at worst introduce 31%
additional storage overhead (indices are encrypted with OPE).
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Securing DBaaS
Security remains one of the biggest obstacles toward the adoption of cloud
database services. Data confidentiality can be protected by encryption. How-
ever, the recent security solutions store the decryption key in a breakable cloud
server and disclose the content of the data after decryption. Recent security
breaches have demonstrated that a strong security model is needed in Cloud
Computing. Particularly, the decryption key and the decrypted data have to
be properly protected against any honest-but-curious administrator.
To be applicable in a practical cloud environment, the protection mech-
anism should address two important and challenging aspects: security and
performance. In terms of security, the protection of the decryption key and
the decrypted data has to be strictly enforced. In other words, the decryp-
tion key should never be disclosed and the data should always be protected
by encryption, even during query processing. In terms of performance, the
protection mechanism should introduce minimal overhead in relation to the
overall query execution time. Enforcing a high security protection mechanism
with high performance is a challenging design problem.
We have developed a system architecture CypherDB to secure database
processing in the cloud with high performance. The key idea is to keep the
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decryption key stored inside the processor chip without disclosing it in any cir-
cumstance and develop a protection mechanism with the use of this undisclosed
key. Although keeping the decryption key inside the processor chip is in line
with other proposals, a distinctive feature of our research is that our protec-
tion mechanism can work tightly with the database application to reduce the
encryption overhead. Besides, our protection mechanism is designed to be ap-
plicable in a cloud computing environment where the encrypted data can move
dynamically among servers for parallel processing. In summary, CypherDB ar-
chitecture addresses four essential issues in securing a cloud database service:
security, performance, cost and deployment in the cloud.
The security of CypherDB is strictly enforced by not disclosing the de-
cryption key and encrypting any sensitive data in o -chip memory. Based
on the assumption that micro-probing on the processor chip is infeasible in
a cloud computing environment, the decryption key of the database owner
can be securely delivered to the secure processor chip in the cloud through a
key encapsulation mechanism and processor attestation. The database data,
query result and any intermediate data are always encrypted in o -chip mem-
ory through our novel look-ahead encryption scheme and cache line encryption.
CypherDB also employs di erent encryption keys for di erent data and vari-
ous protection purposes. This further enhances the security by not overusing
the encryption key.
The design of the look-ahead encryption scheme and cache line encryption
are also motivated by their performance impact. Both designs aim to hide the
encryption latency from program execution or o -chip memory access as much
as possible. In the implementation, these two protection mechanisms are also
highly optimized by a careful design of an automatic shift module and a bu er
to store the encryption seed. Their performance impact is extensively studied
and verified through simulation and execution on hardware. The experiment
of running TPC-H query workloads on SQLite demonstrates 10 percent and
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14 percent performance overhead on average, in simulation and execution on
a FPGA, respectively. This result proves that our CypherDB architecture can
secure the database processing with high performance.
Our design is cost-e ective. Our implementation shows that the resource
consumption (excluding the AES encryption engines) is only 18 percent more
than the baseline architecture.1 Although four AES encryption engines are cur-
rently used in our implementation which consumes 80 percent extra resources,
this can be optimized in our future work which is discussed in Section 9.3. The
modification of SQLite to support our look-ahead encryption scheme is also
minimal which only incurs 208 LOCs while the attribute seed management
software consists of 234 LOCs. This shows that our design uses up minimal
resources and is able to achieve high performance.
CypherDB is highly applicable in Cloud Computing. In the first place, our
look-ahead encryption scheme encrypts the database at a logical level. The
encrypted database can thus be partitioned into records and dynamically allo-
cated in the cloud servers for parallel processing. Secondly, the key encapsu-
lation mechanism allows the database encryption key to be stored in multiple
secure processors, which enables resource pooling in a cluster of processing
nodes with CypherDB secure processors. Rapid elasticity and multi-tenancy
are also possible because the database encryption key is not bound to a par-
ticular secure processor. The number of secure processors allocated for secure
query processing is also on-demand.
9.2 Limitations
CypherDB architecture is not without its limitations. Perhaps one major lim-
itation of CypherDB is that it is not entirely self-contained. It relies on other
security systems to enforce the database protection. For example, it relies on
some secure boot technology and run-time execution validator to protect the
1The baseline architecture here means the unmodified OpenRISC project.
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integrity of the DBMS. It also takes advantage of some hardware-assisted iso-
lated execution solutions for memory allocation. The security of the CypherDB
system is therefore dependent on the security of other employed systems. This
complication is due to the fact that the decryption key, though never undis-
closed, is still used to decrypt the data at the server side. Therefore, multiple
protection mechanisms are needed to protect the use of this encryption key
and the decrypted data in the system. Though complicated, our study shows
that it has a tremendous performance advantage over homomorphic encryp-
tion. CypherDB is thus a practical solution, yet it requires a collaboration of
other techniques for security.
Another limitation is that it requires modification of the application code.
Our experience shows that the actual modification can be minimal but has to
be careful. The modification is just to issue the l.seed instruction at the right
place with the correct seed value and replace normal load/store instructions
with secure load/store instructions. Identifying an ideal place to issue or re-
place these instructions requires careful observation and investigation. Issuing
the l.seed instruction too close to the actual data access instruction cannot hide
much latencies using the look-ahead encryption scheme. Fortunately, the ap-
plication program is not bound to a particular database owner. The database
application program can serve multiple databases from di erent users so that
the modification only needs to be performed once by the database software
vendor.
The data in the allocated SMC cannot be swapped to/from the hard disk
in our current prototype poses another limitation. The reason is that the cache
line in the SMC is encrypted with its physical address. Swapping in and out
another cache line reuses the same physical address, which may potentially
cause “two-time-pad” attack. Fortunately, recent computer systems have a
large memory for SMC allocation and the volatile memory is cheap. Allocating
a large SMC in main memory without swapping in/from the hard disk can
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be made possible. If swapping is unavoidable, a potential solution to this is
to re-encrypt the cache line (or a memory page) with AES in normal mode
(without the encryption seed). However, this requires re-encryption which may
potentially cause certain performance overhead.
9.3 Future Research
9.3.1 Multi-core Architecture
The research described in this thesis can be extended in several directions. One
of the most challenging directions is to extend the current work to multi-core
systems. A simple approach is to replace the core in a multi-core system with
our proposed secure processor core so that each core can support encrypted
data processing. This however leads to ine cient use of the encryption engine
and large resource consumption.
There are better strategies to implement CypherDB architecture on multi-
core systems. For example, every core can have its own encryption module for
look-ahead encryption. However, this requires synchronization among cores
because the encrypted data may be loaded into a core without a proper en-
cryption pad. It is also expensive to implement. On the other hand, a single
encryption module can be shared by all the cores so that synchronization is
easier to perform. However, resource contention may arise in this approach.
To process the query, one can assign a single core to a single query execution
so that each core serves one tenant at a time. This is simpler to implement
because no synchronization of the encryption pad is needed across multiple
cores. Nevertheless, this does not achieve high performance. On the contrary,
multiple cores can be used to serve the secure query execution for a single
tenant. To achieve this, future work on exploring methodology of encryption
pad synchronization is needed. Extending the CypherDB architecture to a
multi-core system is a challenging and interesting research area.
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9.3.2 Target Application
Another interesting direction is to extend the CypherDB architecture to a
column-oriented database. A column-oriented database serializes the column
value together where the column can match multiple rows. This poses great
demand on encryption pad generation. On the positive side, AES encryption
is highly pipelined so that the encryption pad can be generated with high
throughput. However, this may require sophisticated mapping between the
encryption pad and the encrypted data being loaded. There is a great potential
to extend the CypherDB architecture to a column-oriented database but still
requires careful design and investigation.
We envision that the CypherDB architecture may not be limited to database
applications. In fact, other data management applications also require a cer-
tain form of data model and data access function where our look-ahead encryp-
tion scheme can be applied. The potential challenge is the choice of attribute
seed. SQL databases have a well-defined data model that can easily make use
of the logical schema to formulate the attribute seed. This also potentially can
be used in documents like XML to support NoSQL cloud applications. The
trick is how to encrypt the data in di erent granularity using the AES-CTR
and AES-OFB. Heavily using AES-CTR will introduce too many unique en-
cryption seeds to be managed while using AES-OFB can potentially degrade
the performance because shifting the encryption for AES-OFB is costly. This
entails interesting future work of extending the current hardware architecture
to other applications and there is the possibility of modification and optimiza-
tion of the current architecture. Applying our proposed encryption scheme to
other data processing application is thus highly possible in our future research.
9.3.3 Compiler Support
With the insight from the limitation of CypherDB, one future direction is to
provide the CypherDB architecture with intelligent compiler support. This
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is an interesting topic to investigate how an intelligent compiler can support
the proposed look-ahead encryption. In our experience, the insertion of the
l.seed/l.shi f t/l.sload/l.sstore instructions are closely related to the data model
and how the software accesses the data in accordance with the data model. It
is hard to rely on the compiler completely but the compiler may be able to
assist the programmers to locate the right positions.
For example, the relational data model in our work, according to our in-
vestigation, can have a unique seed in the format of (databaseID, tableID,
ColumnID, rowID, cntr) for each attribute datum. First, a formal language
can be invented to describe the relation between the encryption seed and the
data. This formal language is to be parsed and interpreted by the compiler.
After that, the programmers are required to annotate the variables in software
which are to be used as the encryption seed. The compiler can then interac-
tively analyze the performance implication of the look-ahead encryption and
suggest the best positions to insert those instructions in order to yield better
overall performance. With proper annotation in the database application pro-
gram, the compiler may be able to automatically provide an optimal solution
to implement the look-ahead encryption.
9.3.4 Context Switching
Context switching happens frequently in modern computers which support
multi-tasking and interrupts. It is however expensive because it requires saving
the state of the processor (register values) into the stack so that the current
state can be recovered later.
This is especially expensive in our proposed architecture because all the
internal states of the processor have to be stored in the stack and stored in the
SMC, including the states of the encryption module like encryption pad, shift
register and the control states. In normal processors, only register values have
to be stored. Since the process being switched in may consist of malicious code
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that intends to read the data in the cache, the sensitive data residing in on-chip
cache is also subject to attack upon context switching. Thus, the cache line
with S_bit asserted needs to be evicted under our architecture. Writing back
these cache lines requires further encryptions which causes large performance
overhead upon every context switch.
There are several potential solutions to reduce the cost of context switching.
A simple approach is to lock the cache lines with S_bit asserted during a
context switch. By locking the cache lines containing sensitive data, a hardware
circuit can forbid any data access (including load and store operation) to those
locked cache lines. It can also prevent these cache lines from being evicted from
the processor. By abandoning the cache lines with S_bit asserted, the system
can ensure the sensitive data cannot be leaked but it virtually decreases the
cache size to be used by the process being switched in. A better approach is
to have dynamic cache line locking, which allows the cache lines with S_bit
asserted to be evicted from the processor with encryption on-demand (i.e. the
cache lines do not need to be evicted immediately upon a context switch).
Upon a context switch, all sensitive cache lines are locked. If the incoming
process consumes very little data cache, most of the sensitive cache lines do
not need to be evicted, thus reducing the penalty. However, if the incoming
process unfortunately requires a large data cache, the sensitive cache lines have
to be evicted with encryption on demand. It makes the performance penalty
dependence of the data cache usage of the process being switched in. To reduce
the penalty, another interesting approach is to maximize the opportunity of
encryption pad pre-computation so as to hide the cache line encryption latency
as much as possible. This can potentially be achieved by bookkeeping the
TAG and count_val of the sensitive cache line on-chip so that the encryption
pad can be pre-computed once the e ective address of the next load/store
operation is calculated. More aggressively, all encryption pads of the sensitive
cache lines can be pre-computed and stored on-chip but it consumes a lot of
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on-chip storage. Alternatively, predictively pre-computing the encryption pad
can serve as a less aggressive approach.
Context switching has an impact on encryption key management as well.
There are mainly two scenarios: 1) The process/interrupt handler being switched
in is not a secure execution. 2) the process/interrupt handler being switched
in is a secure execution. If the incoming process does not involve an encryp-
tion key, the key can be stored in the on-chip register without any changes.
Since the encryption key cannot be read, the incoming process cannot read or
know the encryption key. However, if the incoming process involves another
encryption key, the original encryption key has to be stored somewhere so that
the on-chip register can be used to store the new encryption key. This can be
solved in two approaches. First, a larger on-chip memory can be used to store
a multiple but fixed number of encryption keys inside the processor. Multi-
ple encryption keys can thus be multiplexed to be used while all of them are
forbidden to be read or stored. This solution however is not scalable for multi-
tenancy. Another approach is to allow the encryption key to be encrypted with
key encapsulation (i.e. Enc(Kdb)) before storing it back to the main memory.
Since the encryption key is protected by key encapsulation (i.e. encrypting
the key with asymmetric key encryption using the processor public key), the
encryption key is still protected even if it is now stored in main memory. But
the drawback of this approach is the excessive overhead on encrypting the en-
cryption key with asymmetric key encryption. Encryption key management
and performance overhead caused by context switching is important to make
our proposed architecture compatible with modern processor’s standards.
9.3.5 Code Injection Attack Protection
The idea of code injection attack is to redirect the original program execution to
run a piece of malicious code so as to perform various active attacks. Common
code injection attacks such as bu er overflow attack and SQL injection attack
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has been the most prevalent attacks in the past few decades. Although we do
not consider code injection attacks in this thesis (only passive attack on the
confidentiality of data is considered in our work), we discuss a few techniques
that can be used in conjunction with our CypherDB architecture.
In our proposed architecture, we can prevent an adversary from getting
the encryption keys (the critical secret) because these keys never leave the
processor. This allows a strong security protection of the confidentiality of
data. It however cannot forbid an adversary to manipulate the secure processor
to indirectly learn the original value of the encrypted data without getting the
encryption key. For example, an adversary can perform a code injection attack
so that the malicious program can issue the l.sload instruction to load and
decrypt the data and then issue the l.store instruction to store the data back to
the memory without further encryption. This will then violate the protection
mechanism of the proposed solution. By having such run-time attack, an
adversary can decrypt the data one by one.
To tackle this problem, we believe that there are several proposed solutions
that can be leveraged to our proposed architecture to thwart code injection
attacks. First, a run-time validator [34] can be used to ensure that the original
trusted program is running but not any untrusted program (i.e. code-injection
attack). The idea of this protection mechanism is to associate each instruction
with a signed hash value so that each instruction (or a batch of instructions)
being executed has a signature identifying that it is an authorized instruction.
Because malicious code being injected does not contain a valid signature, it
provides a tamper-resistant mechanism to prevent code injection attack. An-
other tamper-resistant approach is to restrict the memory page access with the
techniques proposed in Iso-X [27] or Bastion [33]. These approaches share the
same technique that makes use of TLB to restrict the access to a particular
running application process. Bastion [33] uses a trusted software module to
handle the virtual-to-physical address page table. Iso-X [27] uses a hardware-
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protected memory compartment table and a bit vector to store the hardware
usage profile of the secure process. Interestingly, these techniques can poten-
tially be leveraged into our proposed architecture. For example, the encryption
key can be hashed to create a signature. This signature acts as an index to
the corresponding encryption key and is stored in the page table (in Bastion
architecture) or memory compartment table (in Iso-X architecture). Having
the encryption keys bounded to some dedicated memory pages, code injection
attack is thus made di cult since the malicious code has to be injected/stored
in the right memory pages. It is interesting to incorporate these techniques
into our proposed architecture for our future research.
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Appendix A
CypherDB ISA Extension on
OpenRISC Architecture
start_cypherdb_query
Format:
start_cypherdb_query rA, rB
Description: Start the secure query execution by setting up the SMC, gener-
ating the SMC encryption key and initialize the encryption seeds in SeedMem.
The content of general-purpose rA and rB are moved to security registers of
SMC starting address and ending address respectively. A random number gen-
erated from on-chip random number generator is moved to the key register of
SMC encryption key.
Implementation:
SR[SMC_start]  rA
SR[SMC_end]  rB
KeyReg[SMC]  random number from on-chip random number generator
Initialize the SeedMem
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end_cypherdb_query
Format:
end_cypherdb_query
Description: End the secure query execution by zeroizing the contents of
start and end address of SMC in security registers, and the SMC encryption
key stored in key register.
Implementation:
SR[SMC_start]  Zero
SR[SMC_end]  Zero
KeyReg[SMC]  Zero
l.seed
Format:
l.seed rA, rB, K
Description: Sign-extending eight most significant bits of the immediate
value and then logically ORed with the contents of general-purpose register rA.
The result defined the seed register into where the contents of general-purpose
rB are moved.
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Implementation:
SeedReg[exts(K[10:2]) OR rA]  rB
l.shift
Format:
l.shift rA, rB, K
Description: The eight most significant bits of the immediate value is sign-
extended before it is logically ORed with the contents of general-purpose rA
and rB. The result is moved to the shift register.
Implementation:
ShiftReg  rA OR rB OR exts(K[10:2])
l.sload
Format:
Load Byte: l.slbz rD, K(rA) l.slbs rD, K(rA)
Load Half Word: l.slhz rD, K(rA) l.slhs rD, K(rA)
Load Word: l.slwz rD, K(rA) l.slws rD, K(rA)
Description: The format of all secure load instructions (load byte <l.slb>,
load half word <l.slh> and load word <l.slw>) is the same as the normal load
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instructions (l.lb, l.lh and l.lw) except the opcodes are di erent for di erenti-
ation. The implementation of l.sload instruction is also similar to normal load
instruction in various granularity except an additional XORed with the encryp-
tion pad. In brief, the o set (immediate value) is sign-extended and added to
the contents of general-purpose register rA. The sum represents an e ective
address. The bytes (in di erent granularities) in memory addressed by EA are
XORed with the corresponding bytes of the encryption pad for decryption, of
which the result is loaded into the low-order bits (in di erent granularities) of
general-purpose register rD. High-order bits (if any) of general-purpose regis-
ter rD are replaced with zero.
Implementation:
Load Byte: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
rD[7:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-7] OR (EA)[7:0]
rD[31:8]  0
Load Half Word: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
rD[15:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-15] OR (EA)[15:0]
rD[31:16]  0
Load Word: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
rD[31:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-31] OR (EA)[31:0]
l.sstore
Format:
Store Byte: l.ssb K(rA), rB
Store Half Word: l.ssh rD, K(rA)
Store Word: l.ssw rD, K(rA)
Description: The format of all secure store instructions (store byte <l.ssb>,
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store half word <l.ssh> and store word <l.sw>) is the same as the normal
store instructions (l.sb, l.sh and l.sw) except the opcodes are di erent for
di erentiation. The implementation of l.sstore instruction is similar to normal
store instruction in various granularity except an additional XORed with the
encryption pad. In brief, the o set (immediate value) is sign-extended and
added to the contents of general-purpose register rA. The sum represents an
e ective address. The lower-order bytes (in di erent granularities) of general-
purpose rB are XORed with the corresponding bytes of the encryption pad for
encryption before storing the result to memory location addressed by EA.
Implementation:
Store Byte: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
(EA)[7:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-7] OR rB[7:0]
Store Half Word: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
(EA)[15:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-15] OR rB[15:0]
Store Word: EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
(EA)[31:0]  Enc_Pad[Y:Y-31] OR rB[31:0]
set_sr
Format:
set_sr rD, rA, K
Description: Sign-extending the immediate value and then logically ORed
with the contents of general-purpose register rD. The result defined the security
register into where the contents of general-purpose rA are moved.
Implementation:
SR(rD OR exts(K))  rA
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load_encKey
Format:
load_encKey rD, rA, rB, K
Description: The o set (immediate value) is sign-extended and added to the
contents of general-purpose register rA. The sum represents an e ective ad-
dress. The contents of general-purpose register rB represents the total number
of bytes that are used in this instruction. Thus, EA and the content of rB spec-
ifies the memory space of the data to be used. The bytes in memory addressed
by EA are fetched and decrypted using the processor private key before stor-
ing the result into the key register defined by the contents of general-purpose
register rD.
Implementation:
EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
KeyReg(rD)  ESK((EA)[rB:0])
switch_encKey
Format:
switch_encKey rA, K
Description: The immediate value is sign-extended before it is logically ORed
with the contents of general-purpose rA. The result specifies the target key
register, of which its contents is moved to the data path key register to switch
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the encryption key used along the same data path.
Implementation:
DataPathKey  KeyReg(rA OR exts(K))
verify_encKey
Format:
verify_encKey rA, rB, K
Description: The o set (immediate value) is sign-extended and added to the
contents of general-purpose register rA. The sum represents an e ective ad-
dress. The contents of general-purpose register rB represents the total number
of bytes that are used in this instruction. Thus, EA and the content of rB
specifies the memory space of the data to be used. The data within this mem-
ory space is fetched and verified using a verification function. The verification
result is stored in a security register which indicates the status of the encryp-
tion key verification.
Implementation:
EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
SR(Verify_encKey)  Verify((EA)[rB:0]))
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sign_cert
Format:
sign_cert rD, rA, rB, K
Description: The o set (immediate value) is sign-extended and added to the
contents of general-purpose register rA. The sum represents an e ective ad-
dress. The contents of general-purpose register rB represents the total number
of bytes that are used in this instruction. Thus, EA and the content of rB
specifies the memory space of the data to be used. The bytes in memory ad-
dressed by EA are fetched and encrypted using the processor private key. The
result is a signed certificate and is stored into a security register.
Implementation:
EA  exts(K) + rA[31:0]
SR(CPU_Cert)  ESK((EA)[rB:0])
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